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This paper studies how interest groups allocate campaign contributions when congressmen are connected by social ties. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the contribution game and characterize the associated allocation of the interest groups’ moneys. While the allocations are generally complex functions of the environment (the voting function, the legislators’ preferences, and the social network topology), they are simple, monotonically increasing functions of the respective legislators’ Katz-Bonacich centralities. Using data on the 109th–113th Congresses and on congressmen’s alumni connections, we estimate themodel and find evidence supporting its predictions.

We exploit seating rules in the European Parliament to identify peer effects in legislative voting. Sitting adjacently leads to a 7 percent reduction in the overall likelihood that two members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the same party differ in their vote. Peer effects are markedly stronger among pairs of women, MEP pairs from the same country, and in close votes. Using variation in seating across the parliament’s two venues (Brussels and Strasbourg), we show that peer effects are persistent: MEPs who have sat together in the past disagree less even when they are not seated adjacently.

Are ordinary citizens or political party leaders better positioned to select candidates? While the American primary system lets citizens choose, most democracies rely instead on party officials to appoint or nominate candidates. The consequences of these distinct design choices are unclear: while officials are often better informed about candidate qualifications, they may value traits, like party loyalty or willingness to pay for the nomination, at odds with identifying the best performer. We partnered with both major political parties in Sierra Leone to experimentally vary how much say voters have in selecting Parliamentary candidates. Estimates suggest that more democratic procedures increase the likelihood that parties select voters’ most preferred candidates and favor candidates with stronger records of public goods provision.

Eine neue Studie untersucht, wie Nebeneinkünfte von Landtagsabgeordneten mit ihren Abwesenheitsquoten im Parlament und anderen parlamentarischen Aktivitäten zusammenhängen. Reformen in den Offenlegungsvorschriften für Nebeneinkünfte und neue Daten für Mitglieder von sieben deutschen Landesparlamenten liefern dabei neue empirische Evidenz. Die Ergebnisse deuten nicht darauf hin, dass Nebeneinkünfte insgesamt mit parlamentarischer Aktivität der Abgeordneten, wie Abwesenheitsquoten, Anzahl von Reden, Interpellationen oder Fraktionsinitiativen, korreliert sind. Jedoch reagieren die Abgeordneten unterschiedlich auf höhere Nebeneinkünfte. Abgeordnete, die über Parteilisten in das Parlament eingezogen sind, schränken bei höheren Nebeneinkünften ihre parlamentarischen Aktivitäten stärker ein als direkt gewählte Abgeordnete. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass die höhere Rechenschaftspflicht gegenüber Wählerinnen und Wählern für die Beziehung zwischen Nebeneinkünften und den parlamentarischen Aktivitäten der Abgeordneten von Bedeutung ist. Zugleich deuten die Ergebnisse für gewisse Abgeordnete auf einen Anstieg der parlamentarischen Aktivitäten hin, wenn diese höhere Nebeneinkünfte erhalten. Leistungsstarke Abgeordnete scheinen also ihre Nebenbeschäftigungen mit ihren parlamentarischen Pflichten in Einklang zu bringen.

In the US Senate, roll calls are held in alphabetical order. We document that senators early in the order are less likely to vote with the majority of their own party than those whose last name places them at the end of the alphabet. To speak to the mechanism behind this result, we develop a simple model of sequential voting, in which forward-looking senators rely on backward induction in order to free ride on their colleagues. Estimating our model structurally, we find that this form of strategic behavior is an important part of equilibrium play. We also consider, but ultimately dismiss, alternative explanations related to learning about common values and vote buying.

This study investigates how local air quality influences UK Parliament members’ votes on environmental and climate change legislation. Using micro-spatial information at the 1 km-by-1 km grid level, I link local air quality to members of UK parliament (MPs') voting records from 2009 to 2019. I find compelling evidence that MPs representing highly polluted areas are more likely to vote against stringent environmental legislation. I also provide evidence that local political economy considerations constrain pro-environmental voting behaviour: industrialization exacerbates the negative relationship between pollution and pro-environmental voting behaviour by further discouraging MPs representing industrial areas from supporting stringent environmental legislations. These findings underscore the public choice trade-offs between enacting stringent climate change policies and preserving local industry and jobs.

Former legislators who lobby exacerbate the effects of financial resources on the relative political influence that various organized interests achieve. These lobbyists receive more income and achieve favorable policy outcomes more often than other lobbyists. The value of these revolving-door lobbyists, however, is contingent on the continued presence of former colleagues in legislatures. Former legislators achieve influence because of their insider connections, and membership turnover among incumbents decreases the value of this asset for interest groups. I examine the incomes and clienteles of former legislators who lobbied in the American states over seven decades. Turnover is a consistent, negative predictor of revolver value. This effect is enhanced by the presence of legislative staff support. This study is the first to examine the value of revolving-door lobbyists in the state legislatures. My findings imply that reforms that induce turnover help to level playing fields of political advocacy among interests with different levels of financial resources.

Which voting weights ought to be allocated to single delegates of differently sized groups from a democratic fairness perspective? We operationalize the one person, one vote principle by demanding every individual’s influence on collective decisions to be equal a priori. The analysis differs from previous ones by considering intervals of alternatives. New reasons lead to an old conclusion: weights should be proportional to the square root of constituency sizes if voter preferences are independent and identically distributed. This finding is fragile, however, in that preference polarization along constituency lines quickly calls for plain proportionality.