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81 result(s) for "Wellman, Christopher Heath"
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Immigration and Freedom of Association
The commonly prized value of freedom of association provides the basic normative building blocks for a presumptive case in favor of each legitimate state's right to exclude others from its territory. But, while freedom of association provides a weighty consideration in favor of a state's right to limit immigration, it is obviously not the only value of importance. Here, Wellman tries first to construct a presumptive case in favor of a state's right to set its own immigration policy and then to defend this prima facie case against the formidable arguments that have been made on behalf of open borders. If his arguments are sound, then he concludes that even if egalitarians are right that those people in wealthy societies have demanding duties of global distributive justice and even if libertarians are correct that individuals have rights both to freedom of movement and to control their private property, legitimate states are entitled to reject all potential immigrants, even those desperately seeking asylum from corrupt governments.
Debating the ethics of immigration : is there a right to exclude?
Do states have the right to prevent potential immigrants from crossing their borders, or should people have the freedom to migrate and settle wherever they wish? This book develops and defends opposing answers to this timely and important question. Appealing to the right to freedom of association, the book contends that legitimate states have broad discretion to exclude potential immigrants, even those who desperately seek to enter. Against this, it argues that the commitment to the moral equality of all human beings—which legitimate states can be expected to hold—means national borders must be open: equal respect requires equal access, both to territory and membership; and that the idea of open borders is less radical than it seems when we consider how many territorial and community boundaries have this open nature. In addition to engaging with each other's arguments, the authors address a range of central questions and prominent positions on this topic. They provide a critical overview of the major contributions to the ethics of immigration, as well as developing original, provocative positions of their own.
Cosmopolitanism, Occupancy and Political Self-Determination
The brand of cosmopolitanism that Cécile Fabre develops in her excellent book, Cosmopolitan Peace, leaves room for qualifying groups to exercise political self-determination. Important questions thus emerge regarding who is entitled to have a say in the group’s self-determination, questions that take on a heightened practical urgency in the wake of wars that cause massive migration. In this article, I call into question Fabre’s contention that the descendants of unjust occupants necessarily acquire occupancy rights which entitle them to a say in the political self-determination over the territory on which they currently reside.
Hate Crime Legislation as an Antidote to Hate Ideology
Given the prevalence of hate ideology, a concerted, multipronged effort to combat it clearly seems in order. In this essay, I explore whether hate crime legislation is a permissible and advisable component of this effort. In particular, I consider whether it is morally permissible to impose enhanced punishments upon criminals who select their victims at least in part because of an animus toward members of the group to which the victim belongs. Would it be permissible to punish more severely a White supremacist who attacks a person only because she is Black, for instance, or an anti-Semitic thief who selects her victims at least in part because they are Jewish? After sketching a preliminary defense of this type of hate crime legislation, I note some potential concerns, including vexing questions about the likely effects of imposing such laws under the present, nonideal circumstances in the United States.
The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment
Punishment is notoriously difficult to justify because it involves visiting hard treatment upon those who are punished. The rights forfeiture theory of punishment contends that punishment is justified when and because the criminal has forfeited her right not to be subjected to this hard treatment. Because of a number of apparently devastating objections, this account has very few advocates. In this essay I aim to rehabilitate the rights forfeiture account by offering responses to the standard criticisms.
From Humanitarian Intervention to Assassination: Human Rights and Political Violence
An international consensus has begun to take shape around that idea that the cross-border use of armed force by states is morally permissible if such force is required to stop or prevent human-rights abuses amounting to a supreme humanitarian emergency. At the same time, it is widely believed that political assassination is a form of murder and so morally impermissible in principle, regardless of the ends for which it is done. Here, Altman and Wellman reject these views and argue that armed intervention is morally permissible when the target state is illegitimate and the risk to human rights is not disproportionate to the rights violations that one can reasonably expect to avert. Moreover, they explain the consensus view on armed intervention, criticize the two main arguments on its behalf. and outline their alternative account. They contend that the permissibility of armed intervention does not depend upon the consent of the intended beneficiaries. They also explore what the rules of international law ought to be for regulating armed intervention. And finally, they take up the permissibility of assassinating those state leaders who egregiously violate human rights.
What are the obligations of pharmaceutical companies in a global health emergency?
[...]any satisfactory approach should include mechanisms for assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. Additionally, market-based arrangements, with patents, marketing exclusivity, and confidentiality clauses, give pharmaceutical companies the freedom to choose what treatments to research and develop, how to price and distribute their products, and whom to furnish with products through bilateral agreements.9 Indeed, companies need not produce vaccines or infectious disease therapies at all. Unlike vaccines themselves, vaccine-related knowledge is non-rivalrous. [...]vaccine manufacturers have a duty to share knowledge with potential vaccine producers. Transferring technology and scaling up production will take months, maybe years. [...]scarcity abates, pharmaceutical companies are obligated to ensure their vaccine production is both optimised and fairly distributed.
Do Legitimate States Have a Right to Do Wrong?
This essay critically assesses Anna Stilz's argument in Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration that legitimate states have a right to do wrong. I concede that individuals enjoy a claim against external interference when they commit suberogatory acts, but I deny that the right to do wrong extends to acts that would violate the rights of others. If this is correct, then one must do more than merely invoke an individual's right to do wrong if one hopes to vindicate a legitimate state's right to commit injustices. Of course, there may be distinctive features of legitimate states that explain why they enjoy moral protections that individuals lack, but I argue that the value of collective self-determination is not up to this task. And even if these arguments fail, self-determination would at most explain why legitimate states enjoy a right to commit injustices against their own citizens; it would provide them no moral protection when they violate the rights of outsiders.
Contemporary debates in applied ethics
Now in an updated edition with fresh perspectives on high-profile ethical issues such as torture and same-sex marriage, this collection pairs cogently argued essays by leading philosophers with opposing views on fault-line public concerns. Revised and updated new edition with six new pairs of essays on prominent contemporary issues including torture and same-sex marriage, and a survey of theories of ethics by Stephen Darwall Leading philosophers tackle colleagues with opposing views in contrasting essays on core issues in applied ethics An ideal semester-length course text certain to generate vigorous discussion.