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Say an AI program someday passes a Turing test, because it can converse in a way indistinguishable from a human. And say that its developers can then teach it to converse—and even present an extended persuasive argument—in a way indistinguishable from the sort of human we call a “lawyer.” The program could thus become an AI briefwriter, capable of regularly winning brief-writing competitions against human lawyers. Once that happens (if it ever happens), this Essay argues, the same technology can be used to create AI judges, judges that we should accept as no less reliable (and more cost-effective) than human judges. If the software can create persuasive opinions, capable of regularly winning opinion-writing competitions against human judges—and if it can be adequately protected against hacking and similar attacks—we should in principle accept it as a judge, even if the opinions do not stem from human judgment.

The Religion Clauses are the part of the Bill of Rights with which Justice O'Connor most engaged in her opinions. Indeed, it seems to me that she viewed religious freedom and equality as a central feature of the American constitutional order; I expect she would have agreed with Justice Marshall's sentiment that \"our hospitality to religious diversity\" is \"one of this Nation's pillars of strength,\" and she tried to contribute to this hospitality and strength.

An injunction against libel, backed by the threat of prosecution for criminal contempt, is like a miniature criminal libel law-just for this defendant, and just for statements about this plaintiff. That is its virtue. That is its danger. And that is the key to identifying how the First Amendment and equitable principles should constrain such injunctions.

Sometimes the government compels people to pay money to organizations they oppose. A lawyer may be forced to fund a bar association, a college student forced to fund student group activities, a public employee forced to fund a labor union. Unsurprisingly, people often bristle at such compulsion. People don't like having their money taken, and knowing that it will be spent on causes they oppose seems to add insult to injury. But when is it unconstitutional? For over forty years, the Court has unanimously concluded that being required to pay money to a union, or to a state bar, is a serious burden on one's First Amendment rights. This burden, the Court has held, is generally unconstitutional when the money is used for most kinds of political advocacy. In 'Janus v. AFSCME', a majority of the Court went further and held that requiring public employees to pay union agency fees is categorically unconstitutional, even when the money is used for collective bargaining. Such public-sector collective bargaining, the majority held, is itself inherently political. And the government interests in mandating such payments don't suffice to justify such requirements. There was a strong dissent by four Justices, but as we discuss in Part I, we think the majority had the better argument on both of these points.

\"[T]he freedom . . . of the press\" specially protects the press as an industry, which is to say newspapers, television stations, and the like- so have argued some judges and scholars, such as the 'Citizens United v. FEC' dissenters and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Douglas. This argument is made in many contexts: election-related speech, libel law, the journalist's privilege, access to government property, and more. Some lower courts have indeed concluded that some First Amendment constitutional protections apply only to the institutional press, and not to book authors, political advertisers, writers of letters to the editor, professors who post material on their websites, or people who are interviewed by newspaper reporters.

Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) are going to be big—not just for gaming but for work, for social life, and for evaluating and buying real-world products. Like many big technological advances, they will in some ways challenge legal doctrine. In this Article, we will speculate about some of these upcoming challenges, asking: (1) How might the law treat \"street crimes\" in VR and AR—behavior such as disturbing the peace, indecent exposure, deliberately harmful visuals (such as strobe lighting used to provoke seizures in people with epilepsy), and \"virtual groping\"? Two key aspects of this, we will argue, are the Bangladesh problem (which will make criminal law very hard to practically enforce) and technologically enabled self-help (which will offer an attractive alternative protection to users, but also a further excuse for real-world police departments not to get involved). (2) How might the law handle tort lawsuits, by users against users, users against VR and AR environment operators, outsiders (such as copyright owners whose works are being copied by users) against users, and outsiders against the environment operators? (3) How might the law treat users' alteration of other users' avatars, or creation of their own avatars that borrow someone else's name and likeness? (4) How might privacy law deal with the likely pervasive storage of all the sensory information that VR and AR systems present to their users, and that they gather from the users in the course of presenting it? (5) How might these analyses reflect on broader debates even outside VR and AR, especially order without law and the speech—conduct distinction?

Tort law is often seen as a tool for protecting privacy. But tort law can also diminish privacy, by pressuring defendants to gather sensitive information about people, to install comprehensive surveillance, and to disclose information. And the pressure is growing, as technology makes surveillance and other information gathering more cost effective and thus more likely to be seen as part of defendants' duty to take \"reasonable care.\" Moreover, these tort law rules can increase government surveillance power, and not just surveillance by private entities. Among other things, the NSA PRISM story shows how easily a surveillance database in private hands can become a surveillance database in government hands. This Article aims to provide a legal map of how tort law can diminish privacy, and to discuss which legal institutions—juries, judges, or legislatures—should resolve the privacy-versus-safety questions that routinely arise within tort law.

I agree with Professors Post and Weinstein that a broad vision of democratic self-government is one important justification for free speech, though I wouldn't limit First Amendment protection to speech that is part of \"public discourse.\" But I think we should not dismiss the search-for-truth rationale-which is in practice similar to the marketplace-of-ideas rationale-as an additional important justification.

Over the years, many have argued that the Free Speech Clause strongly protects only speech that is on a matter of \"public concern\" or is part of \"public discourse.\" I will argue that such a limitation is unsound even if one focuses on democratic self-government as the chief free speech value. I will focus on responding to the arguments offered by Professors Robert Post and James Weinstein, who are probably today's leading exponents of the \"public discourse\" limitation. But I hope that what I say will also serve as a response to others who have made arguments similar to Post's and Weinstein's.

As vast social media platforms undertake more content policing, the U.S. government has unsurprisingly tried to urge them to police things the way it prefers. This is likely to continue and, indeed, expand. What First Amendment constraints are there on such government pressure? This essay offers some tentative thoughts: 1) Some court of appeals cases have drawn lines distinguishing permissible attempts by government to persuade intermediaries to remove their users’ or business partners’ materials from impermissible government coercion. 2) The Supreme Court’s employer free speech cases may also inform our understanding of what counts as subtle coercion. 3) Courts considering other constitutional rights, especially the Fourth Amendment, have concluded that even noncoercive government persuasion may sometimes constitute impermissible evasion of the constitutional mandate. 4) A recent appellate decision (which the Supreme Court vacated on procedural grounds) suggests a potential distinction between ad hoc and systematic attempts to persuade platforms to remove content, though whether that line is ultimately either sensible or administrable is an open question.