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Eighth Army Takes Tripoli (pg. 1). British Hard Pressed in Tunisia (pg. 1-2). Mr. Attlee on the Military Situation (pg. 2). On the Political Situation in North Africa (pg. 2-3). Mr. Churchill at Casablanca (pg. 3). In Turkey (pg. 3). Allied Governments and German Plunder (pg. 3-4). Chinese Extra-Territoriality Renounced (pg. 4). New Demands on Industrial Production (pg. 4-5). Compulsory Arbitration in the Mining Industry (pg. 5). Supplementary Vote of Credit (pg. 5). Ministry of Town and Country Planning Established (pg. 5-6). L.C.C. and Public School System (pg. 6). Proposed Reforms of Foreign Service (pg. 6-7). House of Commons Approval (pg. 7). Chancellor of Exchequer on Civil Service (pg. 7-8). Air Raids in January (pg. 8). Chancellor of Exchequer on Economic Policy (pg. 8-9). Mr. Dalton on Post-War Industry (pg. 9). Mr. Eden on French North Africa (pg. 9-10). Return of Parliamentary Mission from China (pg. 10). Debate on Catering Bill (pg. 10-11). Mr. Churchill on the Casablanca Conference (pg. 11). On the Situation at Sea (pg. 11-12). On the Far Eastern War (pg. 12). Advance of Eighth Army into Tunisia (pg. 12-13). Commons Debate on Beveridge Report (pg. 13). Government Statement (pg. 13-14). Members' Dissatisfaction (pg. 14). Sir K. Wood's Speech (pg. 14-15). Labour Party's Amendment (pg. 15). Mr. H. Morrison's Speech (pg. 15-16). The Division (pg. 16). Labour Ministers' Reprimand (pg. 16-17). Lords and Beveridge Report (pg. 17). Red Army Anniversary Celebration (pg. 17). Civilian Women's Compensation (pg. 17). Scottish Hydro-electrical Development Bill (pg. 17-18). War Minister on Army Administration (pg. 18-19). On Training and Equipment (pg. 19). First Lord on U-boat War (pg. 19-20). On Fleet Losses and Gains (pg. 20-21). Election of New Speaker (pg. 21). Air Minister on Expansion of Air Force (pg. 21). On Air Defence of Great Britain (pg. 21-22). On Air Offensive over Continent (pg. 22). On Civil Air Transport (pg. 22-23). Friction between Ministry and B.O.A.C. (pg. 23). British Air Raids in February (pg. 23). Operations in Tunisia (pg. 23-24). Rommel's Attacks on Eighth Army (pg. 24). Mareth Line taken by the British (pg. 24-25). Gabes Gap Crossed (pg. 25). Colonial Secretary and Jamaica (pg. 25-26). Progress of Common Wealth Party (pg. 26). Prime Minister on Future World Organisation (pg. 26-27). On Four-Years' Plan for Great Britain (pg. 27-28). Effect of Broadcast (pg. 28). New Powers for Ministry of Production (pg. 28). Lord Cranborne on the Refugee Problem (pg. 28-29). Catering Bill Passed (pg. 29). Mr. Amery on Self-Government in India (pg. 29). British Air Offensive in March (pg. 29-30). Underground Disaster in London (pg. 30). Twenty-fifth Birthday of R.A.F. (pg. 30). Civil Estimates for 1943–44 and Accounts for 1942–43 (pg. 30-31). The “Keynes” Currency Plan (pg. 31). Discussion in Commons (pg. 31-32). Mr. Eden on Anglo-American Relations (pg. 32). The Campaign in Burma (pg. 32).

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Discusses planning for military operations for future nuclear warfare, including combat readiness of armed forces and means of conducting military actions.

Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System uses Electronic equipment Sensors to transmit Imagery intelligence; Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System purpose and characteristics; RF-4C Aircraft are in use with the [U.S. Air Force; U.S. Air Force. Air National Guard]; RF-4C Aircraft primary mission is Tactical intelligence Intelligence collection achieved through penetrating Air defense systems; RF-4C Aircraft are tactical penetrating Aerial reconnaissance Aircraft that carry Photographic equipment and perform Infrared imagery Intelligence collection; TR-1 Aircraft are in service with [NATO; United Kingdom. Royal Air Force]; TR-1 Aircraft primary mission is high-altitude, long endurance tactical Aerial reconnaissance using Electronic equipment Sensors; SR-71 Aircraft are in service with the U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command; SR-71 Aircraft have the Military capability to penetrate areas heavily defended by Anti-aircraft weapons; SR-71 Aircraft primary purpose is high altitude strategic Aerial reconnaissance; [SR-71 Aircraft; TR-1 Aircraft; RF-4C Aircraft] mission and capabilities

International opinion in [Europe; Asia] supports the United States actions in the Cuban Crisis while Sino-Soviet Bloc countries have initiated Propaganda campaigns to condemn the actions; Soviet Union. Armed Forces leaves and discharges are canceled for Military personnel with duties relating to [Rockets; Anti-aircraft weapons; Submarines]; Soviet Union Submarines are spotted along Shipping lanes used by Soviet Merchant vessels; TASS (Soviet Union news agency) states that U.S. Military actions against Soviet Ships will result in \"total\" Warfare according to reports by Japan News media; Contingency plans for military actions against Cuba and other Military actions relating to the Cuban Crisis will be assigned the Codeword Operation Scabbards; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command reports that Communists in [Asia; Sino-Soviet Bloc] are not likely to initiate Military actions against the U.S. Pacific Command

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff believes Soviet counteractions to U.S. action in Cuba most likely to be in Berlin (Federal Republic of Germany) but could be against [Iran; Turkey; Korea (Republic); Taiwan Strait]; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Strategic Survey Council believed that likely Soviet counteractions to U.S. military intervention in Cuba would be an [Intercontinental ballistic missiles; \"accident\" on the U.S. site for; Nuclear weapon tests] at Johnston Island; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command is directed to prepare Operation Grey Wolf Rescue and recovery mission in case Aircraft downings of Low altitude reconnaissance flights Military aircraft occur; Joseph F. Carroll informs Maxwell D. Taylor that Cuba. Armed Forces lack Anti-aircraft weapons capable of seriously interfering with [Low altitude reconnaissance flights; U-2 Flights over Cuba]; Statistics [on the number of; U-2 Flights over Cuba] and Low altitude reconnaissance flights by [RF-101 Aircraft; F-8U Aircraft] from 14 October - 10 December 1962; Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S. Navy authorizes acknowledgement that SS Trajan (Naval vessel) was boarded at the Naval quarantine line on 13 November 1962; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decided on 6 November 1962 to recall U-2 Aircraft Aerial reconnaissance flights because of hostile fire received from Cuban Air defense systems; U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command is authorized to reduce Airborne alert to one-eighth status effective 15 November 1962; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff chronology of Cuban Crisis; U-2 Aircraft Aerial reconnaissance monthly flights increased from 20-50 to 95 during October 1962; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency reports Evidence of Cuba receiving Electronic equipment from the Soviet Union for conducting Electronic countermeasures; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency established a Cuban Situation Room on 4 October 1962; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff consider proposal for Air attacks on Soviet missile bases for Medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba to be \"unsound\"; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that Air attacks on Medium-range ballistic missiles Missile bases would be unsound unless they were accompanied by Blockades of Cuba and strikes against [Tanks; Bomber aircraft; Patrol boats; Nuclear warhead bunkers]; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decide on 17 October 1962 that Missiles in Cuba were a sufficient Military threat to warrant U.S. military intervention in Cuba even after they reached Operational readiness; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Strategic Survey Council believe that likely Soviet counteractions to U.S. military intervention in Cuba would be actions against [Iran; Berlin (Federal Republic of Germany); U.S. Navy]; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff report that 21 October is the earliest feasible date for Air attacks on Cuba and that 23 October 1962 is the optimum date; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the earliest feasible date for Operation Plan 316 was 28 October 1962; Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff believes that the U.S. military intervention in Cuba should be prepared for on 19 October 1962 while the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff support immediate Military intervention; U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary approves cancellation of Exercise Phibriglex-62 on 20 October 1962; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency 20 October 1962 discovery of Nuclear warhead bunkers confirmed Soviet motivations for Deployment of Nuclear warheads in Cuba; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff are unwilling to launch air Blockades of Cuba unless United States counteractions against Cuban Air defense systems are authorized in response to U.S. Aircraft downings; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff request decoding of Communications among Soviet Diplomats in Latin America; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency provides a daily Intelligence Report describing Operational readiness of Soviet [Intermediate-range ballistic missiles; Medium-range ballistic missiles; IL-28 Aircraft] sites and other Weapon systems; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army in Europe was notified on 27 October 1962 of U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary approval to load Nuclear weapons on U.S. \"strike\" Aircraft on \"quick release\" Military alert status; U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary canceled the implementation of Operation Bugle Call and authorized the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command to destroy 6 million leaflets; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Air Force Continental Air Defense Command was informed that his Rules of engagement including a restriction against using Nuclear weapons were not changed for Contingency plans for military actions against Cuba; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff request recommendation from Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command on use of tactical Nuclear weapons to support any U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff is instructed to direct U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities to develop a worldwide Psychological operations program to gain support for removal of all Soviet Offensive weapons from Cuba; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to Robert S. McNamara that Soviet Union-United States Negotiations in New York (25 October - 4 December 1962) include a provision guaranteeing the U.S. right to conduct Aerial reconnaissance in return for a U.S. Non-Invasion Commitment; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommends that United States policy toward Cuban refugees should refrain from aiding groups such as Alpha 66; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff estimates a maximum of 18,500 Casualties in the first ten days of a U.S. military intervention in Cuba assuming no use of Nuclear weapons; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff believes that \"alongside\" Ship inspection by U.S. Naval vessels was not sufficient to assure Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with 5 November 1962 decision of Robert S. McNamara not to disclose the U-2 Aircraft encounter with MiG aircraft but to make Diplomatic protests; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff concludes on 12 November 1962 that only implementation of [Operation Plan 312; Operation Plan 316] can produce a final Cuban Crisis Settlement; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommends that after a \"limited\" period U.S. Air attacks should be conducted to destroy all IL-28 Aircraft in Cuba; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decides on 9 November 1962 that it \"would be preferable\" if IL-28 Aircraft remained in Cuba which would relieve the need for a U.S. Non-Invasion Commitment; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency informs U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command that redeployment of Soviet missile bases is unlikely providing that adequate Verification of Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba occurs; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency identifies total of 27 Surface-to-air missile sites of which three were alternate sites; Aerial reconnaissance does not substantiate reports of Submarine bases in Cayo Largo (Cuba)

Summarizes intelligence on unfolding global events with national security implications.

Director of U.S. Naval Intelligence reports the possibility of naval Mines in Cuban Territorial waters; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command reports that there is no Evidence of Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines among the four Soviet Submarines sighted in the Western Atlantic Ocean; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command is ordered to prepare Operation Bugle Call which calls for dropping Propaganda leaflets on designated Urban areas in Cuba; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that planning for Operation Plan 316 be refined and that planning for Operation Plan 314 be postponed; Low altitude reconnaissance flights over Cuba are subject to Anti-aircraft weapons Attacks; [U.S. Air Force; U.S. Marine Corps] Aircraft are dispersed from southern Florida to reduce their vulnerability; Aerial reconnaissance mission of 26 October 1962 reveals that three IL-28 Aircraft have been assembled in Cuba; U.S. Marine Corps. 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade is reported en route to the Panama Canal to join the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet

