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371 result(s) for "Weinstein, David E."
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The new voices of science fiction
\"Your Future Is Bright! After all, your mother is a robot, your father has joined the alien hive mind, and your dinner will be counterfeit 3D-printed steak. Even though your worker bots have staged a mutiny, and your tour guide speaks only in memes, you can always sell your native language if you need some extra cash.\" -- From publisher's description.
How Much Do Idiosyncratic Bank Shocks Affect Investment? Evidence from Matched Bank-Firm Loan Data
We show that supply-side financial shocks have a large impact on firms’ investment. We develop a new methodology to separate firm borrowing shocks from bank supply shocks using a vast sample of matched bank-firm lending data. We decompose aggregate loan movements in Japan for the period 1990–2010 into bank, firm, industry, and common shocks. The high degree of financial institution concentration means that individual banks are large relative to the size of the economy, which creates a role for granular shocks as in Gabaix’s (2011) study. We show that idiosyncratic granular bank supply shocks explain 30–40 percent of aggregate loan and investment fluctuations.
The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare
We examine conventional approaches to evaluating the economic impact of protectionist trade policies. We illustrate these conventional approaches by applying them to the tariffs introduced by the Trump administration during 2018. In the wake of this increase in trade protection, the United States experienced substantial increases in the prices of intermediates and final goods, dramatic changes to its supply-chain network, reductions in availability of imported varieties, and the complete pass-through of the tariffs into domestic prices of imported goods. Therefore, the full incidence of the tariffs has fallen on domestic consumers and importers so far, and our estimates imply a reduction in aggregate US real income of $1.4 billion per month by the end of 2018. We see similar patterns for foreign countries that have retaliated with their own tariffs against the United States, which suggests that the trade war has also reduced the real income of these other countries.
QUANTIFYING THE SOURCES OF FIRM HETEROGENEITY
We develop and structurally estimate a model of heterogeneous multiproduct firms that can be used to decompose the firm-size distribution into the contributions of costs, “appeal” (quality or taste), markups, and product scope. Using Nielsen barcode data on prices and sales, we find that variation in firm appeal and product scope explains at least four fifths of the variation in firm sales. We show that the imperfect substitutability of products within firms, and the fact that larger firms supply more products than smaller firms, implies that standard productivity measures are highly dependent on implicit demand system assumptions and probably dramatically understate the relative productivity of the largest firms. Although most firms are well approximated by the monopolistic competition benchmark of constant markups, we find that the largest firms that account for most of aggregate sales depart substantially from this benchmark, and exhibit both variable markups and substantial cannibalization effects.
Product Creation and Destruction: Evidence and Price Implications
This paper describes the extent of product creation and destruction in a large sector of the US economy. We find four times more entry and exit in product markets than is found in labor markets because most product turnover happens within firms. Net product creation is strongly procyclical and primarily driven by creation rather than destruction. We find that a cost-of-living index that takes product turnover into account is 0.8 percentage points per year lower than a \"fixed goods\" price index like the CPI. The procyclicality of the bias implies that business cycles are more volatile than indicated by official statistics.
Trade Finance and the Great Trade Collapse
Economic models that do not incorporate financial frictions only explain about 70 to 80 percent of the decline in world trade that occurred in the 2008–2009 crisis. We review evidence that shows financial factors also contributed to the great trade collapse and uncover two new stylized facts in support of it. First, we show that the prices of manufactured exports rose relative to domestic prices during the crisis. Second, we show that US seaborne exports and imports, which are likely to be more sensitive to trade finance problems, saw their prices rise relative to goods shipped by air or land.
Who’s Paying for the US Tariffs? A Longer-Term Perspective
Using another year of data including significant escalations in the trade war, we find that the costs of the US tariffs continue to be almost entirely borne by US firms and consumers. We show that the response of import values to the tariffs increases in absolute magnitude over time, consistent with the idea that it takes time for firms to reorganize supply chains. We find heterogeneity in the responses of some sectors, such as steel, where tariffs have caused foreign exporters to drop their prices substantially, enabling them to export relatively more than in sectors where tariff pass-through was complete.
Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence
We find that prior to World Trade Organization membership, countries set import tariffs 9 percentage points higher on inelastically supplied imports relative to those supplied elastically. The magnitude of this effect is similar to the size of average tariffs in these countries, and market power explains more of the tariff variation than a commonly used political economy variable. Moreover, US trade restrictions not covered by the WTO are significantly higher on goods where the United States has more market power. We find strong evidence that these importers have market power and use it in setting noncooperative trade policy.
Bones, Bombs, and Break Points: The Geography of Economic Activity
We consider the distribution of economic activity within a country in light of three leading theories-increasing returns, random growth, and locational fundamentals. To do so, we examine the distribution of regional population in Japan from the Stone Age to the modern era. We also consider the Allied bombing of Japanese cities in WWII as a shock to relative city sizes. Our results support a hybrid theory in which locational fundamentals establish the spatial pattern of relative regional densities, but increasing returns help to determine the degree of spatial differentiation. Long-run city size is robust even to large temporary shocks.
EXPORTS AND FINANCIAL SHOCKS
A striking feature of many financial crises is the collapse of exports relative to output. This article examines whether deteriorations in bank health can help explain the large drops in exports relative to output. Our article is the first to establish a causal link between the health of banks providing trade finance and growth in a firm's exports relative to its domestic sales. We overcome measurement and endogeneity issues by using a unique data set, covering the Japanese financial crises from 1990 through 2010, which enables us to match exporters with the main bank that provides them with trade finance. Our point estimates are economically and statistically significant, suggesting that the health of financial institutions is an important determinant of firm-level exports during crises.