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Trade adjustment assistance (TAA) is government aid to those affected by trade agreements. We review the history of TAA in Canada and ask whether Canada needs to reintroduce it in response to the recent intensification of trade negotiations. In light of the compensation offered by the federal government in connection with the Canada–European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), we examine how TAA fits in with the evolution of Canadian federalism in the trade policy area. Based in part on interviews with provincial trade negotiators, we conclude, first, that the compensation is an outcome of Canadian federalism. Second, we argue that while there is no reason to reintroduce a federal TAA program for workers, compensation for provinces is necessary to facilitate their cooperation with the implementation of trade treaty provisions. Third, we suggest that a more transparent rationale for such compensation would be superior to the ad hoc compensation observed in CETA.

Purpose The purpose of this study is to explore the essential cause for the policy failure of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) in South Korea. Design/methodology/approach To substantiate the claims made for the failure of the policy, this paper focuses on the differences in policy preferences among the government ministries and agencies involved in TAA. Findings The failure in the TAA policy, according to this study, was attributed to the conflicts and miscoordination arising from the differences in policy preferences among government ministries and agencies. To rectify this failure, the South Korean government had to revise its laws and regulations several times over a short period. Originality/value Drawing on the analytical framework of the literature on policy failure, this paper examines the causal relationships between outcomes of TAA policy and the conflicts or miscoordination among government bodies at each stage: initiatives and planning, implementation and operation of the policy.

The conventional approach to trade liberalization has been to liberalize trade through international agreement and address subsequent domestic fallout and spillovers through domestic policies. In consequence, international obligations in trade liberalization are not legally connected with ‘flanking’ measures to address their negative effects. We discuss the shortcomings of this conventional approach with respect to labor adjustment and environmental protection: for political reasons, trade liberalization requires today the simultaneous regulation of labor and environmental spillovers. We suggest a novel approach to trade liberalization that includes the necessary flanking policies as part of, or linked to, the international agreement itself. This novel approach seeks to achieve the best of both worlds: reaping the benefits of international trade while making sure that negative spillovers are effectively addressed. To illustrate the intricacies of this approach, we introduce a new conceptual framework covering the negative effects of trade liberalization and flanking or mitigating policies, and a proposed novel approach in the form of trade liberalization packages and package treaties. Trade liberalization packages and package treaties are currently emerging around the world (e.g. sustainable palm oil in EFTA–Indonesia) and deserve our close attention.

At a time when trade and globalization are subject to extremely polarized political debates, we study the interplay between politics and the certification outcome of trade adjustment assistance (TAA), a US national policy meant to buffer the domestic labour market from adverse effects of increased international trade. To this end, we capitalize on the unique design, implementation and detailed data collection efforts of the US TAA program. We employ a rich multi-dimensional data set to quantify the effects of political influence on the TAA certification process, controlling for a variety of fixed effects, in particular at the industry level. We find that political factors such as party affiliation of the president, congressional voting outcomes at the state and district levels and whether a petition was filed in a presidential election year influence the TAA certification probability as well as the decision time. À l’heure où le commerce et la mondialisation font l’objet de débats politiques extrêmement polarisés, nous nous intéressons à l’interaction entre la politique et l’aboutissement d’une certification au plan d’aide aux rajustements commerciaux, une politique nationale américaine visant à protéger le marché national du travail des répercussions négatives liées à l’essor du commerce international. À cette fin, nous nous appuyons sur la conception singulière, la mise en œuvre et le recueil de données détaillées du Programme d’aide à l’ajustement commercial des États-Unis (PAAC). Pour mesurer les répercussions de l’influence de la politique sur le processus de certification du PAAC, nous utilisons un ensemble de données multidimensionnel important tenant compte d’un ensemble d’effets fixes, notamment au niveau sectoriel. Nous constatons qu’un certain nombre de facteurs politiques, notamment l’affiliation politique du président, l’issue des votes parlementaires au niveau national et local ou le dépôt d’une pétition au cours d’une année d’élection présidentielle peut avoir une incidence sur la probabilité d’une certification ainsi que sur le calendrier décisionnel.

How responsive is the US’ Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) to the labor dislocation that results from trade integration? Recent findings suggest that the world's most ambitious trade adjustment program barely responds to import shocks, and that the shortfall is made up by disability insurance and early retirement. This holds considerable implications: TAA offers a lens onto the central question of whether developed democracies can effectively redistribute the gains from international economic integration. We take a closer look at these results. Using petition-level data over a 20-year period, we find that TAA is between 1.7 and 3.3 times more responsive than current estimates suggest. Yet the news is not all good. As we show, the responsiveness of TAA has decreased considerably since the 1990s, just as developed democracies started facing increasing pushback against liberalization. This shortfall, in turn, has political consequences: areas where TAA has been least responsive were also more likely to shift toward voting for Trump in the 2016 Presidential election. Our findings speak to the considerable challenge governments face in aiding workers “left behind” by liberalization.

