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Objective : to analyze video games with anticorruption components and to make a conclusion of the possibility to use them in anticorruption education with various mechanics, plots and narratives. Methods : analysis and summarization of the narrative of commercial video games, studies of the scientific literature and research aimed at revealing the influence of video games on a player’s cognitive abilities, as well as studying the possibilities of using video games in education and enlightenment allowed us to assume that video games may be used as an auxiliary instrument for anticorruption enlightenment. Also, we analyzed the audience of video games players to determine its relevancy for the goals of anticorruption education. According to the goals of anticorruption education identified by us, namely: ability to distinguish corruption and its types, developing negative attitude to corruption and positive attitude to a whistle-blower, illustration of short-term and long-term consequences of corruption – we performed a critical analysis of the video games narrative in order to identify the ones most appropriate for anticorruption education. Results : in the work, we studied the educational potential of video games and determined the efficiency level of their influence of the educational process. By the example of particular game projects, we proved in practice the expediency of using video games as a tool of anticorruption education. Scientific novelty : the article proves inexpediency of assessing video games exclusively as a form of escapism and, for the first time, specifies the examples of practical implementation of commercial video games, not being training programs or simulators, for organization of anticorruption education. Practical significance : the main conclusions of the article can be used in practical activity when developing long-term strategies and programs of anticorruption education, as well as within the activity of developing video games to assess longterm consequences of the narrative used.

This volume provides an analytical framework and operational approaches needed for the implementation of results-based accountability. The volume makes a major contribution to the literature on public management and evaluation. Major subject areas covered in this book include: performance based accountability, e-government, legal and institutional framework to hold government to account; fighting corruption; external accountability and the role of supreme audit institutions on detecting fraud and corruption.

Object/Context: This article analyses and compares the ideological dimension of anticorruption discourses and policies in Colombia during the presidency of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) and Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) and in Ecuador during the presidency of Rafael Correa (2007-2017). Methodology: We develop an ideological and discourse analysis of corruption discourses combining the theoretical framework of Laclau and Mouffe on discourse analysis with the morphological analysis of ideologies developed by Michael Freeden. We utilize this theoretical framework in order to analyze both qualitatively and quantitatively anticorruption discourses and policies. Conclusions: In the Colombian case the anticorruption discourse of presidents Uribe and Santos (2002-2018) legitimized a neoliberal order by articulating corruption as a phenomenon that belongs primarily to the public sphere. The government of Correa (2007-2017), however, identified corruption primarily with the private sector. As a consequence, his anticorruption discourse served to resist the neoliberal order and legitimize the ideology of the twenty first-century socialism. Originality: There are very few studies that unearth the ideological dimension of anticorruption discourses and policies. This paper seeks to fill this vacuum by utilizing an innovative theoretical framework that allows us to identify the ways in which anticorruption discourses and policies serve to legitimize and implement a political ideology

Governments at times combat corruption intensively in an attempt to (re)gain political trust. While corruption crackdowns may demonstrate government resolve to fight corruption, the high-profile corruption uncovered may also shock the public. Therefore, how effective can anticorruption policies help boost political trust? We argue that anticorruption policies influence political trust through two channels: direct experience, that is, interactions with governmental bodies, and the media, that is, second-hand information culled from reporting on anticorruption. Differentiating between these two channels illustrates that anticorruption policies may have distinct effects on political trust for different social groups. We contextualize our theoretical framework with the latest anticorruption drive in China, combining longitudinal data from a national survey and field interviews and using difference-in-differences (DID) models. Our findings support our predictions. For state-system insiders (e.g., civil servants), increase of political trust is less pronounced than for outsiders because the former directly experience radical implementation processes and ineffective anticorruption outcomes. Similarly, political trust increases at a lower rate for groups with higher levels of education and greater access to information outside governmental propaganda than for their less-informed counterparts. Intensive anticorruption efforts are therefore more likely to increase political trust for the grassroots than for elites in China.

Fighting corruption is often seen as a crucial step toward building better institutions, but how it affects political selection remains less well understood. This article argues that in systems where corruption functions as an informal incentive for government to attract talent, anticorruption initiatives that curb rent-seeking opportunities may unintentionally weaken both the quality and the representativeness of the bureaucracy. The authors test this argument in China using an original nationwide survey of government officials and an identification strategy that exploits exogenous variations in enforcement levels created by the recent anticorruption campaign. The study finds that intensified enforcement has generated two potentially negative selection effects: a deterrence effect that lowers the average ability of newly recruited bureaucrats, and a compositional effect that discourages the entry of lower-class individuals in favor of those who are affluent and well connected. These findings highlight important hidden human capital costs of corruption elimination in developing countries.

Do anticorruption efforts affect a country’s investment appeal? Business investment depends on a stable and predictable institutional environment, but meaningful control of corruption typically requires a radical change in the institutional system that has enabled it. This underscores the need for a deeper understanding of how anticorruption efforts can affect the enforcing country’s institutional system on which investment relies. Synthesizing the concept of institutional complementarity and the literature on different modes of anticorruption enforcement, we propose that campaign-style anticorruption enforcement in emerging-market countries can produce “regulatory institutional misalignment,” defined as a situation in which government agencies continue to monopolize critical resources while the exercise of bureaucratic discretion essential to achieving effective resource allocation diminishes substantially. We theorize how such institutional misalignment can harm domestic business environments and drive emerging-market firms to engage more actively in cross-border acquisitions (CBAs). Our hypotheses derived from the regulatory institutional misalignment perspective on CBAs are supported by empirical analyses using data from a sample of privately controlled firms during China’s unprecedented anticorruption campaign launched in late 2012. We also discuss this study’s contributions to the IB literature on institutional complementarity, CBAs by emerging-market enterprises, and anticorruption efforts’ impact on international business.

