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"Windt, Jennifer"
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Dreaming
Dreams, conceived as conscious experience or phenomenal states during sleep, offer an important contrast condition for theories of consciousness and the self. Yet, although there is a wealth of empirical research on sleep and dreaming, its potential contribution to consciousness research and philosophy of mind is largely overlooked. This might be due, in part, to a lack of conceptual clarity and an underlying disagreement about the nature of the phenomenon of dreaming itself. InDreaming, Jennifer Windt lays the groundwork for solving this problem. She develops a conceptual framework describing not only what it means to say that dreams are conscious experiences but also how to locate dreams relative to such concepts as perception, hallucination, and imagination, as well as thinking, knowledge, belief, deception, and self-consciousness.Arguing that a conceptual framework must be not only conceptually sound but also phenomenologically plausible and carefully informed by neuroscientific research, Windt integrates her review of philosophical work on dreaming, both historical and contemporary, with a survey of the most important empirical findings. This allows her to work toward a systematic and comprehensive new theoretical understanding of dreaming informed by a critical reading of contemporary research findings. Windt's account demonstrates that a philosophical analysis of the concept of dreaming can provide an important enrichment and extension to the conceptual repertoire of discussions of consciousness and the self and raises new questions for future research.
eBook
Predicting lapses of attention with sleep-like slow waves
Attentional lapses occur commonly and are associated with mind wandering, where focus is turned to thoughts unrelated to ongoing tasks and environmental demands, or mind blanking, where the stream of consciousness itself comes to a halt. To understand the neural mechanisms underlying attentional lapses, we studied the behaviour, subjective experience and neural activity of healthy participants performing a task. Random interruptions prompted participants to indicate their mental states as task-focused, mind-wandering or mind-blanking. Using high-density electroencephalography, we report here that spatially and temporally localized slow waves, a pattern of neural activity characteristic of the transition toward sleep, accompany behavioural markers of lapses and preceded reports of mind wandering and mind blanking. The location of slow waves could distinguish between sluggish and impulsive behaviours, and between mind wandering and mind blanking. Our results suggest attentional lapses share a common physiological origin: the emergence of local sleep-like activity within the awake brain.
Attentional lapses occur in many forms such as mind-wandering or mindblanking. Here the authors show different types of attentional lapse are accompanied by slow waves, neural activity that is characteristic of transitions into sleep.
Journal Article
Reporting dream experience: Why (not) to be skeptical about dream reports
Are dreams subjective experiences during sleep? Is it like something to dream, or is it only like something to remember dreams after awakening? Specifically, can dream reports be trusted to reveal what it is like to dream, and should they count as evidence for saying that dreams are conscious experiences at all? The goal of this article is to investigate the relationship between dreaming, dream reporting and subjective experience during sleep. I discuss different variants of philosophical skepticism about dream reporting and argue that they all fail. Consequently, skeptical doubts about the trustworthiness of dream reports are misguided, and for systematic reasons. I suggest an alternative, anti-skeptical account of the trustworthiness of dream reports. On this view, dream reports, when gathered under ideal reporting conditions and according to the principle of temporal proximity, are trustworthy (or transparent) with respect to conscious experience during sleep. The transparency assumption has the status of a methodologically necessary default assumption and is theoretically justified because it provides the best explanation of dream reporting. At the same time, it inherits important insights from the discussed variants of skepticism about dream reporting, suggesting that the careful consideration of these skeptical arguments ultimately leads to a positive account of why and under which conditions dream reports can and should be trusted. In this way, moderate distrust can be fruitfully combined with anti-skepticism about dream reporting. Several perspectives for future dream research and for the comparative study of dreaming and waking experience are suggested.
