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Machine learning offers empirical methods to sift through accounting datasets with a large number of variables and limited a priori knowledge about functional forms. In this study, we show that these methods help detect and interpret patterns present in ongoing accounting misstatements. We use a wide set of variables from accounting, capital markets, governance, and auditing datasets to detect material misstatements. A primary insight of our analysis is that accounting variables, while they do not detect misstatements well on their own, become important with suitable interactions with audit and market variables. We also analyze differences between misstatements and irregularities, compare algorithms, examine one-year- and two-year-ahead predictions and interpret groups at greater risk of misstatements.

An extensive literature examines the causes and effects of financial misconduct based on samples drawn from four popular databases that identify restatements, securities class action lawsuits, and Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). We show that the results from empirical tests can depend on which database is accessed. To examine the causes of such discrepancies, we compare the information in each database to a detailed sample of 1,243 case histories in which regulators brought enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation. These comparisons allow us to identify, measure, and estimate the economic importance of four features of each database that affect inferences from empirical tests. We show the extent to which each database is subject to these concerns and offer suggestions for researchers using these databases.

This study examines the impact of religion on financial reporting. We predict that firms in religious areas are less likely to engage in financial reporting irregularities because prior research links religiosity to reduced acceptance of unethical business practices. Our results suggest that firms headquartered in areas with strong religious social norms generally experience lower incidences of financial reporting irregularities. We also examine whether religiosity influences managers' methods of managing earnings. Although we find a negative association between religiosity and abnormal accruals, we find a positive association between religiosity and two measures of real earnings management, suggesting that managers in religious areas prefer real earnings management over accruals manipulation. We provide evidence that our results are not driven by firms headquartered in rural areas and conclude that religious social norms represent a mechanism for reducing costly agency conflicts, particularly when other external monitoring is low.

This study examines the extent to which corporate governance acts as an efficient means of protecting investors against accounting irregularities. It is grounded in the literatures on public enforcement of securities laws by market authorities, governance, and fraudulent financial statements. A unique feature of the Canadian tracking and enforcement system for reporting issuers in default is used to refine the definitions of accounting irregularities or fraudulent financial statements used in other studies. We test and find that the governance mechanisms of firms found in default of financial reporting regulations during the first 5 years of existence of the Canadian system are weak compared to a sample of no-default firms. For instance, they have fewer independent and financial expert directors on their boards and audit committees, are more prone to have recently changed auditor and to having their CEO as chair of the board. They also appear to fulfill their financing requirements through private rather than public funds, which is consistent with the fact that default firms are less likely to be in a position to return to the public market to fulfill their needs. This study offers evidence relevant to policy makers and others who are concerned with the potential role of market authorities and governance in protecting investors against accounting irregularities.

This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity-based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question. Because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research design choices, we use propensity-score matching and assess hidden (omitted variable) bias within a broader sample. In contrast to most prior research, we do not find evidence of a positive association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments. Instead, we find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher levels of equity incentives.

Purpose: This study aims to examine the role of firm status and financial performance when a firm's wrongdoing, such as accounting irregularities, is disclosed. This study also examines proactive confession of wrongdoing (e.g., self-reporting of accounting irregularities) and its impact on the consequences of disclosing wrongdoing. Design/methodology/approach: We ran a regression analysis using 441 observations of firms' accounting irregularities in the U.S. business service (SIC codes 73XX) industry. We collected data from the U.S. General Accounting Office, WRDS Compustat, WRDS Execucomp, WRDS CRSP database, and SDC Platinum. After conducting the main analysis, we ran a robustness test (variance inflation factor test) and a post-hoc analysis (two-way ANOVA). Findings: A firm's high-status backfires in the stock market when its accounting irregularity is disclosed. However, this negative effect can be alleviated if the focal firm proactively self-reports its accounting irregularities. Moreover, a focal firm's strong financial performance can positively affect the stock market's reaction after the disclosure of accounting irregularities. Research limitations/implications: This study relies on only one industry, which may affect the generalizability of the research. Moreover, this study focuses only on the reactions of stock market investors in the case of disclosed wrongdoing. Future research should extend this research by using observations from other industries and by focusing on the reactions of various stakeholders. Future research could also address the unsupported hypothesis of this study, which suggests the moderating effect of confession on the relationship between a firm's financial performance and stock market reaction after the disclosure of accounting irregularities. Originality/value: This study contributes to the research on status and research on financial restatements by demonstrating how high-status and superior financial performance affect the stock market reactions from signal receivers (investors) after the disclosure of negative news, and how self-reporting may alleviate the adverse impacts.

