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12,947 result(s) for "ATOMIC WEAPONS"
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Nuclear authority : the IAEA and the absolute weapon
Robert L. Brown has written both a history of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and an analysis of how it has transformed from a weak agent of multilateral cooperation into a strong international nuclear authority over the past two decades. Today, it is one of the most powerful international organizations of any kind, with the ability to inspect and judge member states' nuclear programs and to issue rules and commands regarding nuclear issues. The IAEA also plays an important role in counterproliferation enforcement. Brown argues that the IAEA has been able to acquire power over states on nuclear issues because states have realized that they need, for both political and technological reasons, the IAEA to supply nuclear policy cooperation and to be an agent for nuclear safety and security. The IAEA is in the news on an almost weekly basis, and this book will provide the most in depth and up-to-date overview of the organization. The book will also explain the puzzle of why states would collectively create an agent to help them cooperate, only to see that agent acquire power over them.
Atomic Bill
In Atomic Bill , Vincent Kiernan examines the fraught career of New York Times science journalist, William L. Laurence and shows his professional and personal lives to be a cautionary tale of dangerous proximity to power. Laurence was fascinated with atomic science and its militarization. When the Manhattan Project drew near to perfecting the atomic bomb, he was recruited to write much of the government's press materials that were distributed on the day that Hiroshima was obliterated. That instantly crowned Laurence as one of the leading journalistic experts on the atomic bomb. As the Cold War dawned, some assessed Laurence as a propagandist defending the militarization of atomic energy. For others, he was a skilled science communicator who provided the public with a deep understanding of the atomic bomb. Laurence leveraged his perch at the Times to engage in paid speechmaking, book writing, filmmaking, and radio broadcasting. His work for the Times declined in quality even as his relationships with people in power grew closer and more lucrative. Atomic Bill reveals extraordinary ethical lapses by Laurence such as a cheating scandal at Harvard University and plagiarizing from press releases about atomic bomb tests in the Pacific. In 1963 a conflict of interest related to the 1964 World's Fair in New York City led to his forced retirement from the Times . Kiernan shows Laurence to have set the trend, common among today's journalists of science and technology, to prioritize gee-whiz coverage of discoveries. That approach, in which Laurence served the interests of governmental official and scientists, recommends a full revision of our understanding of the dawn of the atomic era.
Downwind
Downwindis an unflinching tale of the atomic West that reveals the intentional disregard for human and animal life through nuclear testing by the federal government and uranium extraction by mining corporations during and after the Cold War. Sarah Alisabeth Fox highlights the personal cost of nuclear testing and uranium extraction in the American West through extensive interviews with \"downwinders,\" the Native American and non-Native residents of the Great Basin region affected by nuclear environmental contamination and nuclear-testing fallout. These downwinders tell tales of communities ravaged by cancer epidemics, farmers and ranchers economically ruined by massive crop and animal deaths, and Native miners working in dangerous conditions without proper safety equipment so that the government could surreptitiously study the effects of radiation on humans. In chilling detailDownwindbrings to light the stories and concerns of these groups whose voices have been silenced and marginalized for decades in the name of \"patriotism\" and \"national security.\" With the renewed boom in mining in the American West, Fox's look at this hidden history, unearthed from years of field interviews, archival research, and epidemiological studies, is a must-read for every American concerned about the fate of our western lands and communities.
The nuclear crisis
In 1983, more than one million Germans joined to protest NATO's deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe. This volume survey of the \"Euromissiles\" crisis as experienced by its various protagonists in Germany, including NATO's strategic maneuvering and the contours of the German protest movement.
Redefining Science
The Cold War forced scientists to reconcile their values of internationalism and objectivity with the increasingly militaristic uses of scientific knowledge. For decades, antinuclear scientists pursued nuclear disarmament in a variety of ways, from grassroots activism to transnational diplomacy and government science advising. The U.S. government ultimately withstood these efforts, redefining science as a strictly technical endeavor that enhanced national security and deeming science that challenged nuclear weapons on moral grounds \"emotional\" and patently unscientific. In response, many activist scientists restricted themselves to purely technical arguments for arms control. When antinuclear protest erupted in the 1980s, grassroots activists had moved beyond scientific and technical arguments for disarmament. Grounding their stance in the idea that nuclear weapons were immoral, they used the \"emotional\" arguments that most scientists had abandoned. Redefining Science shows that the government achieved its Cold War \"consensus\" only by active opposition to powerful dissenters and helps explain the current and uneasy relationship between scientists, the public, and government in debates over issues such as security, energy, and climate change.
A Nuclear-weapon-free World
The world total of some 50,000 nuclear warheads is beginning to fall off sharply. It should be well below 10,000 by the year 2000. Should the ultimate target be zero? The idea of a nuclear-weapon-free world (NWFW) was put back on the world agenda by President Gorbachev in 1986. President Reagan also had a vision of a world without nuclear weapons. A number of politicians in the nuclear-weapon countries are beginning to see that such a world could be in their best interests. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Communist regime have removed the main purpose of existing nuclear arsenals. The threat to world security now comes from nuclear-weapon proliferation, and the only effective way of stopping this is to have an enforceable worldwide ban. The contributors—many of whom are experts with long experience in the field of nuclear weapons—seek to answer two key questions regarding the concept of a NWFW: Is it desirable? Is it feasible? They outline what they see as the essential provisions of a NWFW treaty and examine the inevitable problems of enforcement. All stocks of weapon-usable materials—civilian as well as military—would have to be closely monitored and guarded. Any technological or official efforts would have to be supported by “societal verification.” That is, it would be the duty of all citizens to notify authorities of any suspected violations. Despite the problems of creating such a treaty and enforcing it, the idea of a truly nuclear-weapon-free world is no longer fanciful. It deserves extensive discussion, and this book provides a solid, informed beginning of the debate.