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The objective of this paper is to investigate, through a qualitative study based on 38 semi-structured interviews with agents who provide assurance of sustainability reports, how they perceive and manage ethical issues underlying the verification of sustainability reports. Most of the ethical issues observed involve four interconnected aspects: the commercialism underlying sustainability assurance, the symbolic nature of the verification process, interdependency between auditing and consulting activities, and familiarity with the audited companies. The findings shed light on the reflexivity of assurance providers on these issues and the legitimation strategies used to explain how they reconcile the independence and impartiality required for auditing activities with commercial aspects related to client-provider relationships. The study also shows the role of contextual variables in the ethics of assurance services. The paper contributes to the literature on the legitimacy of sustainability assurance and commercialism of the audit function. Practical implications and avenues for future research are also developed.

We document 45 specific allegations related to audit deficiencies based on GAAS, as detailed in 141 AAERs and 153 securities class action lawsuits over the violation years 1978–2016. Next, we use these allegations to validate popular proxies of audit quality. Of all the audit quality proxies, we find that restatements consistently predict all of the top six most cited audit deficiencies. The ratio of audit fees to total fees and the presence of a city specialist auditor predict five of the most cited deficiencies. Overall, our results suggest that the predictive power of audit quality proxies depends on (i) the settings that researchers are interested in and (ii) the specific audit deficiencies hypothesized to matter in the investigated setting. For instance, future studies related to auditor independence might consider using restatements and the ratio of audit fees to total fees as proxies of audit quality.

PurposeThe study focusses on explaining why advocates for reform to state audit in the United Kingdom (UK) in the early 1980s, focussed on improving the links between the new National Audit Office (NAO) and Parliament, rather than on traditional notions of audit independence. The study shows how this focus on the auditor's link to Parliament depends on a particular concept of liberty and relates this to the wider literature on the place of audit in democratic society.Design/methodology/approachUnderstanding the issue of independence of audit in protecting the liberties and rights of citizens needs addressed. In this article, the authors investigate the creation of audit independence in the UK in the National Audit Act (1983). To do so, the authors employ a neo-Roman concept of liberty to historical archives ranging from the late 1960s to 1983.FindingsThe study shows that advocates for audit reform in the UK from the 1960s to the 1980s were arguing for an extension to Parliament's power to hold the executive to account and that their focus was influential on the way that the new NAO was established. Using a neo-Roman concept of liberty, the authors show that they believed Parliamentary surveillance of the executive was necessary to secure liberty within the UK.Research limitations/implicationsThe neo-Roman republican concept of liberty extends previous studies in considering the importance of audit for public accountability, the preservation of liberty and democracy.Practical implicationsPublic sector audit can be a fundamentally democratic activity. Auditors should be alert to the constitutional importance of their work and see parliamentary accountability as a key objective.Originality/valueThe neo-Roman concept of liberty extends previous studies in considering the importance of audit for public accountability, preservation of liberty and democracy.

To ensure that audit committees provide sufficient oversight over the auditing process and quality of financial reporting, legislators have imposed stricter requirements on the independence of audit committe members. Although many audit committees appear to be \"fully\" independent, anecdotal evidence suggests that CEOs often appoint directors from their social networks. Based on a 2004 to 2008 sample of U.S.-listed companies after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we find that these social ties have a negative effect on variables that proxy for oversight quality. In particular, we find that firms whose audit committees have \"friendship\" ties to the CEO purchase fewer audit services and engage more in earnings management. Auditors are also less likely to issue going-concern opinions or to report internal control weaknesses when friendship ties are present. On the other hand, social ties formed through \"advice networks\" do not seem to hamper the quality of audit committee oversight.

