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97 result(s) for "1997-2006"
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Grown at Glen Garden : Ben Hogan, Byron Nelson, and the little Texas golf course that propelled them to stardom
\"Follows golfing stars Ben Hogan and Byron Nelson from their early days in the sport through their famous pro careers and portrays the long friendship between the two players\"--Provided by publisher.
Do Better-Connected CEOs Innovate More?
We present evidence suggesting that chief executive officer (CEO) connections facilitate investments in corporate innovation. We find that firms with better-connected CEOs invest more in research and development and receive more and higher quality patents. Further tests suggest that this effect stems from two characteristics of personal networks that alleviate CEO risk aversion in investment decisions. First, personal connections increase the CEO’s access to relevant network information, which encourages innovation by helping to identify, evaluate, and exploit innovative ideas. Second, personal connections provide the CEO with labor market insurance that facilitates investments in risky innovation by mitigating the career concerns inherent in such investments.
شركاء في الجريمة : الدور البريطاني في غزو العراق : الملخص التنفيذي لتقرير لجنة تشيلكوت للتحقيق بشأن العراق
اعتادت القوى العظمى أن تبحث عن مبررات آنية ومباشرة (نظيفة) لتخوض حروبها المقررة مسبقا لأهداف استراتيجية (قذرة) أبعد من تلك الأهداف المباشرة المعلنة. هكذا خاضت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية حروبها طوال القرن العشرين ومطلع القرن الحادي والعشرين، وكان آخرها غزو العراق واحتلاله عام 2003، تحت مبررات كاذبة تتعلق بأسلحة دمار شامل يملكها العراق وبتورط نظامه بالإرهاب. ولم يختلف الأمر بالنسبة إلى بريطانيا، الحليف الأساسي للولايات المتحدة في حربها الأخيرة تلك. لكن ما اختلف في الموضوع أن المبررات \"النظيفة\" الكاذبة التي قدمها رئيس الوزراء البريطاني توني بلير إلى حكومة بلاده ومجلس عمومها لتشريع مشاركته في تلك الحرب لم تمر بلا محاسبة بعد انكشاف زيفها ونتائجها الكارثية، كما تمر عادة في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية. يقدم هذا الكتاب الترجمة العربية للملخص التنفيذي لتقرير لجنة التحقيق في شأن العراق التي ألفها رئيس الوزراء البريطاني غوردن براون عام 2009 للتحقيق في التباسات مشاركة بريطانيا في غزو العراق واحتلاله عام 2003 في عهد رئيس الوزراء الاسبق توني بلير. يساهم هذا الكتاب في تقديم تفاصيل مهمة عن واحدة من أخطر الحروب التي خاضتها بريطانيا (إلى جانب الولايات المتحدة) بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية، والتي أدت إلى تدمير وشل قدرات واحد من أهم البلدان العربية اقتصاديا وعسكريا واستراتيجيا وحضاريا وتهديدا لإسرائيل. ويعد الكتاب خلاصة عمل سبع سنوات للجنة التحقيق البريطانية التي وضعت عام 2016 تقريرا مؤلفا من أثني عشر جزءا تدين بصورة واضحة تورط الحكومة البريطانية في تلك الحرب.
The impact of training on productivity and wages
This paper uses firm-level panel data of on-the-job training to estimate its impact on productivity and wages. To this end, we apply and extend the control function approach for estimating production functions, which allows us to correct for the endogeneity of input factors and training. We find that the productivity premium of a trained worker is substantially higher compared to the wage premium. Our results are consistent with recent theories that explain work-related training by imperfect competition in the labor market.
Diagnosing Expertise
Expert performance is often evaluated assuming that good experts have good outcomes. We examine expertise in medicine and develop a model that allows for two dimensions of physician performance: decision making and procedural skill. Better procedural skill increases the use of intensive procedures for everyone, while better decision making results in a reallocation of procedures from fewer low-risk to high-risk cases. We show that poor diagnosticians can be identified using administrative data and that improving decision making improves birth outcomes by reducing C-section rates at the bottom of the risk distribution and increasing them at the top of the distribution.
Economic Nationalism in Mergers and Acquisitions
This paper studies government reactions to large corporate merger attempts in the European Union during 1997 to 2006 using hand-collected data. We document widespread economic nationalism in which the government prefers that target companies remain domestically owned rather than foreign-owned. This preference is stronger in times and countries with strong far-right parties and weak governments. Nationalist government reactions have both direct and indirect economic impacts on mergers. In particular, these reactions not only affect the outcome of the mergers that they target but also deter foreign companies from bidding for other companies in that country in the future.
Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market
Agency theory and optimal contracting theory posit opposing roles and shareholder wealth effects for corporate inside directors. We evaluate these theories using the market for outside directorships to differentiate among inside directors. Firms with inside directors holding outside directorships have better operating performance and market-to-book ratios, especially when monitoring is more difficult. These firms make better acquisition decisions, have greater cash holdings, and overstate earnings less often. Announcements of outside board appointments improve shareholder wealth, while departure announcements reduce it, consistent with these inside directors improving board performance and outside directorships being an important source of inside director incentives.
Large-Sample Evidence on Firms' Year-over-Year MD&A Modifications
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has expressed concern about the informativeness of firms' Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) disclosures. A firm's MD&A is potentially uninformative if it does not change appreciably from the previous year after significant economic changes at the firm. We introduce a measure for narrative disclosure—the degree to which the MD&A differs from the previous disclosure—and provide three findings on the usefulness of MD&A disclosure. First, firms with larger economic changes modify the MD&A more than those with smaller economic changes. Second, the magnitude of stock price responses to 10-K filings is positively associated with the MD&A modification score, but analyst earnings forecast revisions are unassociated with the score, suggesting that investors—but not analysts—use MD&A information. Finally, MD&A modification scores have declined in the past decade even as MD&A disclosures have become longer; the price reaction to MD&A modification scores has also weakened, suggesting a decline in MD&A usefulness.
THE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
Many states in Latin America, Africa, and Asia lack the monopoly of violence, even though this was identified by Max Weber as the foundation of the state, and thus the capacity to govern effectively. In this paper we develop a new perspective on the establishment of the monopoly of violence. We build a model to explain the incentive of central states to eliminate nonstate armed actors (paramilitaries) in a democracy. The model is premised on the idea that paramilitaries may choose to and can influence elections. Since paramilitaries have preferences over policies, this reduces the incentives of the politicians they favor to eliminate them. We then investigate these ideas using data from Colombia between 1991 and 2006. We first present regression and case study evidence supporting our postulate that paramilitary groups can have significant effects on elections for the legislature and the executive. Next, we show that the evidence is also broadly consistent with the implication of the model that paramilitaries tend to persist to the extent that they deliver votes to candidates for the executive whose preferences are close to theirs and that this effect is larger in areas where the presidential candidate would have otherwise not done as well. Finally, we use roll-call votes to illustrate a possible \"quid pro quo\" between the executive and paramilitaries in Colombia.