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We use variation in historical state centralization to examine the long-term impact of institutions on cultural norms. The Kuba Kingdom, established in Central Africa in the early 17th century by King Shyaam, had more developed state institutions than the other independent villages and chieftaincies in the region. It had an unwritten constitution, separation of political powers, a judicial system with courts and juries, a police force, a military, taxation, and significant public goods provision. Comparing individuals from the Kuba Kingdom to those from just outside the Kingdom, we find that centralized formal institutions are associated with weaker norms of rule following and a greater propensity to cheat for material gain. This finding is consistent with recent models where endogenous investments to inculcate values in children decline when there is an increase in the effectiveness of formal institutions that enforce socially desirable behavior. Consistent with such a mechanism, we find that Kuba parents believe it is less important to teach children values related to rule-following behaviors.

This paper investigates the trade-offs between local elites and state agents as tax collectors in low-capacity states. We study a randomized policy experiment assigning neighborhoods of a large Congolese city to property tax collection by city chiefs or state agents. Chief collection raised tax compliance by 3.2 percentage points, increasing revenue by 44 percent. Chiefs collected more bribes but did not undermine tax morale or trust in government. Results from a hybrid treatment arm in which state agents consulted with chiefs before collection suggest that chief collectors achieved higher compliance by using local information to more efficiently target households with high payment propensities, rather than by being more effective at persuading households to pay conditional on having visited them.

The emergence of large-scale cooperation during the Holocene remains a central problem in the evolutionary literature. One hypothesis points to culturally evolved beliefs in punishing, interventionist gods that facilitate the extension of cooperative behaviour toward geographically distant co-religionists. Furthermore, another hypothesis points to such mechanisms being constrained to the religious ingroup, possibly at the expense of religious outgroups. To test these hypotheses, we administered two behavioural experiments and a set of interviews to a sample of 2228 participants from 15 diverse populations. These populations included foragers, pastoralists, horticulturalists, and wage labourers, practicing Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism, but also forms of animism and ancestor worship. Using the Random Allocation Game (RAG) and the Dictator Game (DG) in which individuals allocated money between themselves, local and geographically distant co-religionists, and religious outgroups, we found that higher ratings of gods as monitoring and punishing predicted decreased local favouritism (RAGs) and increased resource-sharing with distant co-religionists (DGs). The effects of punishing and monitoring gods on outgroup allocations revealed between-site variability, suggesting that in the absence of intergroup hostility, moralizing gods may be implicated in cooperative behaviour toward outgroups. These results provide support for the hypothesis that beliefs in monitoring and punitive gods help expand the circle of sustainable social interaction, and open questions about the treatment of religious outgroups.

Few phenomena have had as profound or long-lasting consequences in human history as the emergence of large-scale centralized states in the place of smaller scale and more local societies. This study examines a fundamental, and yet unexplored, consequence of state formation: its genetic legacy. We studied the genetic impact of state centralization during the formation of the eminent precolonial Kuba Kingdom of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the 17th century. We analyzed genome-wide data from over 690 individuals sampled from 27 different ethnic groups from the Kasai Central Province of the DRC. By comparing genetic patterns in the present-day Kuba, whose ancestors were part of the Kuba Kingdom, with those in neighboring non-Kuba groups, we show that the Kuba today are more genetically diverse and more similar to other groups in the region than expected, consistent with the historical unification of distinct subgroups during state centralization. We also found evidence of genetic mixing dating to the time of the Kingdom at its most prominent. Using this unique dataset, we characterize the genetic history of the Kasai Central Province and describe the historic late wave of migrations into the region that contributed to a Bantu-like ancestry component found across large parts of Africa today. Taken together, we show the power of genetics to evidence events of sociopolitical importance and highlight how DNA can be used to better understand the behaviors of both people and institutions in the past.

Rwanda’s approach to delivering healthcare in a setting of post-conflict poverty offers lessons for other poor countries, say Paul Farmer and colleagues

Here, for the first time, is a collection of short speeches by the charismatic doctor and social activist Paul Farmer. One of the most passionate and influential voices for global health equity and social justice, Farmer encourages young people to tackle the greatest challenges of our times. Engaging, often humorous, and always inspiring, these speeches bring to light the brilliance and force of Farmer's vision in a single, accessible volume. A must-read for graduates, students, and everyone seeking to help bend the arc of history toward justice, To Repair the World: • Challenges readers to counter failures of imagination that keep billions of people without access to health care, safe drinking water, decent schools, and other basic human rights; • Champions the power of partnership against global poverty, climate change, and other pressing problems today; • Overturns common assumptions about health disparities around the globe by considering the large-scale social forces that determine who gets sick and who has access to health care; • Discusses how hope, solidarity, faith, and hardbitten analysis have animated Farmer's service to the poor in Haiti, Peru, Rwanda, Russia, and elsewhere; • Leaves the reader with an uplifting vision: that with creativity, passion, teamwork, and determination, the next generations can make the world a safer and more humane place.