This paper examines whether firms manipulating their reported financial results make suboptimal investment decisions. We examine fixed asset investments for a large sample of public companies during the 1978-2002 period and document that firms that manipulate their earnings-firms investigated by the SEC for accounting irregularities, firms sued by their shareholders for improper accounting, and firms that restated financial statements-over-invest substantially during the misreporting period. Furthermore, following the misreporting period, these firms no longer over-invest, consistent with corrected information leading to more efficient investment levels. We find similar patterns for firms with high discretionary revenues or accruals. Our findings suggest that earnings management, which is largely viewed as targeting parties external to the firm, can also influence internal decisions.

There are competing arguments and mixed prior evidence on whether firms that are aggressive in their financial reporting exhibit more or less tax aggressiveness. Our research contributes to resolving this issue by examining the association between aggressive tax reporting and the incidence of alleged accounting fraud. Relying on several proxies for tax aggressiveness to triangulate our evidence, we generally find that tax aggressive U.S. public firms are less likely to commit accounting fraud. However, we caution that our results are sensitive to how tax aggressiveness is measured. More specifically, four (two) of the five (three) proxies for firms' effective tax rates (book-tax differences) load positively (negatively) during the 1981—2001 period, implying that fraud firms are less tax aggressiveness. Our inferences persist when we isolate the 1995—2001 period in which accounting impropriety steeply rose and corporate tax compliance steeply fell. Moreover, we continue to find that tax aggressive firms are less apt to fraudulently manipulate their financial statements when we apply factor analysis to identify tax avoidance with a common factor extracted from the underlying proxies and match on propensity scores to ensure that the fraud and nonfraud samples have very similar non-tax characteristics.

We argue that earnings management and fraudulent accounting have important economic consequences. In a model where the costs of earnings management are endogenous, we show that in equilibrium, low-productivity firms hire and invest too much in order to pool with high productivity firms. This behavior distorts the allocation of economic resources in the economy. We test the predictions of the model using firm-level data. We show that during periods of suspicious accounting, firms hire and invest excessively, while managers exercise options. When the misreporting is detected, firms shed labor and capital and productivity improves. Our firm-level results hold both before and after the market crash of 2000. In the aggregate, our model provides a novel explanation for periods of jobless and investment-less growth.

PurposeRecognising the growing importance of professional judgement within professional accounting, this paper examines how it relates to Aristotelian practical wisdom, with reference to the ethical failure at Carillion plc in 2018. This includes an examination of how these concepts are similar and how they differ and a reconceptualisation of professional judgement in Aristotelian terms.Design/methodology/approachThe conventional understanding of professional judgement is articulated with reference to accounting standards, professional accounting institutions and academic research. This is compared to Aristotelian practical wisdom, as presented in the Nicomachean Ethics. Both of these conceptualisations are analysed with reference to the failure of Carillion plc.FindingsSome similarities as well as significant differences between the conventional conceptualisation of professional judgement and Aristotelian practical wisdom are identified. Application to the accounting failure of Carillion plc shows how an Aristotelian reconceptualisation of professional judgement, as an ethical concept, provides a more adequate understanding of unethical accounting behaviour.Research limitations/implicationsThe analysis identifies aspects of professional judgement in accounting that have not previously been explored empirically, but which nevertheless have empirical support in other domains.Practical implicationsProfessional judgement is reconceptualised in ethical terms, which informs how professional bodies and firms should conceive and apply this concept.Originality/valueAlthough there has been research on judgement informed by psychology, there has been little research linking judgement and wisdom in an accounting context. This paper utilises a philosophically informed perspective on wisdom to reconceptualise professional judgement in a way that provides a more adequate understanding of ethical failures.