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Teacher turnover is an enduring concern in education policy and can incur substantial costs to students. Policies often address turnover broadly, yet effects turn on net differences in the effectiveness of exiting and entering teachers, in addition to the disruption dealt to classrooms. Recent research has shown mixed effects of teacher evaluation policies, but even where evaluation-induced differential turnover initially benefited students, gains might disappear or reverse as the stock of less effective teachers exits and if more effective teachers view high-stakes evaluation as burdensome. We examine evaluation–induced changes to the composition of exiting and entering teachers in Washington, D.C., the net effect of turnover on student achievement, and the role that evaluation played in teacher turnover. We find that turnover continues to improve teaching skills and student achievement, although effects have diminished. We find little evidence that high-performing teachers’ exit is associated with the evaluation system.

This article uses a game-theoretic, two-sided matching model and method of simulated moments estimation to study factors affecting the match of elementary teachers to their first jobs. We find that employers demonstrate preferences for teachers having stronger academic achievement (e.g., attended a more selective college) and for teachers living in closer proximity to the school. Teachers show preferences for schools that are closer geographically, are suburban, have a smaller proportion of students in poverty, and, for white teachers, have a smaller proportion of minority students. These results appear predictable but contradict findings from prior research estimating hedonic wage equations for teacher labor markets.

Ten years ago, the reform of teacher evaluation was touted as a mechanism to improve teacher effectiveness. In response, virtually every state redesigned its teacher evaluation system. Recently, a growing narrative suggests these reforms failed and should be abandoned. This response may be overly simplistic. We explore the variability of New York City principals'implementation of policies intended to promote teaching effectiveness. Drawing on survey, interview, and administrative data, we analyze whether principals believe they can use teacher evaluation and tenure policies to improve teaching effectiveness and how such perceptions influence policy implementation. We find that principals with greater perceived agency are more likely to strategically use tenure and evaluation policies. Results have important implications for principal training and policy implementation.

There are fierce debates over the best way to prepare teachers. Some argue that easing entry into teaching is necessary to attract strong candidates, whereas others argue that investing in high quality teacher preparation is the most promising approach. Most agree, however, that we lack a strong research basis for understanding how to prepare teachers. This article is one of the first to estimate the effects of features of teachers' preparation on teachers' value added to student test score performance. Our results indicate variation across preparation programs in the average effectiveness of the teachers they are supplying to New York City schools. In particular, preparation directly linked to practice appears to benefit teachers in their 1st year.

Low-achieving students often are taught by the least-qualified teachers. These disparities begin when teachers take their first jobs, and in urban areas they are worsened by teachers' subsequent decisions to transfer and quit. Such quits and transfers increase disparities in at least two ways. First, more qualified teachers are subsequently more likely to leave schools having the lowest-achieving students. Second, the generally high teacher turnover in lower-performing schools disadvantages students in those schools since the effectiveness of teachers increase over the first few years of their careers. In this paper, the authors examine New York City elementary school teachers' decisions to stay in the same school, transfer to another school in the district, transfer to another district, or leave teaching in New York state during the first five years of their careers.

Researchers and policymakers often assume that teacher turnover harms student achievement, though recent studies suggest this may not be the case. Using a unique identification strategy that employs school-by-grade level turnover and two classes of fixed-effects models, this study estimates the effects of teacher turnover on over 850,000 New York City fourth- and fifth-grade student observations over 8 years. The results indicate that students in grade levels with higher turnover score lower in both English language arts (ELA) and math and that these effects are particularly strong in schools with more low-performing and Black students. Moreover, the results suggest that there is a disruptive effect of turnover beyond changing the distribution in teacher quality.

To improve the quality of the teacher workforce, some states have tightened teacher preparation and certification requirements while others have eased requirements and introduced \"alternative\" ways of being certified to attract more people to teaching. Donald Boyd, Daniel Goldhaber, Hamilton Lankford, and James Wyckoff evaluate these seemingly contradictory strategies by examining how preparation and certification requirements affect student achivement. If strong requirements improve student outcomes and deter relatively few potential teachers, the authors say, then they may well be good policy. But if they have little effect on student achievement, if they seriously deter potential teachers, or if schools are able to identify applicants who will produce good student outcomes, then easing requirements becomes a more attractive policy. In reviewing research on these issues, the authors find that evidence is often insufficient to draw conclusions. They do find that highly selective alternative route programs can produce effective teachers who perform about the same as teachers from traditional routes after two years on the job. And they find that teachers who score well on certification exams can improve student outcomes somewhat. Limited evidence suggests that certification requirements can diminish the pool of applicants, but there is no evidence on how they affect student outcomes. And the authors find that schools have a limited ability to identify attributes in prospective teachers that allow them to improve student achievement. The authors conclude that the research evidence is simply too thin to have serious implications for policy. Given the enormous investment in teacher preparation and certification and given the possibility that these requirements may worsen student outcomes, the lack of convincing evidence is disturbing. The authors urge researchers and policymakers to work together to move to a more informed position where good resource decisions can be made.

Teachers in the United States are compensated largely on the basis of fixed schedules that reward experience and credentials. However, there is a growing interest in whether performance-based incentives based on rigorous teacher evaluations can improve teacher retention and performance. The evidence available to date has been mixed at best. This study presents novel evidence on this topic based on IMPACT, the controversial teacher-evaluation system introduced in the District of Columbia Public Schools by then-Chancellor Michelle Rhee. IMPACT implemented uniquely highpowered incentives linked to multiple measures of teacher performance (i.e., several structured observational measures as well as test performance). We present regressiondiscontinuity (RD) estimates that compare the retention and performance outcomes among low-performing teachers whose ratings placed them near the threshold that implied a strong dismissal threat. We also compare outcomes among high-performing teachers whose rating placed them near a threshold that implied an unusually large financial incentive. Our RD results indicate that dismissal threats increased the voluntary attrition of low-performing teachers by 11 percentage points (i.e., more than 50 percent) and improved the performance of teachers who remained by 0.27 of a teacher-level standard deviation. We also find evidence that financial incentives further improved the performance of high-performing teachers (effect size = 0.24). © 2015 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

In practice, teacher turnover appears to have negative effects on school quality as measured by student performance. However, some simulations suggest that turnover can instead have large positive effects under a policy regime in which low-performing teachers can be accurately identified and replaced with more effective teachers. This study examines this question by evaluating the effects of teacher turnover on student achievement under IMPACT, the unique performance-assessment and incentive system in the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS). Employing a quasi-experimental design based on data from the first years of IMPACT, we find that, on average, DCPS replaced teachers who left with teachers who increased student achievement by 0.08 standard deviation (3D) in math. When we isolate the effects of lower-performing teachers who were induced to leave DCPS for poor performance, we find that student achievement improves by larger and statistically significant amounts (i.e., 0.14 SD in reading and 0.21 SD in math). In contrast, the effect of exits by teachers not sanctioned under IMPACT is typically negative but not statistically significant.

Educators raise concerns about what happens to students when they are exposed to new or new-to-school teachers. However, even when teachers remain in the same school they can switch roles by moving grades and/or subjects. We use panel data from New York City to compare four ways in which teachers are new to assignment: new to teaching, new to district, new to school, or new to subject/grade. We find negative effects of having a churning teacher of about one third the magnitude of the effect of a new teacher. However the average student is assigned to churning teachers four times more often than to new teachers, and historically underserved students are slightly more likely to be assigned to churning teachers.