U.S. Army practices airborne training in Exercise Sun Shade from 12 November to 10 December as rehearsal of Operation Plan 316; Cuba. Revolutionary Navy Komar Missile Attack Boats depart Mariel on October 18 for operations at Banes; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command proposed the capture of intact SA-2 Missiles Surface-to-air missile sites as part of [Operation Plan 312; Operation Plan 316]; Commander of the U.S. Navy Naval Base Guantanamo indicated that movement of FROG Missiles into positions threatening Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) should be deemed \"an offensive act unacceptable\" to the U.S. due the missiles capacity to carry Nuclear warheads; Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) reported a marked increase in Cuba harassment in June 1962; Military build-up in Cuba of the Cuba. Revolutionary Navy included the acquisition of [Military training; Komar Missile Attack Boats; Kronshtadt Patrol Boats] from the Soviet Union; Cuba. Revolutionary Air Force Military build-up in Cuba was indicated from 1961 to 1962 by [MiG-15 Aircraft; MiG-17 Aircraft; MiG-19 Aircraft; MiG-21 Aircraft; Helicopters; Light aircraft; Military training] from the Soviet Bloc; Soviet Union Merchant vessels traffic to Cuba increased in July 1962; Cuba. Ground Forces Military equipment includes new shipments of [Tanks; Weapons; Rocket launchers; Artillery; Anti-aircraft weapons; Rifles; Mortars; Machine guns; Amphibious vehicles; Armored personnel carriers]; Intelligence confirms [Surface-to-air missiles; IL-28 Aircraft] Deployment in Cuba and Soviet Submarines in the northwestern Atlantic Ocean region during September to October 1962; Intelligence indicated Soviet combat teams are in control of [FROG Missiles; Snapper Anti-Tank Missiles] at [Artemisa; Santiago de las Vegas; Remedios IRBM Complex (Cuba); Holguin (Cuba)] Military bases; Contingency plans to assure maximum Operational readiness for [Operation Plan 312; Operation Plan 314] were implemented during 1-22 October 1962; Robert S. McNamara informs Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command that Soviet counteractions against Berlin (Federal Republic of Germany) will be considered valid reason for U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Robert S. McNamara directs that evidence of Offensive weapons in Cuba or Attacks by Cuba against Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) will be considered sufficient to warrant U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Robert S. McNamara reports that Cuban intervention in Latin America or indication of support for Cuban anti-Castro groups Attacks will be considered sufficient to warrant U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command describes problems of U.S. Armed Forces Deployment affecting implementation of Operation Plan 316; U.S. Navy. Atlantic Fleet Submarines operations during the Cuban Crisis; U.S. Navy. Atlantic Fleet service force operations during the Cuban Crisis; U.S. Armed Forces Amphibious operations during the Cuban Crisis; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command describes Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet operations in conducting the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962); Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet count of Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba does not match with reports from Soviet Ships; U.S. Navy reports minor collisions between its Naval vessels taking part in the Naval quarantine line; U.S. Navy. Atlantic Fleet. Task Force 135 involvement in Cuban Crisis operations; U.S. Navy. Atlantic Fleet. Anti-Submarine Force involvement in the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) operations; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command describes Anti-submarine warfare activities against Soviet Submarines in the Atlantic Ocean; [Anti-submarine warfare; Air defense systems] forced Soviet Submarines to surface prior to implementation of the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962); Latin America-U.S. Naval Task Force involvement with the U.S. South Atlantic Force during the Cuban Crisis; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command analysis of U.S. Atlantic Command role in the Cuba Crisis; Cuba Alliances with Soviet Union lead to increased requests for [Economic assistance; Security assistance]; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command estimates numbers of Soviet Bloc Military personnel assigned to assist the [Cuba. Revolutionary Army; Cuba. Revolutionary Navy; Cuba. Revolutionary Air Force]; Soviet Bloc Shipping for [Arms shipments; Trade with Cuba] during period of the Cuban Crisis; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command describes status of and command structures for Contingency plans for military actions against Cuba as specified in [Operation Plan 314-61; Operation Plan 312-62; Operation Plan 316]; [Exercise Blue Water; Exercise Phibriglex-62] are carried on prior to Cuban contingency operations; [U-2 Aircraft; Low altitude reconnaissance flights] received fire only twice over Cuba during Surveillance of Soviet missile bases; U.S. Atlantic Command Communications plans and activities during the