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The earliest extant mathematical books from China contain a lot of problems and data about grains. They also betray a close relationship with imperial bureaucracy in this respect. Indeed, these texts quote administrative regulations about grains. For instance, the Book on mathematical procedures 箅數書, found in a tomb sealed ca. 186 BCE, has a section in common with the \"regulations on granaries\" from the Qin statutes in eighteen domains, known thanks to slips excavated at Shuihudi. Mathematical writings also deal with official vessels used to measure grains. They cast light on statements from, and practices evidenced by, official histories and administrative documents. This article addresses the following issues.

This article examines the rise of gallium nitride as a major semiconductor material at the center of a new industry, solid-state lighting. It argues that the development of gallium nitride was shaped by the interplay of three contextual logics: material logic (the materiality of substances, tools, and fabrication techniques); market logic (the needs, demands, and interests of intended users); and competitive logic (the competitive tensions among laboratories, firms, and nations). For nearly forty years, chemists, physicists, and engineers in the United States and Japan struggled with the persistent material challenges presented by gallium nitride to meet the needs of potential markets in lighting and consumer electronics. Competition among firms and the technological and economic rivalry between the U.S. and Japan led to significant material developments and to the shaping of gallium nitride into a critical material for the manufacture of light emitting diodes. This article is intended to contribute to recent interest in the history of advanced materials and to the larger question of the determinants of innovation in technoscience.

Opponents of mainstream economics have not yet called attention to the lack of in-depth examination of the general scientific conception of modern economics. However, economic science cannot consistently fulfil the epistemological and ontological requirements of the scientific standards underlying this conception. What can be scientifically recognized as true cannot be answered, neither through the actual ontological structure of the object of observation nor through a methodological demarcation. These limitations necessarily lead to the claim for both a pragmatic and a radical methodological pluralism.