Explore the vast range of titles available.

We show that the neighborhoods in which children grow up shape their earnings, college attendance rates, and fertility and marriage patterns by studying more than 7 million families who move across commuting zones and counties in the United States. Exploiting variation in the age of children when families move, we find that neighborhoods have significant childhood exposure effects: the outcomes of children whose families move to a better neighborhood—as measured by the outcomes of children already living there—improve linearly in proportion to the amount of time they spend growing up in that area, at a rate of approximately 4% per year of exposure. We distinguish the causal effects of neighborhoods from confounding factors by comparing the outcomes of siblings within families, studying moves triggered by displacement shocks, and exploiting sharp variation in predicted place effects across birth cohorts, genders, and quantiles to implement overidentification tests. The findings show that neighborhoods affect intergenerational mobility primarily through childhood exposure, helping reconcile conflicting results in the prior literature.

We find that regulators can implement identical rules inconsistently due to differences in their institutional design and incentives, and this behavior may adversely impact the effectiveness with which regulation is implemented. We study supervisory decisions of U.S. banking regulators and exploit a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal and state supervisors to the same bank at exogenously set time intervals. Comparing federal and state regulator supervisory ratings within the same bank, we find that federal regulators are systematically tougher, downgrading supervisory ratings almost twice as frequently as do state supervisors. State regulators counteract these downgrades to some degree by upgrading more frequently. Under federal regulators, banks report worse asset quality, higher regulatory capital ratios, and lower return on assets. Leniency of state regulators relative to their federal counterparts is related to costly outcomes, such as higher failure rates and lower repayment rates of government assistance funds. The discrepancy in regulator behavior is related to different weights given by regulators to local economic conditions and, to some extent, differences in regulatory resources. We find no support for regulator self-interest, which includes ‘‘revolving doors’’ as a reason for leniency of state regulators.

We develop two measures of board composition to investigate whether directors appointed by the CEO have allegiance to the CEO and decrease their monitoring. Co-option is the fraction of the board comprised of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office. As Co-option increases, board monitoring decreases: turnover-performance sensitivity diminishes, pay increases (without commensurate increase in pay-performance sensitivity), and investment increases. Non-Co-opted Independence—the fraction of directors who are independent and were appointed before the CEO—has more explanatory power for monitoring effectiveness than the conventional measure of board independence. Our results suggest that not all independent directors are effective monitors.

This paper examines capital reallocation among firms in Korean business groups (chaebol) in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and the consequences of this capital reallocation for the investment and performance of chaebol firms. We show that chaebol transferred cash from low-growth to high-growth member firms, using cross-firm equity investments. This capital reallocation allowed chaebol firms with greater investment opportunities to invest more than control firms after the crisis. These firms also showed higher profitability and lower declines in valuation than control firms following the crisis. Our results suggest that chaebol internal capital markets helped them mitigate the negative effects of the Asian crisis on investment and performance.

We find that socially connected fund managers have more similar holdings and trades. The overlap of funds whose managers reside in the same neighborhood is considerably higher than that of funds whose managers live in the same city but in different neighborhoods. These effects are larger when managers share a similar ethnic background, and are not explained by preferences. Valuable information is transmitted through these peer networks: a long-short strategy composed of stocks purchased minus sold by neighboring managers delivers positive risk-adjusted returns. Unlike prior empirical work, our tests disentangle the effects of social interactions from community effects.

We study the dynamics of high-frequency market efficiency measures. We provide evidence that these measures comove across stocks and with each other, suggesting the existence of a systematic market efficiency component. In vector autoregressions, we show that shocks to funding liquidity (the TED spread), hedge fund assets under management, and a proxy for algorithmic trading are significantly associated with systematic market efficiency. Thus, stock market efficiency is prone to systematic fluctuations, and, consistent with recent theories, events and policies that impact funding liquidity can affect the aggregate degree of price efficiency.

Equity options display a strong factor structure. The first principal components of the equity volatility levels, skews, and term structures explain a substantial fraction of the crosssectional variation. Furthermore, these principal components are highly correlated with the S&P 500 index option volatility, skew, and term structure, respectively. We develop an equity option valuation model that captures this factor structure. The model predicts that firms with higher market betas have higher implied volatilities, steeper moneyness slopes, and a term structure that covaries more with the market. The model provides a good fit, and the equity option data support the model’s cross-sectional implications.

We present evidence on the term structure of the equity premium. We recover prices of dividend strips, which are short-term assets that pay dividends on the stock index every period up to period T and nothing thereafter. It is short-term relative to the index because the index pays dividends in perpetuity. We find that expected returns, Sharpe ratios, and volatilities on short-term assets are higher than on the index, while their CAPM betas are below one. Short-term assets are more volatile than their realizations, leading to excess volatility and return predictability. Our findings are inconsistent with many leading theories.

Our objective in this paper is to examine whether one can use option-implied information to improve the selection of mean-variance portfolios with a large number of stocks, and to document which aspects of option-implied information are most useful to improve their out-of-sample performance. Portfolio performance is measured in terms of volatility, Sharpe ratio, and turnover. Our empirical evidence shows that using option-implied volatility helps to reduce portfolio volatility. Using option-implied correlation does not improve any of the metrics. Using option-implied volatility, risk premium, and skewness to adjust expected returns leads to a substantial improvement in the Sharpe ratio, even after prohibiting short sales and accounting for transaction costs.