The contributors to this volume include numerous members of the trade policy community who analyze and discuss the salient social dimensions of U.S. trade policies. These issues include the effects of trade on wage inequality; trade and immigration policy; U.S. trade adjustment assistance policies; the effects of NAFTA on environmental quality; the role of labor standards in U.S. trade policies; the economics of labor standards and the GATT; issues of child labor; and the role of interest groups in the design and implementation of U.S. trade policies. Chapter authors are Kyle Bagwell, Claude Barfield, George J. Borjas, Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, Nancy Dunne, Gary S. Fields, John Kirton, Mike Jendrzejczyk, Phyllis Shearer Jones, Edward E. Leamer, Robert Naiman, Gregory K. Schoepfle, Robert W. Staiger, and Robert M. Stern.

Background In late 2018 the United States, Canada, and Mexico signed a new trade agreement (most commonly referred to by its US-centric acronym, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA) to replace the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The new agreement is the first major trade treaty negotiated under the shadow of the Trump Administration’s unilateral imposition of tariffs to pressure other countries to accept provisions more favourable to protectionist US economic interests. Although not yet ratified, the agreement is widely seen as indicative of how the US will engage in future international trade negotiations. Methods Drawing from methods used in earlier health impact assessments of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, we undertook a detailed analysis of USMCA chapters that have direct or indirect implications for health. We began with an initial reading of the entire agreement, followed by multiple line-by-line readings of key chapters. Secondary sources and inter-rater (comparative) analyses by the four authors were used to ensure rigour in our assessments. Results The USMCA expands intellectual property rights and regulatory constraints that will lead to increased drug costs, particularly in Canada and Mexico. It opens up markets in both Canada and Mexico for US food exports without reducing the subsidies the US provides to its own producers, and introduces a number of new regulatory reforms that weaken public health oversight of food safety. It reduces regulatory policy space through new provisions on ‘technical barriers to trade’ and requirements for greater regulatory coherence and harmonization across the three countries. It puts some limitations on contentious investor-state dispute provisions between the US and Mexico, provisions often used to challenge or chill health and environmental measures, and eliminates them completely in disputes between the US and Canada; but it allows for new ‘legacy claims’ for 3 years after the agreement enters into force. Its labour and environmental chapters contain a few improvements but overall do little to ensure either workers’ rights or environmental protection. Conclusion Rather than enhancing public health protection the USMCA places new, extended, and enforceable obligations on public regulators that increase the power (voice) of corporate (investor) interests during the development of new regulations. It is not a health-enhancing template for future trade agreements that governments should emulate.

Since 1962, when Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act, every new U.S. trade deal has had the same essential bargain at its core. Congress agrees to give the president the power to lower trade barriers, while at the same time providing adjustment assistance for those workers displaced by competition with new imports. This bargain illustrates what I refer to as the Misalignment Thesis: when a legislative bargain is struck over two or more interdependent policies, the policy subject to more frequent or costlier renegotiation and implementation will be disfavored in the long run. In the trade context, the misalignment occurs because trade liberalization commitments are indefinite, enshrined in international agreements, and implemented by the executive branch; the adjustment assistance provisions are temporary, purely domestic, and require renegotiation and reauthorization in Congress.

Historically, government workforce development programs have focused on younger individuals. The effectiveness of these programs for older workers aged 50 or older remains unclear. Therefore, this study examined the effect of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) programs in the state of Georgia on older workers. This study used WIOA performance data, including a total of 11,390 older workers between 2016 and 2020, and the American Community Survey (ACS) data. Descriptive analyses of two datasets examined participant demographics, training information, program participation outcomes, and older labor force characteristics in the state. WIOA programs were successful in serving two disadvantaged groups in employment, including older females and older Black participants. Despite a decrease in the number of older training participants over time, the most chosen training programs aligned with data on common occupations of the older workforce in the state. These programs improved the employability of older female participants but not for other disadvantaged older workers who were older in age or non-White individuals. The findings of this study emphasize the importance of addressing structural barriers to employment for older workers in employment transition, along with the improvement of the government workforce development programs.

The contributors to this volume include numerous members of the trade policy community who analyze and discuss the salient social dimensions of U.S. trade policies. These issues include the effects of trade on wage inequality; trade and immigration policy; U.S. trade adjustment assistance policies; the effects of NAFTA on environmental quality; the role of labor standards in U.S. trade policies; the economics of labor standards and the GATT; issues of child labor; and the role of interest groups in the design and implementation of U.S. trade policies. Chapter authors are Kyle Bagwell, Claude Barfield, George J. Borjas, Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, Nancy Dunne, Gary S. Fields, John Kirton, Mike Jendrzejczyk, Phyllis Shearer Jones, Edward E. Leamer, Robert Naiman, Gregory K. Schoepfle, Robert W. Staiger, and Robert M. Stern. Commenters are Steve Beckman, Jagdish Bhagwati, Alan V. Deardorff, Avinash Dixit, Pharis Harvey, David van Hoogstraten, John H. Jackson, Lawrence Mishel, Jack Otero, J. David Richardson, Dani Rodrik, Mark Silbergeld, and T. N. Srinivasan. Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern are Professors of Economics and Public Policy, University of Michigan.