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In this paper we examine how accounting conservatism affects the efficiency of debt contracting. We develop the statistical and informational properties of accounting reports under varying degrees of conditional and unconditional accounting conservatism, consistent with Basu's [1997] description of differential verifiability standards. Optimal debt covenants and interest rates on debt are derived from a natural tension between debt holders and equity claimants. We show how optimal covenants vary with the degree of conservatism and derive an efficiency metric that depends on the degree of conservatism. We find that accounting conservatism actually decreases the efficiency of debt contracts, contrary to the suggestions of Watts [2003] and contrary to the hypothesis in numerous empirical studies.

PurposeThis study offers a Bourdieu-oriented analysis of the tax compliance practice for indigenous entrepreneurs in New Zealand. It examines the intersection of accounting and tax for Māori entrepreneurs and their relational interactions with the Inland Revenue Department (IRD)/state/Crown and accountants by considering the contextual factors of history, culture and society of Māori.Design/methodology/approachQualitative research was adopted using face-to-face in-depth interviews with 34 participants and reviewing government documents. The authors analyse the tax compliance practice by drawing on Bourdieu's concepts of field, capital and habitus to conceptualise the tax field as a site of struggle for power and control by the IRD, accountants and indigenous entrepreneurs.FindingsThis study demonstrates how the tax field is structured as a game between tax reporting, taxpaying and monitoring functions. The position within the field is determined by the actor's access to the relevant capitals and habitus. It identifies how accounting, given its centrality to tax compliance, facilitates the power relations between the IRD, accountants and Māori entrepreneurs. The Eurocentric accounting-based tax reporting and the contextual factors illuminate how indigenous entrepreneurs are being dominated in the tax field. They experienced cultural dissonance with conflicting responsibilities when traversing the collectivistic indigenous and tax fields. Their collectivism involves sharing resources as they cherish whanaungatanga (relationship, kinship) and manaakitanga (kindness, generosity), which are at odds and are not valued in the tax field.Practical implicationsIt is an empirical illustration of the connection between accounting, tax and power for indigenous taxpayers and their relationship with the IRD/Crown and accountants. It has practical implications for developing and enhancing tax compliance in jurisdictions with indigenous taxpayers. Such an understanding is helpful for policymakers, government, business agencies and the accounting professions when assisting, empowering and educating indigenous groups regarding tax compliance.Originality/valueThis paper responds to the call for accounting research with modern-day indigenous peoples rather than historical ones. The paper fills a gap in the accounting and tax literature by examining the tax compliance practice of indigenous small and medium enterprise (SME) entrepreneurs using Bourdieu's framework. It identifies how the role of accounting creates, maintains and reinforces power structures in the tax field. Tax/accounting reporting based on Eurocentric rules disempowers and alienates indigenous entrepreneurs. They misrecognise their actions in reproducing the existing power structures in the tax field due to deeply held historical and cultural factors about the fear of the Crown/state and their practice of rangitaratanga (esteeming authorities).

We develop a theoretical framework to investigate (1) both the determinants and the consequences of auditor conservatism in a capital market setting and (2) the implications of Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for auditor conservatism and investment efficiency. We derive three primary results. First, by adjusting the mix of audit and nonaudit fees, companies with high business risk induce auditor conservatism, while companies with low business risk induce auditor aggressiveness. Second, if auditor conservatism is in force, a greater client pressure on auditors improves audit quality; but if auditor aggressiveness is in force, a greater client pressure on auditors impairs audit quality. Third, the nature of a firm's investment inefficiency (overinvestment or underinvestment) depends on its auditor's attestation (conservative or aggressive). Our analysis also implies that a mandatory restriction of nonaudit services imposed by Section 201 may decrease audit quality and damage investment efficiency.

Extant research notes a tendency to propound the idea that female managers are secondary to men. Gender differences constitute an ethical issue and the discursive constructions of gender management are central to research in business ethics. Drawing on evidence gathered from a time-space intersection that has been widely neglected by research in this area, we address whether female business leaders develop gender-stereotypic management styles as well as their propensity to adopt masculine management patterns such as making risky decisions and implementing formal management systems (e.g. accounting reports). Our findings suggest that gender-stereotypic management styles are chosen strategically and target-driven, which implies a selective use of masculine and feminine management styles. Furthermore, as part of the masculine approach, female business owners adopt risk-taking decisions and implement formal management systems. Our results provide support for the argument that gender is context dependent and, hence, the findings of this study may be useful for contemporary jurisdictions featuring male-dominated societies and a strong intervention by the State in the economy.

This paper studies the optimal design of long-term executive pay plans when boards of directors use accounting information for investment decision-making and executives can take costly actions to manipulate this information. The model predicts that a shift to more convex executive pay plans, such as equity plans that rely more on options and less on stock, is associated with higher levels of manipulation, lower reporting quality, and less efficient investment. When designing the optimal contract, the board trades off these effects with the cost of inducing executive effort. The paper also analyzes how the optimal pay convexity and the equilibrium level of manipulation change when the CEO's opportunistic reporting discretion changes. The model predicts that an increase in the CEO's marginal cost of manipulation increases the optimal level of pay convexity and first increases and then decreases the magnitude of manipulation.

We study the implications of imperfect information for term structures of credit spreads on corporate bonds. We suppose that bond investors cannot observe the issuer's assets directly, and receive instead only periodic and imperfect accounting reports. For a setting in which the assets of the firm are a geometric Brownian motion until informed equityholders optimally liquidate, we derive the conditional distribution of the assets, given accounting data and survivorship. Contrary to the perfect-information case, there exists a default-arrival intensity process. That intensity is calculated in terms of the conditional distribution of assets. Credit yield spreads are characterized in terms of accounting information. Generalizations are provided.

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine how farm management and farm accounting may be improved from the accountant's perspective. Design/methodology/approach - There has been a dearth of qualitative studies examining accountant's attitudes to financial reports. This study therefore interviews 13 rural accountants regarding their opinions on the usefulness of financial information they provide to farmers, and what types of financial information could aid farm management. Findings - Accountants generally agree that the present financial reports provided to farmers are of little decision-making value, since they are made for the purposes of compliance. In response, the accountants suggest a number of management accounting reports can better aid farmers. Practical implications - Accountants are important to the success of farms, yet in-depth responses have not previously been sought on the reports that accountants produce for farmers. This research provides accountants' opinions on how reports could be more useful for farmers and how more focused management accounting reports can assist decision-making. Originality/value - The qualitative approach used in this research provides a fresh and richer perspective on the usefulness of accounting to farm management. Interviewing the adviser rather than the business owner is relatively uncommon in agricultural organisations. The interviews have allowed the thoughts and concerns of accountants to come to light in a manner not previously achieved in organisational studies which relate farming and accounting.

Cross-functional teams operate in dynamic environments in which it is difficult to properly align incentives. As a result the free-rider problem can emerge. This paper presents two experiments in which dominant incentives to free ride were held constant. The first experiment examined the question of whether aligning accounting report structure and team structure in such a way as to create a \"group frame\" helps to mitigate the free-rider problem. Accounting report structure was found to complement team structure. When properly aligned, accounting and team structures helped to resolve the free-rider problem interactively by operating as a powerful group framing device. The second experiment provides theory-consistent evidence that people outside the teams (subjects who acted as management control system designers) fail to appreciate how powerfully the design of accounting and team structures influence performance within teams. Finally, the study provides additional insight into the role that accounting structure can play in promoting informal control within cross-functional teams.