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Lying behind the recent Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 is the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters which has sparked international and national attention. The 2015 Act deals with many facets of counter terrorism legislation, but its two principal measures are singled out for analysis and critique in this paper. Thus, Part I of the Act seeks to interdict foreign terrorist fighters by preventing suspects from travelling and dealing decisively with those already in the UK who pose a risk. Part V of the Act implements the second, broader aspect, of legislative policy, reflecting the UN emphasis on 'Countering Violent Extremism', through the statutory elaboration and enforcement of the 'Prevent' element of the long-established Countering International Terrorism strategy, which aims to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism. These measures are explained in their policy contexts and set against criteria of effectiveness, personal freedom, and accountability.

Background to enactment of control orders in the United Kingdom - addressing anticipatory risk and \"neighbour terrorism\" - Prevention of Terrorism Act provides for control orders - derogating and non-derogating control orders - criminal prosecution - judicial review - review by Parliament and the executive - maintaining constitutionalism in the context of the control order regime - preferable to face up to societal needs for safety than to resort to instruments such as detention without trial to achieve the same ends - control orders should not be adopted as long-term solutions.

Background to the United Kingdom control order legislation for terrorism offences - overview of new scheme - Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM) as measures of prevention and investigation - TPIM mechanics - policy transfer to Australia - Council of Australian Governments Review of Counter-Terrorism Legislation - comparison of UK and Australian legislation.

Adopting a multi-disciplinary and comparative approach, this book focuses on the emerging and innovative aspects of attempts to target the accumulated assets of those engaged in criminal and terrorist activity, organized crime and corruption. It examines the ’follow-the-money’ approach and explores the nature of criminal, civil and regulatory responses used to attack the financial assets of those engaged in financial crime in order to deter and disrupt future criminal activity as well as terrorism networks. With contributions from leading international academics and practitioners in the fields of law, economics, financial management, criminology, sociology and political science, the book explores law and practice in countries with significant problems and experiences, revealing new insights into these dilemmas. It also discusses the impact of the ’follow-the-money’ approach on human rights while also assessing effectiveness. The book will appeal to academics and researchers of financial crime, organized crime and terrorism as well as practitioners in the police, prosecution, financial and taxation agencies, policy-makers and lawyers. 'Dirty Assets is a remarkable collection of scientific contributions, which follow the common thread of examining how criminal activities might be countered by putting a stop to illicit financial flows... In conclusion, the volume, which appears written with a clear view of its impact on future directions and developments in the area of criminal assets confiscation and recovery, achieves the goal of offering a brilliant overview of the most relevant measures implemented at both domestic and supranational level in order to interrupt the illicit financial flows that feed criminal and terrorist organisations, enabling them to carry out their criminal activities.' Costantino Grasso , University of East London, UK, Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology Colin King is Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Sussex. He is also Academic Fellow at the Honourable Society of the Inner Temple. Prior to joining Sussex, Colin lectured at the Universities of Manchester and Leeds, and was Director of the University of Leeds Innocence Project. He completed his PhD at the University of Limerick, Ireland in 2010. Clive Walker is Professor of Criminal Justice Studies at the School of Law, University of Leeds, where he has served as the Director of the Centre for Criminal Justice Studies (1987-2000) and as Head of School (2000-2005, 2010). He has written extensively on criminal justice issues with a special focus on terrorism issues and also miscarriages of justice, with many publications not only in the UK but also in several other jurisdictions, especially the USA, where he has been a visiting professor at George Washington and Stanford Universities. In 2003, he was a special adviser to the UK Parliamentary select committee which scrutinised what became the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, from which experience he published The Civil Contingencies Act 2004: Risk, Resilience and the Law in the United Kingdom (Oxford University Press, 2006). He has also given evidence to many other Parliamentary and official inquiries, not only in the UK but also in Australia, Canada, and the US. His latest book on terrorism is a comprehensive study of Terrorism and the Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) and was supported by an AHRC fellowship. His standing in the field of terrorism laws has resulted in his appointment by the Home Office as a special adviser.

The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Wagner Group have engendered debates in several Western countries about how to deal in policy, law and practice with hostile activities originating from states and their proxies. Are they to be treated as terrorists and thereby subjected to extraordinary criminalisation and policing and executive measures? Or should they be hobbled through the application of financial sanctions as well as national security measures? These questions will be asked in the context of the UK which has adopted both approaches but not in a consistent manner. It is found that the policy stance of the UK Government is generally not to treat states as the potential subjects of UK terrorism legislation. This policy stance might be labelled ‘non-ascription’. Arguments for and against are considered in each case.

The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Wagner Group have engendered debates in several Western countries about how to deal in policy, law and practice with hostile activities originating from states and their proxies. Are they to be treated as terrorists and thereby subjected to extraordinary criminalisation and policing and executive measures? Or should they be hobbled through the application of financial sanctions as well as national security measures? These questions will be asked in the context of the UK which has adopted both approaches but not in a consistent manner. It is found that the policy stance of the UK Government is generally not to treat states as the potential subjects of UK terrorism legislation. This policy stance might be labelled ‘non-ascription’. Arguments for and against are considered in each case.

Terrorism speech content presents multiple dangers for liberal democracies, including the mechanics of attacks, the fostering of motivation to become involved in terrorist incitements and the censoring process which can threaten cherished values or drain state resources. This article will explore these dangers in the contexts of three identified responses in the war of words with terrorism. First, attempts are made to impose criminal laws. However, the limited number of prosecutions suggests ineffectiveness, arising from practical problems of evidence-gathering and transnationality. Prosecutions also encounter principled (human rights) objections. The second, more prevalent and sustainable, approach involves administrative controls, as reflected in police Internet referral units and by private sector denunciation mechanisms. These interventions can handle a high volume of traffic. But within corporatist arrangements, we must question whose interests are being served and the fairness of the process. In an ideal speech situation, the fostering of convincing messages against terrorism would be a preferable approach. Paradoxically, a full debate about values may arise in this third approach through the advent of countering violent extremism (CVE) programmes. These programmes are viewed simplistically by some as repressive. However, CVE programmes could become a platform for the public debate of issues around violent extremism rather than its crude censure.

It was Robert Nozick who, distinguishing the classical liberal ‘night-watchman State’ which protected citizens against violence and enforced contracts on their behalf, conjured instead the ‘ultra-minimal State’1 in which the task of the State is confined to the monopolization of violence rather than the actual provision of security (unless paid for by citizens by choice). On the face of it, it seems that Western governments are increasingly keen to move towards this model of the ultra-minimal State and to allow even the provision of force to be assumed by private enterprise on a contractual model in which the rich or the desperate may choose to avail themselves of fortifications at the going rate while the rest take their chances in life. The ultra-minimal State is left with a residual steering2 policy role in which the parameters of contractual engagement for protection can be set. In short, it appears that nothing is sacrosanct in the onward march of the principles of neo-liberalism. Even the ultimate bastions of establishment—Her Majesty's armed forces—are not immune from processes of commodification and marketization that have previously been applied to core functions such as policing3 and imprisonment.4

After 9/11, international counter terrorism financing efforts have delivered measures under both a criminal justice model and a regulatory risks model. Questions therefore arise about the delivery of justice within these respective models, alongside doubts about their capacity to yield meaningful impacts from an 'all risks' platform rather than a targeted criminal suspect approach. Particular reference is made to informal value transfer systems, such as hawala, which have come under sustained suspicion. This article presents original insights from a fieldwork survey of UK counter terrorism legislation and practices in order to assess their intended and, to some extent, unintended consequences.