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We explain how underinvestment in infrastructure upgrades is aggravated under access regulation with a cost-based access charge. When a cost-based access charge is imposed on an incumbent, the incumbent has a weak incentive to invest in infrastructure upgrades due to insufficient rewards for the investment. Then, the incumbent’s underinvestment induces the overuse of a bypass by an entrant that chooses productively efficient technology, when the degree of spillover is large, the production cost of the bypass is low, and the incumbent’s investment cost is high. The overuse of a bypass decreases the incumbent’s profits, which further reduces the incumbent’s incentive for investment. Thus, the overuse of a bypass generates a vicious cycle of underinvestment in infrastructure upgrades.

This paper analyses the regulation of the market of voice call termination on mobile networks, by considering the remedy of asymmetric access charges and the hypothesis of discriminatory retail pricing. In the two way interconnection, the operators revenue depends on two factors: the retail price and the access charge. If the retail prices are different between calls that terminate on the same network (on-net) and calls that terminate on the rival network (off-net), the competition is more complex, involving positive networks externalities for the incumbent operator. In order to reduce the competitive disadvantage for new entrants and smaller operators many European regulation authorities have introduced the remedy of asymmetric access charges. This paper is aimed at analysing the effectiveness of this regulatory measure, assuming that operators are differentiated in terms of brand loyalty and cost structure.

Regulatory arbitrage refers to structuring activity to take advantage of gaps or differences in regulations or laws. Examples include Facebook modifying its terms and conditions to reduce the exposure of its user data to strict European privacy laws, and Uber and other platform companies organizing their affairs to categorize workers as non-employees. This article explores the constraints and limits on regulatory arbitrage through the lens of the technology industry, known for its adaptiveness and access to strategic resources. Specifically, the article explores social license and the bundling of laws and resources as constraining forces on regulatory arbitrage, and the legal mismatch that can arise from new business models and innovations as a key area in which the limits of regulatory arbitrage can be observed.

It has been exactly 20 years since the common grounds for the design of track access charges (TAC) were laid for the European railways by the publication of Directive 2001/14/EC. However, these grounds were defined broadly, thus resulting in significant divergence both in the models applied by countries and during the model redesign within one country over the course of time. The participants in the process of charge system redesign includes all stakeholders from a country’s railway sector (infrastructure manager, train operating companies, the ministries responsible for transport, finance and economy, government, and regulatory bodies). Their opinions and requirements are often opposed, and they all need to be acknowledged simultaneously. This paper aims to solve the issue of ensuring continuity in the charge model redesign while achieving a balance between the requirements of all stakeholders. Moreover, it tackles the issue of producing a sustainable long-term TAC model by using survey methods and statistical analysis. The proposed approach was tested in practice during the access charge model redesign for the railways of Montenegro. The results show the importance of continual enhancement in TAC model development as one of the challenges and key precursors for the harmonization of all stakeholders’ requirements.

We offer a new explanation for why platforms, such as Internet service providers and mobilephone networks, offer plans with download limits: through one of two mechanisms, doing so causes content providers to reduce prices or improve quality. This generates greater surplus for consumers, which a platform captures via higher consumer access fees. Even accounting for congestion externalities, a platform limits downloads more than would be welfare maximizing; indeed, by so much, that barring such practices can be welfare superior to what a platform would do. Paradoxically, a platform will install more bandwidth when it can restrict downloads than when it cannot.

The gold model, which reflects government policy, 2 involves immediate, unrestricted, online access to peer reviewed and published research papers, free of any access charge and with maximum opportunities for reuse. Helen Djurkovic, chief executive of the Political Studies Association, said that open access policy in the UK had been shaped by the life sciences and did not take sufficient account of issues faced by the humanities and social sciences.

Past research in marketing and psychology suggests that pricing structure may influence consumers' perception of value. In the context of two commonly used pricing schemes, pay-per-use and two-part tariff, we evaluate the impact of pricing structure on consumer preferences for access services. To this end, we develop a utility-based model of consumer retention and usage of a new service. A notable feature of the model is its ability to capture the pricing structure effect and measure its impact on consumer retention, usage, and pricing policy. Using data from a pricing field experiment for a new telecommunication service, we find that consumers derive lower utility from consumption under a two-part tariff than pay-per-use pricing, resulting in lower retention of customers and lower usage of the service. Specifically, our demand analysis shows that a two-part tariff structure leads to an average decline of 10.5% in the annual retention rate and an average decrease of 38.7% in yearly usage relative to pay-per-use pricing after controlling for income effects. Despite the higher customer churn and lower usage, we find that the two-part tariff is still the profit-maximizing pricing structure. However, our results show that if firms ignore the pricing structure (or access fee) effect, then they would overcharge customers for the access fee and undercharge them for the per-minute price. Translated in terms of profitability, the failure to account for the access fee effect leads to a reduction of 11% in firm profit.

We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile-to-mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, 'collusion' may well be in line with social welfare.