Cuban Crisis; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command initial reaction to knowledge of the Cuban Crisis was to improve Operational readiness of U.S. Atlantic Command to be able to execute Operation Plan 312; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command of events that may lead to execution of [U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Operation Plan 314]; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command estimates number of Soviet Union. Armed Forces in Cuba and Cuban [Cuba. Revolutionary Air Force; Military personnel] trained in the Soviet Union; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strike Forces increased Operational readiness and prepositioning of Military personnel for the implementation of Operation Plan 314 prior to the days of the Cuban Crisis; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command developed plans for Military governments to assume control of a zone of Emergency powers in southern Florida to start at the \"commencement of hostilities\"; U.S. Federal Aviation Administration participated in planning for [Military air transit rights; Military aircraft] to assume priority over civilian and non-tactical Air traffic as part of implementation of [Operation Plan 312; Operation Plan 314; Operation Plan 316]; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command estimates of Military personnel staffing requirements for U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command evaluates problems affecting the implementation of Military actions and operations; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command estimates of expected Casualties of U.S. Armed Forces with implementation of Operation Plan 316; Psychological operations preparations for [Operation Plan 314; Operation Plan 316]; Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) participation in and command structures during the Cuban Crisis; U.S. Marine Corps participation in U.S. Navy. Atlantic Fleet operations during the Cuban Crisis

United States submits a Deposition for the Oliver L. North Trial (1989); Israel during [Operation Tipped Kettle; Operation Tipped Kettle II] provided the U.S. Department of Defense with Weapons taken from the Palestine Liberation Organization; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency used Weapons obtained through [Operation Tipped Kettle; Operation Tipped Kettle II] for Arms transfers to the Contras; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency used Operation Elephant Herd to stockpile Military equipment after the Boland Amendment II of 12 October 1984 restricted United States Military assistance for the Contras; Reagan Administration (20 January 1981-20 January 1989) assured Israel that it would receive Compensation in the form of [Economic assistance; Security assistance] for its participation in [Operation Tipped Kettle; Operation Tipped Kettle II; Operation Elephant Herd]; Howard J. Teicher and David Kimche discussed using Honduras as a conduit for Third-party arms transfers to deliver Israeli Weapons to the Contras; Saudi Arabia agreed to provide $1 million per month in Contra funding in response to overtures from Robert C. McFarlane; William J. Casey met with [Ronald W. Reagan; George Bush; George P. Shultz; Caspar W. Weinberger; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick; John W. Vessey, Jr.; Arthur S. Moreau, Jr.; Edwin Meese III; Robert C. McFarlane; John M. Poindexter] and recommended offering Quid pro quo arrangements to [Honduras; Costa Rica] providing them with increased Security assistance in return for facilitating Third-party arms transfers to the Contras; China (People's Republic) offered to provide Contra funding through the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency; William French Smith concluded in July 1984 that Third-party arms transfers were not grounds for Impeachment; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Chairman John W. Vessey, Jr. and [Oliver L. North; Richard V. Secord] arranged for China (People's Republic) to provide Anti-aircraft weapons to the Contras; John K. Singlaub discussed the provision of \"substantial\" Contra funding with officials from Korea (Republic) and with a senior official from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in February 1985; Saudi Arabia contributed more than $25 million to the Contras after a personal appeal from Ronald W. Reagan; David Kimche met with Michael H. Armacost to arrange for continued Military assistance from Israel for countries in Central America; Reagan Administration (20 January 1981-20 January 1989) sought [Communications equipment; Aircraft; Military spare parts] for the Contras from countries in [Asia; Latin America]; Yitzhak Rabin of the Israel. Ministry of Defense reportedly offered to provide Military advisors with knowledge of the Spanish language to the Contras as part of Quid pro quo arrangements that included the sale of Kfir Aircraft to Honduras; Brunei Darussalam contributed $10 million to the Contras after solicitations from [Elliott Abrams; Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.; George P. Shultz]; [John M. Poindexter; Yitzhak Rabin] agreed to have the Erria (Israel cargo ship) pick up Weapons for delivery to the Contras on condition that the Arms transfers appear to be privately arranged between Israel and Richard V. Secord; Amiram Nir indicated in September 1986 that Shimon Peres would discuss Third-party