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PurposeWhile the average cost of debt capital can be calculated from historical financial statement data by dividing the interest paid each year by the total level of debt, this average cost of debt provides little information regarding the true cost of acquiring additional debt capital, and hence, its use is potentially problematic in financial decision-making. This study focuses on the linkage between observed changes in the average interest rates calculated from financial statements (balance sheet and income statement) and the marginal cost of borrowing or the cost of acquiring new debt. Motivated by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the marginal cost of capital is modeled as a function of a risk-free interest rate (the return on Moody’s Aaa bonds), returns on the S\\&P stock index capturing overall market returns and a portfolio of agricultural stocks to represent farm sector-specific risks.Design/methodology/approachUsing a unique dataset constructed from United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) state-level Financial Performance of the Farm Sector data for the years 1960 through 2003 and state-level Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) data for the years 2003–2014 and Bayesian methods, we model the observed interest rate as an autoregressive function controlling for changes in debt and key rates of return in the general economy.FindingsThe results indicate that the marginal interest rate is a function of the Aaa corporate bond rate and the stock market. We also find evidence of a negative relationship between returns to a portfolio of agricultural stocks and the marginal interest rate. Overall, the findings suggest that the imputed interest rate frequently misrepresents the marginal cost of debt capital.Originality/valueMost farm financial datasets allow for the analysis of the farm firm’s average interest rate. However, farmers make decisions based on the marginal cost of credit – the interest rate on a newly issued note. This study estimates this marginal interest rate for the 15 states for which the ARMS data are representative for the years 1960 through 2014 and compares the estimated marginal interest rate with the imputed average interest rate.

Nigeria's Vision 2020 has expressed a bold desire for the country to be among the world's top 20 economies by the year 2020. The economy has posted impressive growth figures since 2003, driven by higher oil revenues and a series of home-grown economic reforms. The country is now firmly on the road to middle-income status. But what else do government and the private sector need to do to create the jobs and growth that will underpin the national development strategy? What are the challenges that Nigeria's businesses face today? 'An Assessment of the Investment Climate in Nigeria' provides answers to these questions. Based on a survey of 2,300 companies, it provides evidence-based recommendations designed to support Vision 2020 and the president's seven-point agenda. The authors find that government must move quickly to create jobs and reduce poverty. Key challenges include a desperate shortage of energy and a poor transportation network, as well as low levels of education and continuing unrest in the Niger delta. In addition, Nigeria's workers need to become more productive in order to compete in a globalized economy. As a matter of fact, they are less productive than workers in more dynamic countries, such as Brazil, China, and Kenya. Improving productivity will require simultaneous efforts to foster competition, improve specific aspects of the business environment, and facilitate better management and training within individual firms. In addition to the issues of productivity, Nigeria's best firms have not been able to expand their market share. Consequently, policy makers need to address and elimate obstacles to competition, including barriers to entry, convoluted taxation, property registration, and licensing.

Throughout the developed and developing world there is growing demand for policies that would facilitate access to jobs by the most vulnerable, improve their earnings, and reduce their dependency on public support. As a result, governments are increasingly focused on removing obstacles faced by employers to create jobs and on instilling incentives for individuals to re-enter the labor market or to move toward more productive employment possibilities. Severance pay a program compensating formal workers for dismissal by employers or with an end-of-service benefit is often blamed for distorting employer hiring and firing decisions. Together with restrictive labor market regulations and other formal labor market features, this program is held responsible for excessive job protection with a negative impact on labor market outcomes, in particular affecting the most vulnerable. Despite this strong negative assessment among many labor market economists, surprisingly little is known about this program that exists in most countries around the world as a legally mandated benefit. This lack of knowledge may derive from the special 'positioning' of the program between labor code and social insurance; its origins were in the first policy domain, but its objectives for key programs were replicated in the second domain in particular unemployment and retirement benefits. This is the first-ever book to shed light on this program in a comprehensive manner its historical origins, its rationale, and its characteristics across the world. It reviews the soundness of the empirical accusation, assesses recent country reforms, and offers policy reform alternatives and policy guidance. The policy directions include folding severance pay into existing social insurance programs, where they exist, and to make severance pay contractual between market partners as a way to enhance efficiency in a knowledge-based economy. Folding severance pay into employment benefits may also be an opportunity to move away from unemployment insurance, which is fraught by moral hazard, toward a promising 'hybrid' system of unemployment insurance savings accounts supplemented by social pooling.

