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The idea that humans could, at some point, develop machines that actually \"think\" for themselves and act autonomously has been embedded in their literature and culture since the beginning of civilization. But these ideas were generally thought to be religious expressions -- what one scholar describes as an effort to forge their own Gods -- or pure science fiction. One vision was uncritically Utopian. Intelligent machines, this account goes, would transform and enlighten society by performing the mundane, mind-numbing work that keeps humans from pursuing higher intellectual, spiritual, and artistic callings. The introduction of highly sophisticated autonomous machines may be literally around the corner. How the law chooses to treat machines without principals will be the central legal question that accompanies the introduction of truly autonomous machines, and at some point, the law will need to have an answer to that question.

In his 2013 Colston Warne Lecture, Georgetown Law Professor David C. Vladeck reflects on his recent four-year tenure as the Director of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection and discusses what he believes will be the economic downturn's most enduring legacy—the dilemmas that have been spawned by the pervasive and intractable debt that many US consumers are bearing.

This Symposium was convened to assess how, in this new age of environmental law, scholars, advocates, policy makers, journalists, and other interested members of the public can gain access to and harness information about the environment. The author's modest role is to provide an overview of federal right-to-know laws, including the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and to ask whether these statutes ensure that environmental information is made available to the public in a timely and dependable way. First, right-to-know laws should place an affirmative duty on the government to make environmental information available to the public. Second, right-to-know laws should grapple with the crosscutting problem of confidential business information, which is the most frequently invoked justification for denying public access to environmental data. FOIA establishes a presumption of open access to all records in the hands of the federal government.

Kessler and Vladeck highlight what they believe are the two most problematic aspects of the FDA's pro-preemption position that do not stand out in more comprehensive treatments of the issue. The first point is that the FDA's pro-preemption arguments are based on a reading of the FDCA that understates the ability of drug manufacturers to change labeling unilaterally to respond to newly discovered risks, or to seek labeling changes from the FDA. While, the second concern is that the FDA's pro-preemption arguments are based on unrealistic assessment of the agency's practical ability--once it has approved the marketing of a drug--to detect unforeseen adverse effects of the drug and to take prompt and effective remedial action.

In his 2013 Colston Warne Lecture, Georgetown Law Professor David C. Vladeck reflects on his recent four‐year tenure as the Director of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection and discusses what he believes will be the economic downturn's most enduring legacy—the dilemmas that have been spawned by the pervasive and intractable debt that many US consumers are bearing.

The author examines the recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Pearson v. Shalala, which struck down on First Amendment grounds the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) regulatory scheme for approving health claims for dietary supplements. In its recent ruling, the Pearson court rejected the FDA's view that health claims that cannot be proved as either true or false pose a serious risk to consumers. Although the court recognized that some health claims will mislead consumers, it reasoned that the FDA's regulations are nonetheless impermissibly restrictive because they do not allow manufacturers to make health claims accompanied by clarifying disclosures when significant scientific agreement is lacking. The court suggested that disclaimers referring to the absence of FDA approval, or the inconclusive nature of the scientific evidence, might be sufficient to guard against consumer deception. The author explains why the reasoning of Pearson misconceives basic First Amendment commercial speech principles and places the public at risk. Congress enacted the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act to ensure that consumers would no longer be subjected to unreliable and unverifiable health claims for dietary supplements. Pearson thwarts that purpose. The disclaimers envisioned by the court will simply underscore the uncertainty about the product's utility. Accordingly, Pearson relegates consumers to a marketplace that will be rife with unproven and unreliable health claims and thus poses a real threat to the health of consumers.

THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT THE UNITED STATES NEEDS A STRONG REGULATORY SYSTEM TO PREVENT UNNECESSARY PERSONAL INJURIES. IN ADDITION, BECAUSE ANY REGULATORY SYSTEM IS IMPERFECT AND CANNOT ADEQUATELY DISCIPLINE THE MARKETPLACE, THE TORT SYSTEM MUST PROVIDE REMEDIES FOR THOSE WHO ARE INJURED. BOTH THE TORT AND REGULATORY SYSTEMS DEAL WITH RISK ALLOCATION, AND RISK MUST BE ANALYZED IN TERMS OF CHOICE. THE RISK THAT REQUIRES REGULATION IS DIFFERENT FROM THE RISK ONE VOLUNTARILY ASSUMES. THEREFORE, GOVERNMENT MUST REGULATE TO PROTECT CITIZENS FROM THOSE RISKS OVER WHICH THEY HAVE NO CONTROL.

The ongoing effort by the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules to promulgate a rule to forbid circuit courts from prohibiting the citation of unpublished opinions has unleashed a charged debate over the publication practices of our federal courts of appeals. Embedded in the controversy over publication practices is a problem of far greater dimension: the workload burdens on the federal appellate courts have grown to the point where something must be done or else the published opinion will become a statistical anomaly. That result would serve no one. Nonetheless, the legal establishment focuses on the publication question and leaves unattended the more threatening problem of caseload overload. Federal courts and civil procedure courses seldom make mention of the two track system of appellate justice in our federal courts, and most academics are barely aware (if that) that this problem exists. And Congress, almost predictably, has responded by failing to provide additional resources to the judiciary, notwithstanding the clear resource deficit facing the courts. Instead, Congress continues blindly to place new burdens on the courts.139 Perhaps it is the duty of all symposia participants to plant the seeds of a return invitation. But we believe that until solutions are found for the resource burdens plaguing our appellate courts, debates over publication practices will persist and become even more intense. It is time to address the root cause of the problem and not just one symptom.