arms transfers with Ronald W. Reagan; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reported that Honduras would continue to supply covert Military assistance to the Contras after the passage of the Boland Amendment II of 12 October 1984; [John M. Poindexter; Ronald W. Reagan] discussed a proposal by George P. Shultz allowing the U.S. Congress to \"wink\" at Third-party arms transfers involving the delivery of Weapons from the United States through El Salvador to the Contras; [Guatemala; Honduras] provided [Aircraft; Ammunition; Military equipment; Equipment maintenance; Military spare parts; Contra camps] and false End user certificate to the Contras; Contra leaders on the Southern Front received $100 thousand from Manuel Antonio Noriega in July 1984; Robert C. McFarlane was advised that Guatemala would support the Contras as part of Quid pro quo arrangements with the Reagan Administration (20 January 1981-20 January 1989) that called upon the United States to provide Guatemala with [Economic assistance; Credit] and other services; Ronald W. Reagan agreed to recommendations by the U.S. National Security Council. Crisis Pre-Planning Group that Honduras be offered Quid pro quo arrangements calling upon the United States to provide Security assistance and aid from the Economic Support Fund in return for continued Honduran support for the Contras; George Bush served as an emissary between the Reagan Administration (20 January 1981-20 January 1989) and Honduras. President Roberto Suazo Cordova in the fall of 1985 to convey the terms of Quid pro quo arrangements calling for expedited Security assistance for Honduras; Costa Rica. President Luis Alberto Monge and United States officials apparently agreed on Quid pro quo arrangements permitting the Contras to construct the Santa Elena Airstrip (Costa Rica) in return for Funding for Costa Rica from the United States; Oliver L. North met with Military officers from the Honduras. Armed Forces to discuss impediments to Contra resupply operations caused by restrictions on the use of Honduran Airstrips; Oliver L. North recommended to [George Bush; John M. Poindexter] in January 1986 that they stress to Honduras. President Jose Azcona Hoyo the necessity of Honduran assistance for the Contras; Reagan Administration (20 January 1981-20 January 1989) official was told that he should avoid specific comments about U.S. Department of State. Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office flights passing through Honduras because Contra resupply operations originating from [Ilopango Airport (El Salvador); Aguacate Air Base (Honduras)] carried both Humanitarian assistance and Weapons; Costa Rica senior official Benjamin Piza Carranza was instrumental in organizing the Southern Front and in providing Logistics support to the Contras; Elliott Abrams with the knowledge of [Ronald W. Reagan; George Bush; Donald T. Regan; Philip C. Gast; Richard L. Armitage; Nestor D. Sanchez] offered Quid pro quo arrangements to Jose Azcona Hoyo calling for the United States to provide [Weapons; Surface-to-air missiles] to Honduras valued at $20 million; Ronald W. Reagan wrote to [Jose Napoleon Duarte; Jose Azcona Hoyo] in May 1986 with the concurrence of [Elliott Abrams; William J. Casey; Fred C. Ikle] affirming Reagan's intention to provide El Salvador with Trade concessions and to provide Honduras with assistance from the Economic Support Fund; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reported to the [U.S. National Security Agency; U.S. Department of State; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency; U.S. Office of the White House; U.S. National Security Council; U.S. Southern Command; United States Embassy. Costa Rica; United States Embassy. Nicaragua; United States Embassy. Honduras; United States Embassy. Panama] about contributions from Donors in the United States and Latin America for Contras fighting on the Southern Front including funds provided to Contra leaders by Manuel Antonio Noriega; Manuel Antonio Noriega representative reportedly met with Oliver L. North in August 1986 and offered to carry out the Assassination of the leadership of the Ortega Administration (10 January 1985-25 April 1990) in return for a resumption of Security assistance for Panama and United States help in improving Noriega's image in International opinion; [Oliver L. North; John M. Poindexter] agreed that Assassination attempts would be Illegal activities but that Sabotage carried out by Panama would be \"another story\"; British citizens carried out the Sabotage of Nicaraguan Weapons storage sites in 1985 with assistance from ordnance experts who were Panamanian citizens; Oliver L. North recommended helping former Honduras. Armed Forces officer Jose Bueso Rosa after his conviction in the United States for Illegal activities in order to deter him from revealing his participation with [John D. Negroponte; Paul F. Gorman; Duane R. (\"Dewey\") Clarridge] in Covert operations on behalf of the Contras; Manuel Antonio Noriega told Oliver L. North in September 1986 that he was willing to undertake \"immediate action\" against the Ortega Administration (10 January 1985-25 April 1990) and suggested [Oil refineries; Airports; Puerto Sandino] as potential targets; Oliver L. North asked in September 1986 that a scheduled meeting between Oscar Arias Sanchez and Ronald W. Reagan be canceled because Arias had disclosed the existence of the Santa Elena Airstrip (Costa Rica)