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We argue that several difficulties facing expressivist solutions to the Frege-Geach problem are paralleled by almost exactly analogous problems facing realist semantic theories. We show that by adopting a variation on a prominent realist solution, the expressivist brings her account of logical consequence closer to philosophical orthodoxy. Our discussion also demonstrates that a standard objection to expressivism is based on a misinterpretation of the Frege-Geach problem and that the expressivist can appeal to a wide range of attitudinal conflicts in her semantic theorizing—far wider than Mark Schroeder, for example, allows in his recent work.

A natural suggestion and increasingly popular account of how to revise our logical beliefs treats revision of logic analogously to the revision of scientific theories (Hjortland, Priest, Russell, Williamson, etc.). I investigate this approach and argue that simple applications of abductive methodology to logic result in revision-cycles, developing a detailed case study of an actual dispute with this property. This is problematic if we take abductive methodology to provide justification for revising our logical framework. I then generalize the case study, pointing to similarities with more recent and popular heterodox logics such as naïve logics of truth. I use this discussion to motivate a constraint—LOGICAL PARTISANHOOD—on the uses of such methodology: roughly: both the proposed alternative and our actual background logic must be able to agree that moving to the alternative logic is no worse than staying put.

Abstract Spindle cell sclerosing rhabdomyosarcoma (sc-RMS) is an extremely rare soft tissue tumor. We report an unusual case of sc-RMS in a 36-year-old patient whose tumor arose in a rectus abdominis muscle free flap that had been used for lower extremity reconstruction 18 years previously. After surgical excision of the tumor and immediate reconstruction, the patient has remained in remission and has full function of his lower extremity six months after diagnosis and treatment.

Sometimes a fact can play a role in a grounding explanation, but the particular content of that fact make no difference to the explanation—any fact would do in its place. I call these facts vacuous grounds. I show that applying the distinction between-vacuous grounds allows us to give a principled solution to Kit Fine and Stephen Kramer's paradox of (reflexive) ground. This paradox shows that on minimal assumptions about grounding and minimal assumptions about logic, we can show that grounding is reflexive, contra the intuitive character of grounds. I argue that we should never have accepted that grounding is irreflexive in the first place; the intuitions that support the irreflexive intuition plausibly only require that grounding be non-vacuously irreflexive. Fine and Kramer's paradox relies, essentially, on a case of vacuous grounding and is thus no problem for this account.

I argue that certain species of belief, such as mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs, are insulated from a form of Harman‐style debunking argument whereas moral beliefs, the primary target of such arguments, are not. Harman‐style arguments have been misunderstood as attempts to directly undermine our moral beliefs. They are rather best given as burden‐shifting arguments, concluding that we need additional reasons to maintain our moral beliefs. If we understand them this way, then we can see why moral beliefs are vulnerable to such arguments while mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs are not—the very construction of Harman‐style skeptical arguments requires the truth of significant fragments of our mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs, but requires no such thing of our moral beliefs. Given this property, Harman‐style skeptical arguments against logical, mathematical, and normative beliefs are self‐effacing; doubting these beliefs on the basis of such arguments results in the loss of our reasons for doubt. But we can cleanly doubt the truth of morality.

I discuss Greg Restall's attempt to generate an account of logical consequence from the incoherence of certain packages of assertions and denials. I take up his justification of the cut rule and argue that, in order to avoid counterexamples to cut, he needs, at least, to introduce a notion of logical form. I then suggest a few problems that will arise for his account if a notion of logical form is assumed. I close by sketching what I take to be the most natural minimal way of distinguishing content and form and suggest further problems arising for this route.

Loss of chromosome 1p/19q in oligodendrogliomas represents a powerful predictor of good prognosis. Expression of internexin (INA), a neuronal specific intermediate filament protein, has recently been proposed as a surrogate marker for 1p/19q deletion based on the high degree of correlation between both parameters in oligodendrogliomas. The aim of this study was to assess further the diagnostic utility of INA expression in a set of genetically well-characterized oligodendrogliomas. On the basis of a conservative approach for copy number determination, using both comparative genomic hybridization and fluorescent in situ hybridization, INA expression as a surrogate marker for 1p/19q loss had both reduced specificity (80%) and sensitivity (79%) compared with respective values of 86% and 96% reported in the previous report. The histologic interpretation and diagnostic value of INA expression in oligodendrogliomas should therefore be assessed with greater caution when compared with 1p/19q DNA copy number analysis. In addition, DNA copy number aberrations of chromosomes 10, 16, and 17 were detected exclusively in 1p/19q codeleted samples, suggesting that other regions of the genome may contribute to the 1p/19q-deleted tumor phenotype inthese samples.

I argue against expressivism as a descriptive account of moral language. I do this by leveraging features of the connection between ordinary assertion and belief to test the putative connection between moral assertion and various non-cognitive states. Expressivists explain the expression relation which obtains between sincere moral assertion and the conative or affective attitude thereby expressed by appeal to the relation which obtains between sincere assertion and thereby expressed belief. In fact, they often explicitly take these relations to be the same. If the relations really are identical and if expressivism is correct, we should find Moore-paradoxical constructions where we deny that we possess certain non-cognitive attitudes. We do not. Hence either the relations are distinct or expressivism is incorrect as a descriptive account of moral language. I favor the latter. A number of objections are canvassed and rejected.

The best extant demarcation of logical constants, due to Tarski, classifies logical constants by invariance properties of their denotations. This classification is developed in a framework which presumes that the denotations of all expressions are definite. However, some indefinite expressions, such as Russell's indefinite description operator η, Hubert's ε, and abstraction operators such as 'the number of', appropriately interpreted, are logical. I generalize the Tarskian framework in such a way as to allow a reasonable account of the denotations of indefinite expressions. This account gives rise to a principled classification of the denotations of logical and non-logical indefinite expressions. After developing this classification and its application to particular cases in some detail, I show how this generalized framework allows a novel view of the logical status of certain abstraction operators such as 'the number of'. I then show how we can define surrogate abstraction operators directly in higher-order languages augmented with an ε-operator.