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Cardiac physiological synchrony is regarded as an important component of social interaction due to its putative role in prosocial behaviour. Yet, the processes underlying physiological synchrony remain unclear. We aim to investigate these processes. 20 dyads (19 men, 21 women, age range 18–35) engaged in a self-paced interpersonal tapping synchronization task under different levels of tapping synchrony due to blocking of sensory communication channels. Applying wavelet transform coherence analysis, significant increases in heart rate synchronization from baseline to task execution were found with no statistically significant difference across conditions. Furthermore, the control analysis, which assessed synchrony between randomly combined dyads of participants showed no difference from the original dyads’ synchrony. We showed that interindividual cardiac physiological synchrony during self-paced synchronized finger tapping resulted from a task-related stimulus equally shared by all individuals. We hypothesize that by applying mental effort to the task, individuals changed into a similar mental state, altering their cardiac regulation. This so-called psychophysiological mode provoked more uniform, less variable fluctuation patterns across all individuals leading to similar heart rate coherence independent of subsequent pairings. With this study, we provide new insights into cardiac physiological synchrony and highlight the importance of appropriate study design and control analysis.

Behavioral rhythms synchronize between humans for communication; however, the relationship of brain rhythm synchronization during speech rhythm synchronization between individuals remains unclear. Here, we conducted alternating speech tasks in which two subjects alternately pronounced letters of the alphabet during hyperscanning electroencephalography. Twenty pairs of subjects performed the task before and after each subject individually performed the task with a machine that pronounced letters at almost constant intervals. Speech rhythms were more likely to become synchronized in human–human tasks than human–machine tasks. Moreover, theta/alpha (6–12 Hz) amplitudes synchronized in the same temporal and lateral-parietal regions in each pair. Behavioral and inter-brain synchronizations were enhanced after human–machine tasks. These results indicate that inter-brain synchronizations are tightly linked to speech synchronizations between subjects. Furthermore, theta/alpha inter-brain synchronizations were also found in subjects while they observed human–machine tasks, which suggests that the inter-brain synchronization might reflect empathy for others' speech rhythms.

Human adults recruit distinct networks of brain regions to think about the bodies and minds of others. This study characterizes the development of these networks, and tests for relationships between neural development and behavioral changes in reasoning about others’ minds (‘theory of mind’, ToM). A large sample of children ( n  = 122, 3–12 years), and adults ( n  = 33), watched a short movie while undergoing fMRI. The movie highlights the characters’ bodily sensations (often pain) and mental states (beliefs, desires, emotions), and is a feasible experiment for young children. Here we report three main findings: (1) ToM and pain networks are functionally distinct by age 3 years, (2) functional specialization increases throughout childhood, and (3) functional maturity of each network is related to increasingly anti-correlated responses between the networks. Furthermore, the most studied milestone in ToM development, passing explicit false-belief tasks, does not correspond to discontinuities in the development of the social brain. Though adults’ brains process the internal states of others’ bodies versus others’ minds in distinct brain regions, it is not clear when this functional dissociation emerges. Here, authors study 3–12 year olds and show that these networks are distinct by age 3 and become even more distinct with age.

Economic games are used to investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying cooperative behaviour, and show that intuition supports cooperation in social dilemmas, whereas reflection can undermine these cooperative impulses. Generosity is a question of timing Many people are willing to make sacrifices for the common good, but little is known about the cognitive mechanisms that underlie such cooperative behaviour. In economic experiments subjects often contribute cooperatively against what rational self-interest should dictate. This study uses a series of ten varied experimental designs, including both one-shot and repeated games, to establish whether we are intuitively predisposed to cooperate or to act selfishly. And it seems our gut response is to cooperate — but given more time to think the logic of self-interest undermines collective action and we become less generous. Cooperation is central to human social behaviour 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 . However, choosing to cooperate requires individuals to incur a personal cost to benefit others. Here we explore the cognitive basis of cooperative decision-making in humans using a dual-process framework 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 . We ask whether people are predisposed towards selfishness, behaving cooperatively only through active self-control; or whether they are intuitively cooperative, with reflection and prospective reasoning favouring ‘rational’ self-interest. To investigate this issue, we perform ten studies using economic games. We find that across a range of experimental designs, subjects who reach their decisions more quickly are more cooperative. Furthermore, forcing subjects to decide quickly increases contributions, whereas instructing them to reflect and forcing them to decide slowly decreases contributions. Finally, an induction that primes subjects to trust their intuitions increases contributions compared with an induction that promotes greater reflection. To explain these results, we propose that cooperation is intuitive because cooperative heuristics are developed in daily life where cooperation is typically advantageous. We then validate predictions generated by this proposed mechanism. Our results provide convergent evidence that intuition supports cooperation in social dilemmas, and that reflection can undermine these cooperative impulses.

Scientists have traditionally limited the mechanisms of social cognition to one brain, but recent approaches claim that interaction also realizes cognitive work. Experiments under constrained virtual settings revealed that interaction dynamics implicitly guide social cognition. Here we show that embodied social interaction can be constitutive of agency detection and of experiencing another's presence. Pairs of participants moved their “avatars” along an invisible virtual line and could make haptic contact with three identical objects, two of which embodied the other's motions, but only one, the other's avatar, also embodied the other's contact sensor and thereby enabled responsive interaction. Co-regulated interactions were significantly correlated with identifications of the other's avatar and reports of the clearest awareness of the other's presence. These results challenge folk psychological notions about the boundaries of mind, but make sense from evolutionary and developmental perspectives: an extendible mind can offload cognitive work into its environment.

