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Recent models and the popular press suggest that large groups of hedge funds follow similar strategies resulting in crowded equity positions that destabilize markets. Inconsistent with this assertion, we find that hedge fund equity portfolios are remarkably independent. Moreover, when hedge funds do buy and sell the same stocks, their demand shocks are, on average, positively related to subsequent raw and risk-adjusted returns. Even in periods of extreme market stress, we find no evidence that hedge fund demand shocks are inversely related to subsequent returns. Our results have important implications for the ongoing debate regarding hedge fund regulation. This paper was accepted by Wei Jiang, finance.

Recent models and the popular press suggest that large groups of hedge funds follow similar strategies resulting in crowded equity positions that destabilize markets. Inconsistent with this assertion, we find that hedge fund equity portfolios are remarkably independent. Moreover, when hedge funds do buy and sell the same stocks, their demand shocks are, on average, positively related to subsequent raw and risk-adjusted returns. Even in periods of extreme market stress, we find no evidence that hedge fund demand shocks are inversely related to subsequent returns. Our results have important implications for the ongoing debate regarding hedge fund regulation.

We test whether model misspecification or liquidity spirals primarily explain the observed excess dependence in filtered (for economic fundamentals) hedge fund index returns and the links between volatility, liquidity shocks, and hedge fund return clustering. Evidence supports the model misspecification hypothesis: i) hedge fund filtered return clustering is symmetric, ii) filtered Short Bias fund returns exhibit negative dependence with filtered returns for other hedge fund types, iii) negative liquidity shocks are associated with clustering in both tails and market volatility subsumes the role of negative liquidity shocks, and iv) these same patterns appear in size-sorted equity portfolios.

A widely held view concerning hedge funds is that they act as a negative disruptive force in financial markets due to “contagion.” Hedge funds are often viewed as culprits in both the 2007–2008 financial crisis and the 2007 quant crisis, for example. The authors evaluate both existing and new evidence of: 1) hedge fund contagion, 2) hedge fund crowding, 3) hedge funds’ role in the 2007–2008 financial crisis, and 4) hedge funds’ role in the August 2007 quant crisis. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the popular press, and most academic work, the authors find little evidence to support the view that hedge fund contagion has widespread negative effects on markets and mispricing.