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In this paper we make a case for the use of multiple theoretical perspectives—theory on boundary objects, epistemic objects, cultural historical activity theory, and objects as infrastructure—to understand the role of objects in cross-disciplinary collaboration. A pluralist approach highlights that objects perform at least three types of work in this context: they motivate collaboration, they allow participants to work across different types of boundaries, and they constitute the fundamental infrastructure of the activity. Building on the results of an empirical study, we illustrate the insights that each theoretical lens affords into practices of collaboration and develop a novel analytical framework that organizes objects according to the active work they perform. Our framework can help shed new light on the phenomenon, especially with regard to the shifting status of objects and sources of conflict (and change) in collaboration. After discussing these novel insights, we outline directions for future research stemming from a pluralist approach. We conclude by noting the managerial implications of our findings.

This study compares the predictive validity of single-item and multiple-item measures of attitude toward the ad ($A_{Ad}$) and attitude toward the brand ($A_{Brand}$), which are two of the most widely measured constructs in marketing. The authors assess the ability of $A_{Ad}$ to predict $A_{Brand}$ in copy tests of four print advertisements for diverse new products. There is no difference in the predictive validity of the multiple-item and single-item measures. The authors conclude that for the many constructs in marketing that consist of a concrete singular object and a concrete attribute, such as $A_{Ad}$ or $A_{Brand}$, single-item measures should be used.

Computing is a high-level process of a physical system. Recent interest in non-standard computing systems, including quantum and biological computers, has brought this physical basis of computing to the forefront. There has been, however, no consensus on how to tell if a given physical system is acting as a computer or not; leading to confusion over novel computational devices, and even claims that every physical event is a computation. In this paper, we introduce a formal framework that can be used to determine whether a physical system is performing a computation. We demonstrate how the abstract computational level interacts with the physical device level, in comparison with the use of mathematical models in experimental science. This powerful formulation allows a precise description of experiments, technology, computation and simulation, giving our central conclusion: physical computing is the use of a physical system to predict the outcome of an abstract evolution. We give conditions for computing, illustrated using a range of non-standard computing scenarios. The framework also covers broader computing contexts, where there is no obvious human computer user. We introduce the notion of a 'computational entity', and its critical role in defining when computing is taking place in physical systems.

Bas van Fraassen, one of the most energetic defenders of the semantic conception of scientific theories, has recently held that while scientific theories can be identified through their models they cannot be identified with them (van Fraassen [1985], cf. this volume). In this paper I want to discuss the content and implications of this idea. I hold that it reveals a confusion present in some of van Fraassen’s previous works, and also that it now shows a commitment to a view compatible with a form of realism. I go on to argue that the confusion at issue is also present in Pérez Ransanz’s conception of scientific theories, according to what she expressed in her debate with van Fraassen. I stress the idea that there are at least three ways in which the notion of “model” can be used, which are relevant in philosophy of science for the analysis of the structure and function of scientific theories: 1) model in the sense of a structure that satisfies a set of conditions of definition; I refer to this type as logical models; 2) sentential models; and 3) iconic models. For types 2) and 3) I follow Harré [1970] with some modifications which I consider adequate for the analysis of science 1 wish to defend: Sentential Models. Let T and T’ be two sets of sentences; T’ is a sentential model of T if and only if for every p in T there is a q in T’ such that if q is acceptable for an epistemic community, i.e. q is objective, then p is supposed to be true, i.e. acceptable for any rational being. (Cf. Olivé [unpublished] for an explication of the notions of objectivity and truth here assumed.) Iconic Models. M is an iconic model of N, if and only if it is possible to construct two sets of sentences, T’ and T, such that T’ describes M, T describes N and T’ is a sentential model of T. M and N are either abstract objects or objects of possible experience. Thus the same structure can play the role of a logical model or of an iconic model. The very same structure, from the perspective of satisfaction of certain conditions of definition plays the role of a logical model. But seen from the perspective of its capacity to represent another object, it plays the role of an iconic model. Van Fraassen’s recent declarations have made explicit that he considers theories as constituted by structures which certainly play the role of both logical and iconic models. In this sense he adopts as a matter of fact a realist position, namely that there is an empirical world which is independent of the theories and conceptual frameworks used to conceptualize it, and also that theories are constituted by structures that play the role of iconic models. I further contend that Pérez Ransanz unduly stresses the logical role of models and overlooks their iconic role. This arises out of her emphasis in that scientific theories must be seen as sets of structures that satisfy certain conditions of definition, and also from her idea that intended applications of theories must he seen as parts of the very same theories. From my own point of view, an empirical theory has built into itself the claim that it can he applied to the empirical world. In this sense applications must he seen as part of the empirical world, not as parts of theories. It is true, however, that such applications involve first of all the construction of models, which are abstract entities. Finally, I discuss Pérez Ransanz’s ideas as to the empirical basis for theory testing. The problem is that she regards applications as idealizations of empirical systems, thus as models, and hence as parts of theories. So, if the empirical basis is constituted by applications, but in turn these are seen as parts of theories, she is committed to the view that theories must be tested against structures which are constitutive parts of themselves.