The cholera epidemic in Haiti will be a year old in October and is far from under control. As cases spiked across the country during the summer rainy season, the ranks of cholera relief workers grew thin. Too few patients reach healthcare facilities with enough time to be sure that treatment -- simple rehydration in most cases -- can restore them to health. Access to clean water and to modern sanitation is dwindling. People must redouble existing efforts at cholera prevention and care, while simultaneously integrating vaccination into the ongoing response. Founded in the aftermath of the largest and most successful slave revolt in history, modern-day Haiti is marred by extreme poverty, political unrest, a high burden of disease, and weak infrastructure. Haiti's chronic afflictions were exacerbated when a magnitude 7.0 earthquake devastated its capital, Port-au-Prince, and the surrounding regions on Jan 12, 2010, killing an estimated 220,000 people and displacing some 1.3 million more.

The emergence of large-scale cooperation during the Holocene remains a central problem in the evolutionary literature. One hypothesis points to culturally evolved beliefs in punishing, interventionist gods that facilitate the extension of cooperative behaviour toward geographically distant coreligionists. Furthermore, another hypothesis points to such mechanisms being constrained to the religious ingroup, possibly at the expense of religious outgroups. To test these hypotheses, we administered two behavioural experiments and a set of interviews to a sample of 2228 participants from 15 diverse populations. These populations included foragers, pastoralists, horticulturalists, and wage labourers, practicing Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism, but also forms of animism and ancestor worship. Using the Random Allocation Game (RAG) and the Dictator Game (DG) in which individuals allocated money between themselves, local and geographically distant co-religionists, and religious outgroups, we found that higher ratings of gods as monitoring and punishing predicted decreased local favouritism (RAGs) and increased resource-sharing with distant co-religionists (DGs). The effects of punishing and monitoring gods on outgroup allocations revealed between-site variability, suggesting that in the absence of intergroup hostility, moralizing gods may be implicated in cooperative behaviour toward outgroups. These results provide support for the hypothesis that beliefs in monitoring and punitive gods help expand the circle of sustainable social interaction, and open questions about the treatment of religious outgroups.

Few countries achieve peace and prosperity without a capable and accountable government. Political scientists and historians have documented the consolidation of modern nation states in Europe, and the emergence of accountable governance when citizens resist taxation. Although theoretically appealing, the presumed link between state building and citizen engagement in politics has escaped testing with modern quantitative methods due to the non-randomness of taxation and other state-building initiatives. I fill this gap by partnering with governments to embed randomized evaluations into their tax programs. In the first chapter, I examine the first field experiment to randomize tax collection: a door-to-door property tax campaign in Kananga, D.R. Congo. Consistent with the classic ‘tax-participation hypothesis,’ individuals living in neighborhoods assigned to the tax program are nearly five percentage points more likely to engage in costly participation. The second chapter investigates the determinants of tax compliance in this tax campaign. Despite the prominence of pecuniary motives in models of tax compliance, I find that the perceived legitimacy of the state is a stronger predictor of citizen tax payment. Moreover, the campaign improves citizens’ perceptions of the provincial government, indicating a positive feedback loop in tax collection and state legitimacy. In the third chapter, I examine citizens’ decisions to participate in corruption. This co-authored chapter explores the elasticity of citizen bribe payment at the roadway tolls in Kananga with respect to price. We argue that citizens’ limited responsiveness to monetary incentives to obtain a valid receipt reflects the fact that bribes accelerate interactions at the toll. The dissertation thus brings experimental evidence to bear on long-theorized links between state building and citizen political engagement.

How should tax rates be set in developing countries? This project estimates the elasticity of property tax compliance and tax revenue in a field experiment in Kananga, D.R. Congo, a setting with very low tax compliance. In collaboration with the provincial government, we randomly assign four tax rates at the household level as part of a door-to-door city-wide property tax campaign covering 48,000 properties. Property owners randomly face the status quo tax liability or a reduction of 17%, 33% or 50% in their tax liability. We find that the elasticity of tax compliance with respect to the tax rate is -1.19 and the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the tax rate is -0.26, suggesting that tax rates are on the wrong side of the Laffer curve and that the government could increase revenues by lowering tax rates. We also find that beyond higher revenues, lowering tax rates results in lower amounts of bribes being collected and improves citizens’ view of the government. Finally, we document further policy implications resulting from the substantial heterogeneity in the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the tax rate. First, we use heterogeneous treatment effects to show that a progressive tax schedule would maximize revenue. Second, we use tax collector heterogeneity to show that an increase in government’s enforcement capacity would permit higher tax rates.