Journal Article
Predictive brains, dreaming selves, sleeping bodies: how the analysis of dream movement can inform a theory of self- and world-simulation in dreams
In this paper, I discuss the relationship between bodily experiences in dreams and the sleeping, physical body. I question the popular view that dreaming is a naturally and frequently occurring real-world example of cranial envatment. This view states that dreams are functionally disembodied states: in a majority of dreams, phenomenal experience, including the phenomenology of embodied selfhood, unfolds completely independently of external and peripheral stimuli and outward movement. I advance an alternative and more empirically plausible view of dreams as weakly phenomenally-functionally embodied states. The view predicts that bodily experiences in dreams can be placed on a continuum with bodily illusions in wakefulness. It also acknowledges that there is a high degree of variation across dreams and different sleep stages in the degree of causal coupling between dream imagery, sensory input, and outward motor activity. Furthermore, I use the example of movement sensations in dreams and their relation to outward muscular activity to develop a predictive processing account. I propose that movement sensations in dreams are associated with a basic and developmentally early kind of bodily self-sampling. This account, which affords a central role to active inference, can then be broadened to explain other aspects of self- and world-simulation in dreams. Dreams are world-simulations centered on the self, and important aspects of both self- and world-simulation in dreams are closely linked to bodily self-sampling, including muscular activity, illusory own-body perception, and vestibular orienting in sleep. This is consistent with cognitive accounts of dream generation, in which long-term beliefs and expectations, as well as waking concerns and memories play an important role. What I add to this picture is an emphasis on the real-body basis of dream imagery. This offers a novel perspective on the formation of dream imagery and suggests new lines of research.
Journal Article
How deep is the rift between conscious states in sleep and wakefulness? Spontaneous experience over the sleep–wake cycle
Whether we are awake or asleep is believed to mark a sharp divide between the types of conscious states we undergo in either behavioural state. Consciousness in sleep is often equated with dreaming and thought to be characteristically different from waking consciousness. Conversely, recent research shows that we spend a substantial amount of our waking lives mind wandering, or lost in spontaneous thoughts. Dreaming has been described as intensified mind wandering, suggesting that there is a continuum of spontaneous experience that reaches from waking into sleep. This challenges how we conceive of the behavioural states of sleep and wakefulness in relation to conscious states. I propose a conceptual framework that distinguishes different subtypes of spontaneous thoughts and experiences independently of their occurrence in sleep or waking. I apply this framework to selected findings from dream and mind-wandering research. I argue that to assess the relationship between spontaneous thoughts and experiences and the behavioural states of sleep and wakefulness, we need to look beyond dreams to consider kinds of sleep-related experience that qualify as dreamless. I conclude that if we consider the entire range of spontaneous thoughts and experiences, there appears to be variation in subtypes both within as well as across behavioural states. Whether we are sleeping or waking does not appear to strongly constrain which subtypes of spontaneous thoughts and experiences we undergo in those states. This challenges the conventional and coarse-grained distinction between sleep and waking and their putative relation to conscious states. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.
Journal Article
Do individuals with disorders of consciousness dream and mind wander? Implications for improving diagnosis and understanding patient wellbeing
Abstract
Fluctuations in the presence, experiential quality and contents of consciousness occur naturally during sleep and wakefulness and are core features of the healthy human mind. The purpose of this article is to consider the possibility that such fluctuations, including mind wandering and dreaming, which we refer to collectively as spontaneous thoughts and experiences (STE), may also be important elements of experience in certain patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC). The presence of these states may have urgent implications for DoC diagnosis, which centres on the detection of consciousness. Furthermore, learning more about STE in DoC may provide insight into subjective experience and quality of life in DoC, about which little is currently known. Given the challenges that exist in studying conscious experience in this population, much of the evidence about STE we consider is indirect and involves triangulation from the healthy population and other brain-injured patients. The evidence we consider is inconclusive, but it indicates that the occurrence of mind wandering and dreaming in DoC is a real possibility that, because of its important implications in these patients, requires further research. We argue that, given the possible life-or-death consequences of diagnosis in DoC, it is of pressing importance to use diagnostic measures that are sensitive to these internally directed forms of conscious experience. We also consider some lines of research that may deepen our understanding of STE in DoC, and how further knowledge about these states may impact inferences about quality of life in this population.