This report is comprised of two volumes. Global Development Finance (GDF) 2008 volume one provides analysis of key trends and prospects, including coverage of the role of international banking in developing countries. Volume two provides summary and country tables contain statistical tables on the external debt of the 134 countries that report public and publicly guaranteed debt under the Debtor Reporting System (DRS). It also includes tables of selected debt and resource flow statistics for individual reporting countries as well as summary tables for regional and income groups. It is the culmination of a year-long process that requires extensive cooperation from people and organizations around the globe-national central banks, ministries of finance, major multilateral organizations, and many departments of the World Bank.

This paper examines the distribution of output around capacity when money demand is a nonlinear function of the nominal interest rate such that nominal interest rates cannot become negative. When fluctuations in output result primarily from disturbances to the money market, the variance of output is shown to be an increasing function of the trend inflation rate. When they result from disturbances to the goods market, the variance of output is a decreasing function of the trend inflation rate. When both disturbances are significant, there exists, in general, a critical non-zero trend inflation rate that minimizes the variance of output.

This lecture focuses on the costs of public debt when safe interest rates are low. I develop four main arguments. First, I show that the current US situation, in which safe interest rates are expected to remain below growth rates for a long time, is more the historical norm than the exception. If the future is like the past, this implies that debt rollovers, that is the issuance of debt without a later increase in taxes, may well be feasible. Put bluntly, public debt may have no fiscal cost. Second, even in the absence of fiscal costs, public debt reduces capital accumulation, and may therefore have welfare costs. I show that welfare costs may be smaller than typically assumed. The reason is that the safe rate is the risk-adjusted rate of return to capital. If it is lower than the growth rate, it indicates that the risk-adjusted rate of return to capital is in fact low. The average risky rate however also plays a role. I show how both the average risky rate and the average safe rate determine welfare outcomes. Third, I look at the evidence on the average risky rate, i.e., the average marginal product of capital. While the measured rate of earnings has been and is still quite high, the evidence from asset markets suggests that the marginal product of capital may be lower, with the difference reflecting either mismeasurement of capital or rents. This matters for debt: the lower the marginal product, the lower the welfare cost of debt. Fourth, I discuss a number of arguments against high public debt, and in particular the existence of multiple equilibria where investors believe debt to be risky and, by requiring a risk premium, increase the fiscal burden and make debt effectively more risky. This is a very relevant argument, but it does not have straightforward implications for the appropriate level of debt. My purpose in the lecture is not to argue for more public debt, especially in the current political environment. It is to have a richer discussion of the costs of debt and of fiscal policy than is currently the case.

Nominal interest rates may remain substantially below the averages of the last half century, because central banks’ inflation objectives lie below the average level of inflation, and estimates of the real interest rate that are likely to prevail over the long run fall notably short of the average real interest rate experienced during this period. Persistently low nominal interest rates may lead to more frequent and costly episodes at the effective lower bound (ELB) on nominal interest rates. We revisit the frequency and potential costs of such episodes in a world of low interest rates, using both a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model and the Federal Reserve’s largescale econometric model, the FRB/US model. Four main conclusions emerge. First, monetary policy strategies based on traditional, simple policy rules lead to poor economic performance when the equilibrium interest rate is low, with economic activity and inflation more volatile and systematically falling short of desirable levels. Moreover, the frequency and length of ELB episodes under such policy approaches are estimated to be significantly higher than in previous studies. Second, a risk adjustment to a simple rule—whereby monetary policymakers are more accommodative, on average, than prescribed by the rule—ensures that inflation averages its 2 percent objective, and requires that policymakers systematically seek inflation near 3 percent when the ELB is not binding. Third, commitment strategies, whereby monetary accommodation is not removed until either inflation or economic activity overshoots its longrun objective, are very effective in both the DSGE and FRB/US models. And fourth, our simulation results suggest that the adverse effects on economic and price stability associated with the ELB may be substantial at inflation targets near 2 percent if the equilibrium real interest rate is low and monetary policy follows a traditional approach. Whether such adverse effects could justify a higher inflation target depends upon the degree to which monetary policy strategies that differ substantially from such traditional approaches are feasible, and an assessment of a broader array of the inflation target’s effects on economic welfare.

Buying is easier than shorting for many equity investors. Combining this arbitrage asymmetry with the arbitrage risk represented by idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) explains the negative relation between IVOL and average return. The IVOL-return relation is negative among overpriced stocks but positive among underpriced stocks, with mispricing determined by combining 11 return anomalies. Consistent with arbitrage asymmetry, the negative relation among overpriced stocks is stronger, especially for stocks less easily shorted, so the overall IVOL-return relation is negative. Further supporting our explanation, high investor sentiment weakens the positive relation among underpriced stocks and, especially, strengthens the negative relation among overpriced stocks.