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115 result(s) for "Winfree, Jason"
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This study analyzes representation in collective bargaining in professional sports leagues and shows that the labor market is not completely competitive off-the-field. Because collective bargaining impacts future compensation and player unions are always represented by current players and often represented by more experienced players, there is amuch higher incentive to advocate for policies that increase pay for more experienced players. Conversely, policies that maintain monopsony power for leagues with regards to inexperienced players, such as player drafts, have remained in sports leagues. However, these policies may also restrict the quantity demanded for more experienced players. This paper provides a theoretical model and examines empirical evidence regarding the differences between younger and older players.
Collective Reputation and Quality
Firms who sell regional or specialty products often share a collective reputation based on aggregate quality. Collective reputation can be approached as a dynamic common property resource problem. We show that for an experience good without firm traceability, individual firms have the incentive to choose quality levels that are sub-optimal for the group. These results support minimum quality standards. Trigger strategies are analyzed as an alternative solution to this problem. Finally, the implications of these results are discussed as they relate to the case study of Washington apples.
Discrimination and Demand: The Effect of International Players on Attendance in Major League Baseball
Objectives. This article tests the presence of demand-driven discrimination attributable to foreign-born players in Major League Baseball (MLB). We quantify the change in demand at MLB games given the number of foreign players on an MLB team. We further measure how matching market population demographics and team demographics affects demand. Methods. We use regression analysis to estimate the effect on attendance of a change in the number of foreign players on a team. We then use these estimates to find the change in revenue for the team. Results. The results show that the effect evolves over time. At the outset of the sample (1985), the net effect of an additional foreign-born player was a decrease in ticket demand. This effect diminished steadily until 1992, when the net effect became positive, peaking in 2000, and then slightly decreasing until the end of the sample (2005). The matching of team and population demographics was not found to be significant. Conclusions. We discuss the implications of this result on league policy decisions.
Food Origin Labeling and “Promoting Competition”
This paper analyzes the consumer and producer implications of origin-of-food labeling when the production process is a credence attribute. Since origin-of-food labeling has been discussed by the U.S. government in the context of “promoting competition”, a model is presented that evaluates consumer welfare and producer welfare as a function of labeling standards. The model finds that if there is consumer misperception and the consumers are unaware that labeling does not imply completely domestic production, then consumers are helped with higher standards; but domestic profits may be higher with a more lax standard. If consumers are aware of the average level of domestic production that is implied by the label, then they are indifferent to the standard, while domestic profits are still maximized with a standard that balances a price premium with the costs of domestic production. The model also analyzes possible differences between upstream and downstream producers.
Short-Run Demand and Uncertainty of Outcome in Major League Baseball
This article explores the importance of uncertainty in athletic contests. We use a probit model and Monte Carlo simulations to forecast game outcomes in Major League Baseball. Simulations are necessary to understand fully the preferences that consumers have towards uncertainty in sports. We use these simulations to estimate demand using attendance data for regular season games. Our findings show that when game, playoff, and consecutive season uncertainty measures are all included in estimating attendance for individual games, only the metrics that are related to the home team's standing are significant. These metrics include the change in performance from the previous season and the importance of the game in qualifying for the playoffs.
The Effects of Cross-Ownership and League Policies Across Sports Leagues Within a City
Since prior research suggests that some economic competition exists between teams in different sports leagues, economic competition and ownership structure can affect an owner's incentive to invest in talent. This paper uses a theoretical model to examine the differences in owners' incentives to invest in talent when they are operating as monopolists, as duopolists, or as a cross-owned team. Our model shows that economic competition results in an ambiguous level of investment compared to that of a monopolist. A firm that engages in cross-ownership will invest less in talent compared to a duopolist, but the difference in profits is ambiguous. League policies are studied and are shown to affect the quality of teams in other leagues.
Revenue Sharing with Heterogeneous Investments in Sports Leagues: Share Media, Not Stadiums
This study examines revenue sharing in sports leagues where franchises engage in multiple types of investments. Previous literature typically treats revenues and investments as homogeneous, but we add to the literature by differentiating between investment types and revenue sources. This is important because investment in talent leads to winning, which is a zero-sum game for the league and therefore owners have an incentive to limit talent investment. However, other investments, such as stadiums, are not a zero-sum game, and therefore the implications of revenue sharing are different for the league. We provide sufficient conditions under which it is more efficient to share media revenue compared to stadium revenue. We conclude by providing applications of this model.
This Game is Being Played under Protest
Madden (in press) hopes that it is “Game Over” regarding the “Walrasian Fixed Supply Conjecture” and “Contest-Nash” solutions. In this paper, I argue that framing the debate as such misses the point of Winfree and Fort (2012). Furthermore, Madden (in press) argues that under certain assumptions, which need to be made, the model that follows was previously given in Madden (2011). However, I argue that Madden (2011) is one of many models that might follow and his assumptions do not hold in all leagues.