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This paper stems from the observation that there are two worldwide trends, pension reform and population ageing, and asks whether the two may be related. Exploring the cases of pension reform in different countries, we find that, although they are very different, the cases share a common characteristic: they shift risks away from workers towards those who are retired. Furthermore, population ageing, by increasing the weight of the elderly relative to working generations, raises the price of intergenerational risk sharing. Combining these findings, we argue and show formally that pension reform can be seen as a welfare-best response to population ageing.

Funded defined-benefit pensions add to welfare on account of providing intergenerational risk sharing, but lower it on account of inducing labour supply distortions. We show that a properly designed funded defined-benefit pension scheme involves a welfare improvement even if contributions are distortionary and even if individuals face potentially correlated wage and equity risks. Numerical calculations indicate that diversification gains from risk sharing are large compared to the losses related to labour supply distortions. This result withstands a number of extensions, like the introduction of a short-sale constraint for individuals or the inclusion of a labour income tax.

Traditionally, collective defined benefit pension schemes have played an important role in the provision of pensions. Various trends such as population ageing put these schemes under serious pressure, however. Whether this is good or bad depends among other things on two factors: one is the value of the risk sharing between generations that is organized by pension schemes, and another is the cost of the distortions of labour supply decisions that these collective schemes imply. This paper constructs a model with overlapping generations of households and a pension scheme to assess the role of these two factors. The paper finds that the welfare gain from intergenerational risk sharing generally dominates the cost of labour supply distortions.

A popular view is that ageing populations increase health expenditure to GDP ratios because health expenditure correlates positively with age and because the concomitant shrinking of the labour force depresses GDP. The resulting increase in transfers from the young to the old then calls for a reform of health care policies. This article critically examines the arguments underlying this view. It gives credit to factors that counteract the expenditure effect, the effects upon health care market and labour market distortions and the effects upon intergenerational solidarity. Although important, these factors are found to have insufficient weight to invalidate the popular view. (JEL: H21, I10, J10)

This paper explores the implications of informational asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors for optimal capital tax rates and welfare. It adopts a model in which asymmetric information implies a home bias in equity. The paper finds that asymmetric information may raise capital tax rates by reducing the marginal cost of taxation. Furthermore, it shows that investors may gain from informational asymmetries. Although asymmetric information increases the uncertainty as perceived by investors, it may also increase tax rates and allow for a higher consumption of public goods. This reflects that asymmetric information may reduce the distortionary effects of competition among governments. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

This paper analyses the labour market and efficiency effects of various kinds of disability policies. It therefore extends Pissarides (1990) model of equilibrium unemployment with disability risk and disability benefits and allows for the improper use of disability schemes by the unemployed. The paper finds that recognition of this improper use can reverse the ranking of policies. In addition, it concludes that disability policies that reduce the participation in disability schemes tend to increase the rate of official unemployment. Only policies that lower the rate of disability shocks succeed to reduce both the participation in disability and unemployment schemes. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

According to the 2018 Mercer Global Pension Index, the pension systems of Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands are the best three in the world. They ensure a minimum old age income for all and provide relatively high replacement rates for a large majority of citizens. At the same time, their fiscal sustainability is relatively robust with respect to population aging. This article seeks to identify differences and similarities between these three pension systems, including the institutional framework within which they operate. The authors emphasize the collective and compulsory nature of the earnings-related pension schemes and the important role for social partners in decision making as their common elements of success. They also discuss the most important challenges these systems face, namely, how to maintain the legitimacy of their decision-making processes given declining unionization and how to avoid restricting individual choices too much. TOPICS: Retirement, social security, pension funds, wealth management Key Findings • The 2018 Mercer Global Pension Index ranked the pension systems of Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands as the best three in the world. Their common strengths include minimum old-age income for all and relatively high replacement rates for most citizens, together with substantial funding and automatic links between the pension eligibility age and life expectancy, which improve their fiscal sustainability. • The important role of “social partners”—representatives of employers and employees—in the three pension systems have likely been critically important to get acceptance for policies preparing for future demographic burdens and to protect the pension systems from populist proposals. • The pension systems may be subject to some legitimacy issues. This is the case because 1) participation in the pension systems is mandatory for workers; 2) decision makers are often elected based on low voter turnouts among union members; and 3) unionization is declining in all three countries. Another challenge these pension systems face is how to provide sufficient flexibility regarding individual saving for old age within a compulsory system.