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This groundbreaking book is the first to look at administration and administrative law in the earliest days of the American republic. Contrary to conventional understandings, Mashaw demonstrates that from the very beginning Congress delegated vast discretion to administrative officials and armed them with extrajudicial adjudicatory, rulemaking, and enforcement authority. The legislative and administrative practices of the U.S. Constitution's first century created an administrative constitution hardly hinted at in its formal text. Beyond describing a history that has previously gone largely unexamined, this book, in the author's words, will \"demonstrate that there has been no precipitous fall from a historical position of separation-of-powers grace to a position of compromise; there is not a new administrative constitution whose legitimacy should be understood as not only contestable but deeply problematic.\"

\"With the Chinese government planning a comprehensive and detailed reform of regulatory law, the European experience is likely to contribute significantly. This timely book analyses comparative Chinese and EU regulatory reform from a law and economics perspective.\"-- Provided by publisher.

Federal agencies have taken steps to include the public in a wide range of environmental decisions. Although some form of public participation is often required by law, agencies usually have broad discretion about the extent of that involvement. Approaches vary widely, from holding public information-gathering meetings to forming advisory groups to actively including citizens in making and implementing decisions. Proponents of public participation argue that those who must live with the outcome of an environmental decision should have some influence on it. Critics maintain that public participation slows decision making and can lower its quality by including people unfamiliar with the science involved. This book concludes that, when done correctly, public participation improves the quality of federal agencies' decisions about the environment. Well-managed public involvement also increases the legitimacy of decisions in the eyes of those affected by them, which makes it more likely that the decisions will be implemented effectively. This book recommends that agencies recognize public participation as valuable to their objectives, not just as a formality required by the law. It details principles and approaches agencies can use to successfully involve the public.

Focuses on the oft-cited but ultimately overlooked concept of scale to identify the root causes of China's regulatory failures in food safety. --Page [i].

The strict procedural rules that characterize modern administrative law are said to be necessary to sustain the fragile legitimacy of a powerful and constitutionally suspect administrative state. We are likewise told that they are essential to public accountability because they prevent factional interests from capturing agencies. Yet the legitimacy-and-accountability narrative at the heart of administrative law is both overdrawn and harmful. Procedural rules have a role to play in preserving legitimacy and discouraging capture, but they advance those goals more obliquely than is commonly assumed and may exacerbate the very problems they aim to fix. This Article aims to draw into question the administrative lawyer's instinctive faith in procedure, to reorient discussion to the trade-offs at the heart of any system designed to structure government action, and to soften resistance to a reform agenda that would undo counterproductive procedural rules. Administrative law could achieve more by doing less.

Judicial deference to executive statutory interpretation — a doctrine now commonly associated with the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council—is one of the central principles in modern American public law. Despite its significance, however, the doctrine's origins and development are poorly understood. The Court in Chevron claimed that the roots of judicial deference stem from statutory interpretation cases dating to the early nineteenth century. Others, by contrast, have sought to locate Chevron's doctrinal roots in judicial review's origins in the writ of mandamus. According to the standard narrative, courts in the pre-Chevron era followed a multifactor and ad hoc approach to issues of judicial deference; there was little theory that explained the body of cases; and the holdings and reasoning of the cases were often contradictory and difficult to rationalize. This Article challenges the standard account. It argues that the Supreme Court in Chevron, and scholarly commentators since, have misidentified nineteenth-century statutory interpretation cases applying canons of construction \"respecting\" contemporaneous and customary interpretation as cases deferring to executive interpretation as such. It further argues that, although the standard for obtaining a writ of mandamus was central to judicial review in the early Republic, statutory developments in the latter half of the nineteenth century (significantly, the enactment of general federal-question jurisdiction in 1875) ultimately mooted the relevance of that standard. Finally, it discusses the intellectual challenges to the traditional interpretive framework beginning in the early twentieth century; the Supreme Court's embrace of these intellectual challenges in the early 1940s; and Congress's attempt in the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) standard-of-review provision to reject the Court's interpretive experimentation and corresponding deviation from the traditional canons. The Article thus seeks to establish — contrary to the suggestion in Chevron and recent cases — that there was no rule of statutory construction requiring judicial deference to executive interpretation qua executive interpretation in the early American Republic. And it contends that the governing statute of administrative law—the APA—was intended to codify the traditional interpretive approach and to reject the experimentation of the 1940s Court. Taken together, these conclusions cast doubt on much of the received wisdom on the doctrinal basis for the rule announced in Chevron.

Section 5(d), the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA's) underutilized declaratory order provision, possesses the power to transform administrative governance. To date, however, agencies have failed to comply with Congress's command to liberally administer section 5(d)'s \"sound discretion\" standard. That standard mandates binding decisions to resolve regulatory uncertainties.