PurposeDue to the mixed evidence regarding politically connected (PCON) firms and voluntary disclosure, the authors seek to investigate the direction of the association between Brazilian PCON firms and their level of information disclosed in the fight against corruption. This study is conducted in a developing country with a weak judicial system where board members or directors with political connections can operate without any oversights.Design/methodology/approachThe authors empirically test our hypothesis that voluntary anti-corruption disclosure is negatively associated with political connections. Content analysis, Wilcoxon Rank and Pearson Correlation were employed in a sample of 30 companies that belong to sectors with the highest risk of corruption, between 2014 and 2016, the period of Brazilian elections. A sample of 90 observations is used with data collected from annual reports of companies listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange in Brazil.FindingsThe study’s results indicate a positive and significant association between the level of voluntary anti-corruption disclosure and corporate political connection, confirming our second hypothesis. PCON firms could seek to improve their legitimacy after recent corporate corruption scandals discovered in Brazil where government members participated in the schemes of bribe and money laundering and embezzlement. Although our sample is composed of firms in industries of high corruption risk, which could increase bias, the results improve the literature with empirical contribution that has given little attention to the issue.Originality/valueThe latest corruption scandals in Brazil showed that companies were involved with government officials, corruption is one of the country's biggest issues for diverting public resources to basic needs such as education and health. The relationship between political connections and voluntary disclosure is an open empirical question, particularly dealing with anti-corruption. The study’s findings bring light on the subject, which deserves greater attention not only from researchers but from the society that is most affected by corruption.

The established literature has recognized revolving-door hiring as a means for firms to obtain protection against political risks and advance their business interests. This article theorizes about the cost of the revolving door between politics and business, which transmits uncertainty during turbulent times from the political system to firms. I empirically estimate the cost of revolving-door recruitment for over 3,000 publicly listed firms in the early years of a major corruption crackdown in China. I show that firm-level returns on revolving-door recruitment became negative during this period. In contrast to conventional corporate governance explanations, the mechanism proposed in this article emphasizes the external perceptions and financing of firms. Text analyses of over 1 million equity reports and bank-loan record data show that political connections act as a negative signal to external financiers, thereby discouraging external financing.

More than 1 billion people around the world live without access to safe, potable water, in part because of poor governance and corruption. Illegal connections and substantial losses caused by deferred maintenance have eroded the revenues of water utilities, leading to a downward spiral in performance. Embezzlement of funds, bribes for access to illegal water connections, manipulation of meter counters, and collusion in public contracts add to the litany of corrupt practices. 'Improving Transparency, Integrity, and Accountability in Water Supply and Sanitation' is a useful tool for diagnosing, analyzing, and remedying systemic corruption in the water supply and sanitation sectors. It will serve as a practical guide for governments; utility regulators, managers, and staff; civil society organizations; contractors; and citizens in their quest for a model of service provision that responds to the pressing needs of people in the developing world. The book aims to increase the involvement of civil society by engaging all stakeholders in setting priorities and monitoring performance; help water and sanitation delivery contribute to poverty reduction by increasing the service quality and coverage provided by service delivery organizations to poorer communities on an equitable basis; provide a tool that promotes the financial sustainability of service delivery organizations, thus building stakeholders' confidence in those institutions' ability to expand and improve service; and raise ethical standards among all stakeholders, especially service delivery organizations, thereby instilling a sense of public service in these organizations.

This paper explores PAS actors and policy advice quality dynamics within anticorruption policymaking processes in Kiambu and Nairobi City counties, which are two devolved systems of government in Kenya. It is based on empirical research that sought to determine the level of policy advice quality provided by three critical PAS actors—the state, business, and civil society. These actors were of particular interest as they were mentioned in corruption scandals, linked to sycophancy as they sought to curry favor, and exhibited signs of disengagement, due to frustrations within the policymaking process. The study was framed within the multiple streams framework (MSF) and interrogated policy advice quality through the SERVQUAL model of reliability, assurance, tangibles, empathy, and responsiveness. The analytical strengths of MSF and SERVQUAL were considered suitable in Kenya’s context where corruption is systemic, in an effort to overcome the limitations of previous approaches that have looked at corruption as a principal-agent problem. Two focus group discussions with key stakeholders were held in each county. Sixty-three respondents from 10 strategic functions, 12 members of the public, and 24 suppliers from each county were interviewed. The results demonstrate the analytical capacity of MSF and SERVQUAL, and provide a theoretical framework within which to ground third-generation policy advice research. The paper addresses the main research problem of inadequate data from the global south, and the lack of measurements for policy advice quality. It also contributes conceptual tools that deepen our understanding by presenting MSF and SERVQUAL as useful models for consideration.