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What makes wars drag on and why do they end when they do? Here H. E. Goemans brings theoretical rigor and empirical depth to a long-standing question of securities studies. He explores how various government leaders assess the cost of war in terms of domestic politics and their own postwar fates. Goemans first develops the argument that two sides will wage war until both gain sufficient knowledge of the other's strengths and weaknesses so as to agree on the probable outcome of continued war. Yet the incentives that motivate leaders to then terminate war, Goemans maintains, can vary greatly depending on the type of government they represent. The author looks at democracies, dictatorships, and mixed regimes and compares the willingness among leaders to back out of wars or risk the costs of continued warfare. Democracies, according to Goemans, will prefer to withdraw quickly from a war they are not winning in order to appease the populace. Autocracies will do likewise so as not to be overthrown by their internal enemies. Mixed regimes, which are made up of several competing groups and which exclude a substantial proportion of the people from access to power, will likely see little risk in continuing a losing war in the hope of turning the tide. Goemans explores the conditions and the reasoning behind this \"gamble for resurrection\" as well as other strategies, using rational choice theory, statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Germany, Britain, France, and Russia during World War I. In so doing, he offers a new perspective of the Great War that integrates domestic politics, international politics, and battlefield developments.

What does it mean to live during wartime away from the battle zone? What is it like for citizens to go about daily routines while their country sends soldiers to kill and be killed across the globe? Timely and thought-provoking, War at a Distance considers how those left on the home front register wars and wartime in their everyday lives, particularly when military conflict remains removed from immediate perception, available only through media forms. Looking back over two centuries, Mary Favret locates the origins of modern wartime in the Napoleonic era and describes how global military operations affected the British populace, as the nation's army and navy waged battles far from home for decades. She reveals that the literature and art produced in Britain during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries obsessively cultivated means for feeling as much as understanding such wars, and established forms still relevant today. Favret examines wartime literature and art as varied as meditations on the Iliad, the history of meteorology, landscape painting in India, and popular poetry in newspapers and periodicals; she locates the embedded sense of war and dislocation in works ranging from Austen, Coleridge, and Wordsworth to Woolf, Stevens, and Sebald; and she contemplates how literature provides the public with methods for responding to violent calamities happening elsewhere. Bringing to light Romanticism's legacy in reflections on modern warfare, this book shows that war's absent presence affects home in deep and irrevocable ways.

In a 1968 speech on British immigration policy, Enoch Powell insisted that although a black man may be a British citizen, he can never be an Englishman. This book explains why such a claim was possible to advance and impossible to defend. Ian Baucom reveals how \"Englishness\" emerged against the institutions and experiences of the British Empire, rendering English culture subject to local determinations and global negotiations. In his view, the Empire was less a place where England exerted control than where it lost command of its own identity. Analyzing imperial crisis zones--including the Indian Mutiny of 1857, the Morant Bay uprising of 1865, the Amritsar massacre of 1919, and the Brixton riots of 1981--Baucom asks if the building of the empire completely refashioned England's narratives of national identity. To answer this question, he draws on a surprising range of sources: Victorian and imperial architectural theory, colonial tourist manuals, lexicographic treatises, domestic and imperial cricket culture, country house fetishism, and the writings of Ruskin, Kipling, Ford Maddox Ford, Forster, Rhys, C.L.R. James, Naipaul, and Rushdie--and representations of urban riot on television, in novels, and in parliamentary sessions. Emphasizing the English preoccupation with place, he discusses some crucial locations of Englishness that replaced the rural sites of Wordsworthian tradition: the Morant Bay courthouse, Bombay's Gothic railway station, the battle grounds of the 1857 uprising in India, colonial cricket fields, and, last but not least, urban riot zones.

\" \"The ferocity of the Soviet resistance,\" writes British military historian and war correspondent Chris Bellamy, became a key factor in \"the most absolute war ever fought,\" a war marked by \"primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; the play of chance and probability; and [its] political direction.

