Catalogue Search | MBRL
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
{{itemTitle}}
58
result(s) for
"Wait, Andrew"
Sort by:
Sunk costs, entry and clustering
We examine how differences in firm sunk entry costs affect both entry order and the potential for clustering in a triopoly preemption game. If the cost asymmetry between the firms is sufficiently large, the firms always enter in the order from the lowest to highest cost, whereas if firms are relatively symmetric, it is possible that the second-highest cost firm enters first. There is never clustering of entry when there is any difference in cost between the two most productively efficient firms. Lastly, when the cost asymmetry between firms is large, the leader’s entry time in the triopoly is always earlier than it is in a duopoly.
Journal Article
Delegation of Decisions About Change in Organizations: The Roles of Competition, Trade, Uncertainty, and Scale
Using unique establishment-level data, we find that delegation of organizational change is more likely in workplaces that: face a competitive product market, export, have predictable demand, are part of a smaller overall organization, and have fewer workplaces in the firm producing the same output. Surprisingly, we find no significant relationship between import competition and the allocation of decision-making rights within a firm. Our results are robust to a range of specifications and to alternative measures of our key explanatory variables.
Journal Article
Ownership, Access, and Sequential Investment
We extend the property-rights framework to allow for a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto and for sequential investment. Parties investing first do so before contracting is feasible. It is possible, however, that parties investing second can share (at least some of) their investment costs. Along with this cost-sharing effect, the incentive to invest is affected by a strategic effect generated by sequential investment. Together these effects can overturn some of the predictions of the property-rights literature. For example, the most inclusive ownership structure might not be optimal, even if all investments are complementary. On développe le cadre d'analyse des droits de propriété en permettant une séparation des droits de propriété, d'accès et de veto, et l'investissement séquentiel. Les agents investissant d'abord le font avant que la contractualisation soit possible. Il est cependant possible pour les agents investissant en second lieu de partager (en partie tout au moins) leurs coûts d'investissement. En plus de cette possibilité de partage de coûts, l'incitation à investir est affecté par un effet stratégique engendré par l'investissement séquentiel. Ensembles ces deux effets peuvent entraîner le renversement de certaines prédictions dans la littérature sur les droits de propriété. Par exemple, la structure de propriété la plus inclusive peut ne pas être optimale, même si tous les investissements sont complémentaires.
Journal Article
Should I Stay or Should I Go? Participation and Decision-Making in Family Firms
We explore the implications of altruism in family firms for the allocation of decision-making rights. Our results suggest that centralization occurs in a broader range of circumstances in family than in nonfamily firms, consistent with empirical evidence. We show that an agent might remain in a decentralized family firm even though he prefers centralization, and that an agent might remain in a centralized family firm even when it does not do the type of work the agent prefers. We relate our findings to the relative performance of family versus nonfamily firms, and to problems of succession.
Journal Article
Tendering and bidding for access: a regulator's guide to auctions
Tenders and traditional auctions are increasingly being used in regulation; as a consequence it is essential regulators have an understanding of the basics of auction theory. There is no simple prescription for the design of an auction or tender that will fit all situations; moreover, the costs from inappropriate auction and tender design can be high For example, while a second-price sealed bid auction is efficient in the absence of collusion, if participants can collude then such auction formats can result in very low revenue. Low revenue can also result with a second-price auction when there are few bidders and no reserve price.
Journal Article
Hold-Up and Sequential Specific Investments
We explore the hold-up problem when parties can make investments simultaneously or sequentially. Sequencing of investments can allow some projects to proceed that would not be feasible with a simultaneous regime. However, a cost of sequencing is that it can disadvantage some parties, reducing their incentive to invest. The mere possibility of sequential investment can prevent trade from occurring; this can be interpreted as a new form of hold-up. If both parties prefer to invest second, as the number of potential investment periods is increased, the subgame-perfect equilibrium can switch between a prisoners' dilemma and a coordination game.
Journal Article