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Behavioural interventions that leverage social norms are widely used to foster energy conservation. For instance, home energy reports combine information on others’ behaviour (descriptive feedback) and approval for norm compliant behaviour (injunctive feedback). In a randomized controlled trial, we investigated how descriptive and injunctive feedbacks interact to affect electricity use, and evaluate the effects of additional normative feedback presented in the form of descriptive or injunctive energy conservation norm primes. We found that consistent descriptive and injunctive feedback boosts the effectiveness of social information in inducing energy conservation. When descriptive and injunctive feedback are in conflict, conservation behaviour is a function of the relative strength of the two types of feedback. Additional normative feedback produces smaller gains when it reinforces existing information of the same type. These results suggest complementarities between different types of normative messages rather than superiority of any one kind of feedback. Home energy reports convey information about others’ energy use (descriptive norms) and social approval for energy saving behaviour (injunctive norms). This study shows that the combined effect of descriptive and injunctive feedback depends on their consistency and relative strength.

We use a field experiment to test whether saving and borrowing satisfy demand for lump-sum accumulation from regular deposits. Inspired by ROSCAs, we offer different credit and saving contracts to subjects. We find that individuals often accept both credit and saving contract across experimental waves. This behaviour can be rationalised by assuming that individuals seek lump-sum payments and struggle to hold savings. Structural estimation of this model accounts for the behaviour of 75% of participants. Of these, two-thirds have high demand for lump-sum accumulation but savings difficulties. These results imply that the distinction between microlending and microsaving is largely illusory.

We study whether leaders influence the unethical conduct of followers. To avoid selection issues present in natural environments, we use an experiment in which we create simple laboratory firms and assign leadership roles at random. In our first experiment, firms engage in competition and unethical behavior enhances firm earnings but produces a negative externality for all firms. We vary, by treatment, two instruments through which leaders can influence follower conduct—prominent statements to the group and the allocation of monetary incentives. We find that leaders influence the ethical conduct of followers both through their statements and through the use of incentives. Moreover, leaders who are likely to have acted dishonestly in a preliminary stage of the experiment are more likely to employ mechanisms to encourage dishonesty among followers. As a result, firms randomly assigned one of these unethical leaders are more likely to engage in misreporting. A second experiment finds that the above relationships are present, though weaker, when firms do not engage in direct competition.

We conduct lab experiments to investigate demand for consumption agency in married couples from Pakistan. Most subjects are no better at guessing their spouse’s preferences than those of a stranger, suggesting that individual executive agency has instrumental value. We find significant evidence of demand for agency in all experiments, varying with the cost and anticipated instrumental benefit of agency. But subjects often make choices incompatible with purely instrumental motives—e.g., paying for agency when knowing their partner assigned them their preferred choice. Female subjects are willing to exert agency even when they have little executive agency within their household.

We examine the causal effect of legal institutional quality on informal norms of cooperation and study the interaction of institutions and culture in sustaining economic exchange. A total of 346 subjects in Italy and Kosovo played a market game under different and randomly allocated institutional treatments, which generated different incentives to behave honestly, preceded and followed by a noncontractible and nonenforceable trust game. Significant increases in individual trust and trustworthiness followed exposure to better institutions. A 1-percentage-point reduction in the probability of facing a dishonest partner in the market game, which is induced by the quality of legal institutions, increases trust by 7–11 percent and trustworthiness by 13–19 percent. This suggests that moral norms of cooperative behavior can follow improvements in formal institutional quality. Cultural origin, initial trust, and trustworthiness influence opportunistic behavior in markets, but only in the absence of strong formal institutions.

Energy-efficiency classes provide coarse but easy-to-process information designed to help complex decisions. However, they are multi-attribute indices, imprecisely related to the running costs of graded products. Here we evaluate the impact of adding simple but accurate yearly or lifetime energy cost information to the European Union energy label. We conduct a field experiment with an online retailer of energy-using durables, measuring customers’ ( n  = 126,614) search and purchases of refrigerators. Providing precise energy costs leads to purchasing products with lower prices and in lower energy-efficiency classes, but with similar overall energy and total costs. Furthermore, information provision lengthens product search among buyers, with more attention paid to low energy class products. These results highlight that the use of energy classes involves a trade-off between short-term economic savings and higher search cost. By drawing attention away from energy costs, energy-efficiency classes might not be adequate in the context of a fair and transparent climate transition. Energy-efficiency classes provide product information in a simple way but do not accurately report details about lifetime costs. Now, a randomized trial to add energy cost information to a retailer’s website finds that consumers tend to buy cheaper, lower-efficiency products but with similar overall energy and total costs.

The adoption of low carbon technologies needs to go hand in hand with an increased awareness of climate change and its consequences and solutions. Attitudes toward climate change are influenced by a variety of factors, most notably educational attainment and exposure to climatic events attributable to climate change. However, less is known about the effect of technology adoption on climate change beliefs and support for mitigating measures. Through a longitudinal, incentivized field experiment with Chinese households, we assess attitudes toward climate change before and after adopting efficient lighting technology. The results show differential patterns of attitudinal change: while belief in the reality of climate change and willingness to adopt energy-efficient appliances increase, support for energy taxes does not. We attribute the attitudinal change to the adoption of LED light bulbs. Further evidence suggests that experience with efficient technology, rather than knowledge acquisition, drives this change. These results highlight the importance of action-initiating behavioral intervention to complement educational programs aimed at improving knowledge.

Households reduced their electricity use the most when they learnt both that they were using more energy than their neighbours and that energy conservation was socially approved. This suggests that efforts to use social information to nudge conservation should combine different types of social feedback to maximize impact. Messages for policy The content of social information messages determines their impact on energy conservation. Combining descriptive information on neighbours’ efficient energy usage and injunctive social approval for energy efficiency maximizes the effectiveness of social information. Delivering inconsistent descriptive and injunctive information reduces the impact of each piece of feedback. Simply adding more pieces of feedback of the same type has a limited effect.

This study investigates the effect of a large-scale behavioral intervention to conserve energy in the workplace, consisting of an energy-saving competition among a bank's branches. More than 500 branches were involved for a period of one year. Using a difference-in-difference estimation, we find that the competition significantly reduces monthly electricity consumption outside the work schedule (by 7 percent), but that overall energy use does not change significantly (reduction of 2.5 percent). Branch characteristics do not lead to differentiated program response, in stark contrast with the residential sector. In the same setting, we also evaluate a technological intervention automating building energy management. The retrofit leads to significant energy savings (of 18 percent), also concentrated outside the main work schedule. Our results stress the importance of considering contextual characteristics when implementing behavioral programs and show potential overlaps with smart technology investments.