PurposeThis study aims to understand independence in internal auditing by investigating how internal auditor independence is constructed when analysed in its corporate governance context.Design/methodology/approachA critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the corporate governance reports of Swedish large stock market listed non-financial companies, for three consecutive years, is undertaken, using a theoretical lens of organisational embeddedness and operational coupling to understand independence as a situated practice.FindingsThe study develops four archetypes of internal auditor independence – autarchic, instrumental, symbiotic and subservient – and discusses each archetype's implications for independence, related to tripartite relations with management and the audit committee, regarding who has the mandate to direct work and how the work is done. It finds that internal auditors always have a capacity to be independent. Although they are not independent in relation to agents in the subservient archetype, they are independent of those down the organisational chain of command, suggesting independence is both situational and relational.Research limitations/implicationsThe analysis contributes a novel approach to the literature and develops a conception of independence using the dimensions of embeddedness and coupling. The archetypes offer an analytical framework for future studies on independence.Practical implicationsInternal auditors may understand their practice differently through the archetypes that result from this study.Social implicationsInternal auditors' power relations within corporate governance further an understanding of the pressures on internal auditors and their role.Originality/valueThis study contributes new knowledge on the situatedness of independence by showing how internal auditors are embedded and coupled helps build their independence.

Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize the recent financial crisis and economic recession as an exogenous shock that allows us to shed light on the relative influence of the audit committee and the CFO on fee negotiations. During the recession, we find larger fee reductions in the presence of more powerful CFOs, and smaller fee reductions in the presence of more powerful audit committees. We also find the CFO or the audit committee primarily influences fees when their counterpart is less powerful. Our findings suggest a more complex relationship between the CFO and the audit committee than current regulations recognize and cast doubt on the ability of regulation to force one structure on the negotiation process.

In 2005–2006, the PCAOB imposed restrictions on auditors' tax services in order to strengthen auditor independence and improve audit quality. The restrictions resulted in a significant drop in auditor-provided tax services (APTS). To test the impact on audit quality, I partition the sample into a treatment group (companies whose APTS purchases dropped significantly when the restrictions were introduced) and a control group (companies whose APTS purchases were relatively unaffected) and I measure audit quality using the incidence of accounting misstatements, tax-related misstatements, and auditors' going-concern opinions. Using a difference-in-differences design, I find no change in audit quality for the treatment group relative to the control group after the restrictions are imposed.

We examine the issue of auditor independence in a unique setting. Specifically, we test for auditor independence impairment among (1) private client firms, for which the risk of auditor reputation loss is lower than for publicly traded firms, and (2) in a low litigation environment (i.e., Norway) that further reduces the expected costs to the auditor associated with independence impairment. We have thus chosen a setting that gives independence impairment its best chance of being detected if it exists. Using a large sample of private Norwegian firms, we analyze whether auditors who receive higher fees are less likely to issue modified opinions. Despite the low litigation risk and the reduced reputation risk, our empirical results provide no evidence that auditors compromise their independence through fee dependence. These results are robust to controlling for the expected portion of fees, to different sample specifications, to the use of both levels and changes specifications, and to a number of sensitivity analyses.

Independence in financial auditing is a topic with extensive research, due to the ethical values expected from accountants and the conflicts with agency pressures and commercial interests. However, there is a lack of research on the benefits of ethical behaviors in the dynamic interactions between auditors and clients. This study aims to achieve through a qualitative approach an in-depth understanding of the self-perceived auditor independence and how it intervenes in the relationship with clients. Ten semi-structured interviews with auditors from the five major audit offices in the city of Porto were conducted. The results explore conflicts of interest between auditor independence and customer relationships. However, the findings highlight that improving auditor’s independence allows at the same time the development of a better professional relationship with the client, mitigating the conflicts of interests identified in previous literature. This paper presents a formula in which audit firms can leverage the concept of independence when they promote communication, transparency, and an open market. Regulation and supervision should work in favour for the same goal.

We examine auditor independence in the banking industry by analyzing the relation between fees paid to auditors and the extent of earnings management through loan loss provisions (LLP). We also examine whether this relation differs across large banks whose managements are required under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act to evaluate internal control over financial reporting and whose auditors must attest to the effectiveness of such internal controls, and small banks that are not subject to those requirements. We find that unexpected auditor fees are unrelated to earnings management for large banks. For small banks, we find greater earnings management via under-provisioning of LLP by banks that pay higher unexpected total and nonaudit fees to the auditor. These results suggest that auditor fee dependence on the audit client is associated with earnings management via abnormal LLP and is a potential threat to auditor independence for small banks. Our findings are relevant to policymakers contemplating new regulations in light of the recent banking crisis.