Synchrony refers to the coordinated interplay of behavioural and physiological signals that reflect the bi-directional attunement of one partner to the other’s psychophysiological, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral state. In mother-child relationships, a synchronous pattern of interaction indicates parental sensitivity. Parenting stress has been shown to undermine mother-child behavioural synchrony. However, it has yet to be discerned whether parenting stress affects brain-to-brain synchrony during everyday joint activities. Here, we show that greater parenting stress is associated with less brain-to-brain synchrony in the medial left cluster of the prefrontal cortex when mother and child engage in a typical dyadic task of watching animation videos together. This brain region overlaps with the inferior frontal gyrus, the frontal eye field, and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which are implicated in inference of mental states and social cognition. Our result demonstrates the adverse effect of parenting stress on mother-child attunement that is evident at a brain-to-brain level. Mother-child brain-to-brain asynchrony may underlie the robust association between parenting stress and poor dyadic co-regulation. We anticipate our study to form the foundation for future investigations into mechanisms by which parenting stress impairs the mother-child relationship.

The default mode network (DMN) is classically considered an ‘intrinsic’ system, specializing in internally oriented cognitive processes such as daydreaming, reminiscing and future planning. In this Perspective, we suggest that the DMN is an active and dynamic ‘sense-making’ network that integrates incoming extrinsic information with prior intrinsic information to form rich, context-dependent models of situations as they unfold over time. We review studies that relied on naturalistic stimuli, such as stories and movies, to demonstrate how an individual’s DMN neural responses are influenced both by external information accumulated as events unfold over time and by the individual’s idiosyncratic past memories and knowledge. The integration of extrinsic and intrinsic information over long timescales provides a space for negotiating a shared neural code, which is necessary for establishing shared meaning, shared communication tools, shared narratives and, above all, shared communities and social networks.The role of the default mode network (DMN) is unclear. In this Perspective, Yeshurun, Nguyen and Hasson review evidence that the DMN integrates extrinsic inputs with intrinsic information over long timescales, enabling it to represent meaning in a way that can be shared between individuals.

Most neuroscientists would agree that for brain research to progress, we have to know which experimental manipulations have no effect as much as we must identify those that do have an effect. The dominant statistical approaches used in neuroscience rely on P values and can establish the latter but not the former. This makes non-significant findings difficult to interpret: do they support the null hypothesis or are they simply not informative? Here we show how Bayesian hypothesis testing can be used in neuroscience studies to establish both whether there is evidence of absence and whether there is absence of evidence. Through simple tutorial-style examples of Bayesian t-tests and ANOVA using the open-source project JASP, this article aims to empower neuroscientists to use this approach to provide compelling and rigorous evidence for the absence of an effect.Keysers et al. show why P values do not differentiate inconclusive null findings from those that provide important evidence for the absence of an effect. They provide a tutorial on how to use Bayesian hypothesis testing to overcome this issue.

Key Points Sense of agency refers to the feeling of controlling one's own actions and, through them, events in the external world. Sense of agency can be measured in experimental settings by asking participants to explicitly judge whether their action caused an outcome event or by using implicit measures, such as the compression of perceived time between action and outcome. Current models of motor control propose that the sense of agency is established retrospectively, by comparing delayed sensory feedback about actions and their consequences with the feedback predicted by an internal model. The connectivity between the frontal areas that develop motor plans for voluntary action and the parietal areas that monitor outcomes plays a key part in computing sense of agency. Processes in the frontal cortex occurring before the initiation of action also contribute to sense of agency. For example, selecting which of a number of alternative actions to make can increase the sense of agency over the subsequent outcome. These frontal contributions to agency operate prospectively and underlie the metacognitive experience of one's own voluntary action. Several neuropsychiatric disorders involve distorted or unreliable sense of agency. This suggests that successful computation of agency by the brain is a key element of normal consciousness and mental health. Many key features of modern human societies, such as social responsibility or use of advanced technologies, are based on the ability of the brain to compute agency correctly, even in complex interactions. The experience of controlling our own actions is an important feature of human mental life. The processes giving rise to this experience are thought to be disrupted in some psychiatric disorders. In this article, Haggard describes recent developments in our understanding of the cognitive processes and neural mechanisms underlying the sense of agency. In adult life, people normally know what they are doing. This experience of controlling one's own actions and, through them, the course of events in the outside world is called 'sense of agency'. It forms a central feature of human experience; however, the brain mechanisms that produce the sense of agency have only recently begun to be investigated systematically. This recent progress has been driven by the development of better measures of the experience of agency, improved design of cognitive and behavioural experiments, and a growing understanding of the brain circuits that generate this distinctive but elusive experience. The sense of agency is a mental and neural state of cardinal importance in human civilization, because it is frequently altered in psychopathology and because it underpins the concept of responsibility in human societies.

Although a large proportion of our lives are spent participating in social interactions, the investigation of the neural mechanisms supporting these interactions has largely been restricted to situations of social observation — that is, situations in which an individual observes a social stimulus without opportunity for interaction. In recent years, efforts have been made to develop a truly social, or ‘second-person’, neuroscientific approach to these investigations in which neural processes are examined within the context of a real-time reciprocal social interaction. These developments have helped to elucidate the behavioural and neural mechanisms of social interactions; however, further theoretical and methodological innovations are still needed. Findings to date suggest that the neural mechanisms supporting social interaction differ from those involved in social observation and highlight a role of the so-called ‘mentalizing network’ as important in this distinction. Taking social interaction seriously may also be particularly important for the advancement of the neuroscientific study of different psychiatric conditions.Studies that examine brain activity during real-time social interactions may advance our understanding of human social behaviour. Redcay and Schilbach describe progress in ‘second-person’ neuroscience and discuss the insights into the brain mechanisms of social behaviour that have been gained.