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This paper will explore how the financial regulatory structure propelled three credit rating agencies—Moody's, Standard & Poor's (S&P), and Fitch—to the center of the U.S. bond markets—and thereby virtually guaranteed that when these rating agencies did make mistakes, these mistakes would have serious consequences for the financial sector. We begin by looking at some relevant history of the industry, including the series of events that led financial regulators to outsource their judgments to the credit rating agencies (by requiring financial institutions to use the specific bond creditworthiness information that was provided by the major rating agencies) and when the credit rating agencies shifted their business model from “investor pays” to “issuer pays.” We then look at how the credit rating industry evolved and how its interaction with regulatory authorities served as a barrier to entry. We then show how these ingredients combined to contribute to the subprime mortgage debacle and associated financial crisis. Finally, we consider two possible routes for public policy with respect to the credit rating industry: One route would tighten the regulation of the rating agencies, while the other route would reduce the required centrality of the rating agencies and thereby open up the bond information process in way that has not been possible since the 1930s.

The informational opacity of small businesses makes them an interesting area for the study of banks' lending practices and procedures. We use data from a survey of small businesses to analyze the micro level differences in the loan approval processes of large and small banks. We provide evidence that large banks ($1 billion or more in assets) employ standard criteria obtained from financial statements in the loan decision process, whereas small banks rely to a greater extent on information about the character of the borrower. These cookie-cutter and character approaches are compatible with the incentives and environments facing large and small banks.

In this study, we analyze why commercial banks failed during the recent financial crisis. We find that traditional proxies for the CAMELS components, as well as measures of commercial real estate investments, do an excellent job in explaining the failures of banks that were closed during 2009, just as they did in the previous banking crisis of 1985–1992. Surprisingly, we do not find that residential mortgage-backed securities played a significant role in determining which banks failed and which banks survived. Our results offer support for the CAMELS approach to judging the safety and soundness of commercial banks, but call, into serious question the current system of regulatory risk weights and concentration limits on commercial real estate loans.

Antitrust discussions in the U.S. have a long tradition of describing intellectual property (IP)—primarily patents and copyrights—in unqualified terms of “monopoly”. Although there have been substantial efforts over the past two decades to pull back from this automatic association, the presumption of unqualified monopoly continues to appear in important legal decisions—as well as in legal and social sciences academic discussions—that involve IP. There is another place where these decisions and discussions might start: with a presumption that any IP is “primarily property”—albeit with some important distinctions that separate IP from “garden variety” tangible property and that raise the possibility of market power in some instances. This paper explores the important similarities—and differences—between “garden variety” property, such as real estate, and IP; it concludes that the similarities are substantial, so that the presumption that IP is “primarily property” is a reasonable alternative starting point for antitrust/IP discussions. It then discusses some beneficial differences that this alternative starting point could have made and/or could still make.

The financial collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008 led to one of the most sweeping government interventions in private financial markets in history. The bailout has already cost American taxpayers close to