The nature of mathematical objects, their various types, the way in which they are formed, and how they participate in mathematical activity are all questions of interest for philosophy and mathematics education. Teaching in schools is usually based, implicitly or explicitly, on a descriptive/realist view of mathematics, an approach which is not free from potential conflicts. After analysing why this view is so often taken and pointing out the problems raised by realism in mathematics this paper discusses a number of philosophical alternatives in relation to the nature of mathematical objects. Having briefly described the educational and philosophical problem regarding the origin and nature of these objects we then present the main characteristics of a pragmatic and anthropological semiotic approach to them, one which may serve as the outline of a philosophy of mathematics developed from the point of view of mathematics education. This approach is able to explain from a non-realist position how mathematical objects emerge from mathematical practices.

There is a common practice of providing natural-language ‘glosses’ on sentences in the language of higher order logic: for example, the higher-order sentence ∃X(X Socrates) might be glossed using the English sentence ‘Socrates has some property’. It is widely held that such glosses cannot be strictly correct, on the grounds that the word ‘property’ is a noun and thus, if meaningful at all, should be meaningful in the same way as any other noun. Against this view, this paper argues that natural languages feature pervasive type-ambiguity, in such a way that the relevant English sentences have natural readings on which they are equivalent to the higher-order sentences of which they serve as ‘glosses’. It also responds to some objections that have often been taken to be fatal to such type-ambiguity, such as the challenge of accounting for the meaning of ‘mixed disjunctions’ like ‘Either Mars or the property of being red is interesting’.

Abstract artifacts such as musical works and fictional entities are human creations; they are intentional products of our actions and activities. One line of argument against abstract artifacts is that abstract objects are not the kind of objects that can be created. This is so, it is argued, because abstract objects are causally inert. Since creation requires being caused to exist, abstract objects cannot be created. One common way to refute this argument is to reject the causal inefficacy of abstracta. I argue that creationists should rather reject the principle that creation requires causation. Creation, in my view, is a non-causal relation that can be explained using an appropriate notion of ontological dependence. The existence and the creation of abstract artifacts depend on certain individuals with appropriate intentions, along with events of a certain kind that include but are not limited to creations of certain concrete objects.

This study aimed to identify if complementing representations of concrete objects with representations of abstract objects improves students' conceptual understanding as they use a simulation to experiment in the domain of Light and Color. Moreover, we investigated whether students' prior knowledge is a factor that must be considered in deciding when to use representations of abstract objects. A pre-post comparison study design was used, involving 69 participants assigned to two conditions. The first condition consisted of 36 students who had access to a simulation with representations of concrete objects, whereas the second condition consisted of 33 students who had access to a simulation with representations of both concrete and abstract objects. Both conditions used the same inquiry-oriented curriculum materials, consisting of three sections that included physical phenomena with increasingly complex underlying mechanisms, so that the third section's mechanisms were more complex in nature than those in the first two sections. Tests were administered to assess students' conceptual understanding before and after the presentation of the curricular material as a whole, as well as before and after each of its three sections. Results revealed that the presence of representations of abstract objects was helpful for the first two sections, but only for students with low prior knowledge. On the third, most complex section, also the students with higher prior knowledge profited from the presence of abstract objects. From these findings, we conjecture that for physical phenomena with a lower level of complexity, students with high prior knowledge are able to mentally construct the necessary abstract concepts on their own, whereas for higher levels of complexity they need an explicit representation of the abstract objects in the learning environment.

The argument from internal relatedness was one of the major nineteenth century neo-Hegelian arguments for monism. This argument has been misunderstood, and may even be sound. The argument, as I reconstruct it, proceeds in two stages: first, it is argued that all things are internally related in ways that render them interdependent; second, the substantial unity of the whole universe is inferred from the interdependence of all of its parts. The guiding idea behind the argument is that failure of free recombination is the modal signature of an integrated monistic cosmos. Frequently consider the connection of all things in the universe and their relation to one another. For in a manner all things are implicated with one another …          (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, p. 43)