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Bennett Reimer's philosophy of music education laid out in his influential A Philosophy of Music Education (1970) was born in the height of Cold War superpower confrontation but until recently its connection to Cold War politics and mentality has not been noticed and explored, in large part due to Reimer's decontextualized and depoliticized discourse. The present article, building on the findings of recent Cold War historiography and research on cultural Cold War, places Reimer's theory in the historical context and examines the entrenchment of its aesthetic foundation as well as Reimer's understanding of the relation of music education to society and politics and the developmental dynamics of the discipline in the Cold War political climate and ideology.

Why do some wars end with an absolute outcome, with state death or regime change? I argue that we are more likely to see absolute outcomes when we have territorial disputes with the potential for credible commitment problems and asymmetric disputants. In the absence of credible commitment problems, disputes are less likely to recur, and states are unlikely to seek to absorb the opponent state or remove its government. Among more symmetric disputants, states cannot impose an absolute outcome, and we are more likely to see recurrent disputes in the face of credible commitment problems. Only in very asymmetric dyads are we likely to have both the required willingness and opportunity to impose absolute outcomes to attempt to solve a credible commitment problem over territorial conflict.

In the mid-twentieth century, the Japanese state trained its citizens to identify the sound of a falling bomb. This article explores the little-studied impact of audio-based military technology on wider society, beyond the military sector and beyond Western contexts. In 1941, Japan's elementary schools-renamed National People's Schools-provided new musical training in perfect pitch to strengthen Japan's national defense efforts in wartime. \"Explosive sound training\" taught children to identify recorded explosive sounds of enemy aircraft, though ultimately such training could not mitigate widespread destruction. This article argues that the recent discussion of \"the story of acoustic defense\" can benefit from a much broader historiographical framework, one focused not just on the military frame. In the Japanese case, the story was shaped through the active interactions between the military, society, and educational institutions. A multidisciplinary analytical perspective provides a more critical and nuanced understanding of how modern sound-politics overlapped with exercising wartime power.

In this study, we performed customized ultrasonic measurements of the stone block foundation of the Sungnyemun Gate, which is representative of the stone architectural heritage in the Republic of Korea. Furthermore, the weathering evaluation standards, which are extensively used in stone heritage, were improved considering the type of rock and its provenance site. In particular, the absolute weathering grade used the ultrasonic velocity (P-wave) of a universal hard rock, whereas the relative weathering grade used the differences between the ultrasonic velocities of the materials in the stone block foundation of the Sungnyemun Gate (weathered stone) and the fresh rocks in the provenance. Among these, the absolute weathering grade was observed to be constant regardless of the type of rock; however, the relative weathering grade varied depending on the type dof rock. Because the average ultrasonic velocity of the original blocks of the stone block foundation of the Sungnyemun Gate was 2665 m/s, it was estimated that their ultrasonic velocity reduced by approximately 2.1 m/s per year as compared to that observed in case of fresh rocks (average 3932 m/s) in the provenance site. Furthermore, the weathering evaluation exhibited that there were approximately two stages of difference between the original blocks and the new blocks. As compared to the relative weathering grade, the absolute weathering grade was observed to underestimate the overall ultrasonic velocity of the stone block foundation of the Sungnyemun Gate. This study presents a customized method for performing ultrasonic measurements and for evaluating weathering. It is assumed that the results of this study will be extensively used in diagnosing and monitoring the stone architectural heritage.

After the 2008 war with Russia, many internally displaced people (IDPs) in the Republic of Georgia complained that they had nothing, despite the fact that international donors gave more than $450 million in humanitarian aid. What was nothing? How was it related to forced migration? Why did humanitarianism continually focus the IDPs' attention on what they had lost rather than the help they had been given? In this article, I use the work of existentialist philosopher Alain Badiou to argue that humanitarianism creates four forms of absence: anti-artifacts, black holes, imaginary numbers, and absolute zero. These forms of nothingness force displaced people into having nothing, doing nothing, and being nothing, which in turn prevents them from reassembling the fragments of their previous lives into meaningful forms of existence in the present.