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In the recent literature on the appropriate structure for an international monetary system characterised by either adjustable-peg or gliding-peg exchange rates, a great deal of attention has been placed on the concept of the pivot. the present work seeks to place this literature in proper perspective, critically reexamining the propositions that have been advanced about the pivot and identifying thew weaknesses and strengths inherent in each. The various statements on the subject are first restated as formal theorems, and the arguments used to justify them are outlined. The policy implications implicit in such theorems are then developed. A critical evaluation of the basic theorems and their associated policy implications is then presented. Finally, some unresolved questions regarding the pivot are indicated.   JEL: E42

The exchange-rate system established at Bretton Woods was intended to combine a fixity of the par-value of each member’s currency in the short run with a flexibility of the parity in the longer-run. Because of this emphasis on the fixity of the spot rates and of the parity in the short run, the Fund’s par-value system can be regarded as a variant of fixed exchange rates. The presumption that there is a devaluation-bias in present international monetary arrangements rests primarily on the hypothesis that under any variant of a fixed exchange rate the deficit country is more likely to be forced unwillingly to devalue than the surplus country is to be forced unwillingly to appreciate. The present paper considers the validity of the presumption that a devaluation-bias does exist under the Fund’s system of the adjustable peg. The author reviews the actual experience among Fund members in making changes in the par-value and then considers the analytical and statistical evidence which might throw light on this experience.   JEL: E42, F33

This paper seeks to extend discussion of monetary policy instruments to the situation of a country faced with major capital inflows when the process of domestic financial liberalization is incomplete. It briefly summarizes the recent usage of traditional monetary instruments, discusses the practical limits to classic sterilization measures as well as the pros and cons of using other supplementary measures including tax-based controls on capital inflows. It also examines the efficacy of such measures in Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, Spain, and Thailand. The conclusion is that, for a time and as a transitional measure, a country may find it opportune to supplement the traditional instruments with certain \"belt and braces\" measures including, in some instances, indirect (tax-based) capital controls.

The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 hit Denmark particularly hard. In this paper we argue that a combination of innovation in mortgage finance and the need to defend a euro-exchange rate peg was partly responsible. Sustained pressure against the Danish krone forced the central bank to increase policy interest rates consecutively in the last quarter of 2008. Monetary tightening in the midst of the GFC deepened the ongoing recession for the usual Keynesian aggregate demand reasons. Innovations in mortgage finance, which had made the economy more sensitive to changes in the policy rate, exacerbated this effect.

The paper models an adjustable peg exchange rate arrangement as a policy rule with an escape clause under which the timing and magnitudes of realignments are the outcomes of policy optimization decisions. Under the assumptions that market participants are rational, risk averse, and fully informed about the incentives of policymakers, the analysis focuses on the implications for relating realignment expectations to the state variables that enter the policy objective function, for modeling the bias in using forward exchange rates to predict future spot rates, and for characterizing the effectiveness of sterilized intervention.