Journal Article
Examining the association between depersonalisation traits and the bodily self in waking and dreaming
Depersonalisation (DP) is characterized by fundamental alterations to the sense of self that include feelings of detachment and estrangement from one’s body. We conducted an online study in healthy participants (n = 514) with DP traits to investigate and quantify the subjective experience of body and self during waking and dreaming, as the vast majority of previous studies focussed on waking experience only. Investigating dreams in people experiencing DP symptoms may help us understand whether the dream state is a ‘spared space’ where people can temporarily ‘retrieve’ their sense of self and sense of bodily presence. We found that higher DP traits—i.e. higher scores on the Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale (CDS)—were associated with more frequent dream experiences from an outside observer perspective (r = 0.28) and more frequent dream experiences of distinct bodily sensations (r = 0.23). We also found that people with higher CDS scores had more frequent dream experiences of altered bodily perception (r = 0.24), more frequent nightmares (r = 0.33) and higher dream recall (r = 0.17). CDS scores were negatively correlated with body boundary scores (r = − 0.31) in waking states and there was a negative association between CDS scores and the degree of trust in interoceptive signals (r = − 0.52). Our study elucidates the complex phenomenology of DP in relation to bodily selfhood during waking and dreaming and suggests avenues for potential therapeutic interventions in people with chronic depersonalisation (depersonalisation -derealisation disorder).
Journal Article
Does the Mind Wander When the Brain Takes a Break? Local Sleep in Wakefulness, Attentional Lapses and Mind-Wandering
Sleep has been classically described as an all-or-nothing global phenomenon. However, recent research strongly suggests that this view requires tempering. Invasive and non-invasive recordings in animals and humans show that neural activity typically associated with sleep can locally occur during wakefulness. Although local sleep is defined neuronally, it has been associated with impaired performance during cognitive tasks. Comparatively, the phenomenology of local sleep (i.e., what it feels like when your brain is partially asleep) has been less explored. Taking into account the literature on the neuronal and behavioral profile of local sleep intrusions in wakefulness, we propose that occurrences of local sleep could represent the neural mechanism underlying many attentional lapses. In particular, we argue that a unique physiological event such as local sleep could account for a diversity of behavioral outcomes from sluggish to impulsive responses. We further propose that local sleep intrusions could impact individuals' subjective experience. Specifically, we propose that the timing and anatomical sources of local sleep intrusions could be responsible for both the behavioral consequences and subjective content of attentional lapses and may underlie the difference between subjective experiences such as mind wandering and mind blanking. Our framework aims to build a parallel between spontaneous experiences in sleep and wakefulness by integrating evidence across neuronal, behavioral and experiential levels. We use the example of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) to illustrate how local sleep could explain complex cognitive profiles which include inattention, impulsivity, mind-wandering and mind-blanking.
Journal Article
Modulating dream experience: Noninvasive brain stimulation over the sensorimotor cortex reduces dream movement
Recently, cortical correlates of specific dream contents have been reported, such as the activation of the sensorimotor cortex during dreamed hand clenching. Yet, despite a close resemblance of such activation patterns to those seen during the corresponding wakeful behaviour, the causal mechanisms underlying specific dream contents remain largely elusive. Here, we aimed to investigate the causal role of the sensorimotor cortex in generating movement and bodily sensations during REM sleep dreaming. Following bihemispheric transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) or sham stimulation, guided by functional mapping of the primary motor cortex, naive participants were awakened from REM sleep and responded to a questionnaire on bodily sensations in dreams. Electromyographic (EMG) and electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings were used to quantify physiological changes during the preceding REM period. We found that tDCS, compared to sham stimulation, significantly decreased reports of dream movement, especially of repetitive actions. Other types of bodily experiences, such as tactile or vestibular sensations, were not affected by tDCS, confirming the specificity of stimulation effects to movement sensations. In addition, tDCS reduced EEG interhemispheric coherence in parietal areas and affected the phasic EMG correlation between both arms. These findings show that a complex temporal reorganization of the motor network co-occurred with the reduction of dream movement, revealing a link between central and peripheral motor processes and movement sensations of the dream self. tDCS over the sensorimotor cortex interferes with dream movement during REM sleep, which is consistent with a causal contribution to dream experience and has broader implications for understanding the neural basis of self-experience in dreams.
Journal Article