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Research suggests that belief in conspiracy theories (CT) stems from basic psychological mechanisms and is linked to other belief systems (e.g., religious beliefs). While previous research has extensively examined individual and contextual variables associated with CT beliefs, it has not yet investigated the role of culture. In the current research, we tested, based on a situated cultural cognition perspective, the extent to which culture predicts CT beliefs. Using Hofstede 's model of cultural values, three nation-level analyses of data from 25, 19, and 18 countries using different measures of CT beliefs (Study 1, N = 5323; Study 2a, N = 12,255; Study 2b, N = 30,994) revealed positive associations between masculinity, collectivism, and CT beliefs. A crosssectional study among U.S. citizens (Study 3, N = 350), using individual-level measures of Hofstede's values, replicated these findings. A meta-analysis of correlations across studies corroborated the presence of positive links between CT beliefs, collectivism, r = .31, 95% CI = [.15; .47], and masculinity, r = .39, 95% CI = [.18; .59]. Our results suggest that in addition to individual differences and contextual variables, cultural factors also play an important role in shaping CT beliefs.

This study investigates patterns of lay perception of economics, and in particular the place of conspiratorial thinking regarding the economic domain. We devised four types of accounts in the economic domain, over a range of questions regarding different aspects of the economy: the classical neo-liberal economic view (which we labeled Econ101), and the Conspiracy view (the destructive outcomes of economy are due to small and powerful groups who are manipulating the markets), to which we added the Government malfunction view (failures in the economy are due to the authorities), and the Bad Invisible Hand view (the invisible hand may go wrong, and the equilibrium reached by its doings may be undesirable). The last two views are the ones most strongly endorsed by our respondents, in the US, Israel and Switzerland. The pattern of inter-correlations between the four accounts, and that between each and the psycho-social variables we examined, exhibits two clusters, Econ101 vs. the other three views of economy. This corresponds to a general opposition between people who trust the neoliberal economic system, and those opposed to it. What sets economic conspiratorial thinking apart are its links with other conspirational beliefs and with paranormal beliefs.

Belief in conspiracy theories has often been associated with a biased perception of randomness, akin to a nothing-happens-by-accident heuristic. Indeed, a low prior for randomness (i.e., believing that randomness is a priori unlikely) could plausibly explain the tendency to believe that a planned deception lies behind many events, as well as the tendency to perceive meaningful information in scattered and irrelevant details; both of these tendencies are traits diagnostic of conspiracist ideation. In three studies, we investigated this hypothesis and failed to find the predicted association between low prior for randomness and conspiracist ideation, even when randomness was explicitly opposed to malevolent human intervention. Conspiracy believers' and nonbelievers' perceptions of randomness were not only indistinguishable from each other but also accurate compared with the normative view arising from the algorithmic information framework. Thus, the motto \"nothing happens by accident,\" taken at face value, does not explain belief in conspiracy theories.

The aim of this research is to identify what social and psychological variables may attract people to a social protest movement, mely the Yellow Vests (YVs) in France, which origited in October 2018. This alysis, albeit correlatiol, may nevertheless give important hints to identify in an exploratory way what causal factors could lead people (a) to become a sympathizer of the movement and (b) to become a member of that movement, and what psychosocial consequences would derive from (a) and (b). Notably, the role of conspiracy beliefs and anomie will be scrutinized because of their role in fostering non-normative political violence. In this purpose, we alyzed the results of a poll conducted on a representative sample of the French population (N = 1760). This survey explored a range of respondents’ attitudes towards social issues and towards the YVs movement. Our alyses showed that adherence to the YVs movement is mainly caused by socio-economic factors (such as educatiol level, economic capital) and belonging to political extremes (far left and even more far right), relying on and probably increasing distrust toward authorities and unconventiol beliefs (paranormal and conspiracist). Ultimately, adherence to the movement seems triggered by the objective factor of dependency on a car and endorsement of conspiracist beliefs; whereas, simple sympathy is related to a less irratiol form of accusation of authorities, low subjective economic capital, and pessimism toward the future. YVs also more often use social media and Youtube, but less often use media websites and newspapers as their first source of information.

Following the recent avian influenza and pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreaks, public trust in medical and political authorities is emerging as a new predictor of compliance with officially recommended protection measures. In a two-wave longitudinal survey of adults in French-speaking Switzerland, trust in medical organizations longitudinally predicted actual vaccination status 6 months later, during the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vaccination campaign. No other variables explained significant amounts of variance. Trust in medical organizations also predicted perceived efficacy of officially recommended protection measures (getting vaccinated, washing hands, wearing a mask, sneezing into the elbow), as did beliefs about health issues (perceived vulnerability to disease, threat perceptions). These findings show that in the case of emerging infectious diseases, actual behavior and perceived efficacy of protection measures may have different antecedents. Moreover, they suggest that public trust is a crucial determinant of vaccination behavior and underscore the practical importance of managing trust in disease prevention campaigns.

Objectives: To explore how perceived disease threat and trust in institutions relate to vaccination intent, perceived effectiveness of official recommendations, and to othering strategies. Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional survey of Swiss adults in July 2020. Outcome variables were vaccination intent, perceived effectiveness of official recommendations and othering strategies (labelling a given social group as responsible for the disease and distancing from it). Independent variables were perceived disease threat, trust in various institutions, perceived health-related measures, and sociodemographic variables. Linear and logistic regressions were performed. Results: The response rate was 20.2% (1518/7500). Perceived disease threat and trust in medical/scientific institutions were positively associated with vaccination intent and perceived effectiveness of official recommendations for coronavirus mitigation measures. Only disease threat was associated with a perception of effectiveness among othering strategies. Age and education levels were associated with vaccination intent. Conclusion: Reinforcing trust in medical/scientific institutions can help strengthen the perceived effectiveness of official recommendations and vaccination. It however does not prevent adherence to ineffective protecting measures such as othering strategies, where decreasing perceptions of epidemic threat appears to be more efficient.

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (that is, conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation) or amongst both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N = 104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, albeit small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (that is, those deprived of political control). Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control.Across 26 countries, Imhoff et al. find that conspiracy mentality is more prevalent at both ends of the political spectrum than the centre. This U-shaped pattern is accentuated for supporters of political parties not in government, particularly on the political right.

One of the most widespread and long-running conspiracy theories is about an alleged Jewish plot to undermine Christianity and dominate the world. The longevity, spread and impact of the Jewish conspiracy theory is breathtaking. The Jewish conspiracy theory illustrates an extreme point on three fundamental dimensions along which conspiracy theories can vary, namely stick, spread and action. Stickiness refers to the potential of a representation for belief. The chapter describes the process of transmission itself, before reviewing research on situational factors and features of conspiracy theory content that affect transmission. It aims to define transmission as the process of communicating about a conspiracy theory with other people. Conspiracy theories can also be broadcast via mass media or social media as when people debate the plausibility of conspiracy theories in online forums. Conspiracy theories are spread in two main communicative genres: storytelling and argumentation.