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result(s) for
"Afghanistan-China (People"
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Prime Minister Amin Reiterates That He Wants \Friendly Relations with the U.S.\
in
Afghanistan-China (People's Republic) relations
,
Afghanistan-United States relations
,
Amin, Hafizullah
1979
Hafizullah Amin declares that Afghanistan seeks friendly [Afghanistan-United States relations; Afghanistan-China (People's Republic) relations] but protests Propaganda broadcast by the [Voice of America; Radio Peking]
Government Document
Demarche to Soviet Ambassador at Kabul about Evacuation of American Dependents
in
Afghanistan-China (People's Republic) relations
,
Afghanistan-Iran relations
,
Afghanistan-Pakistan relations
1979
Alexander Puzanov criticizes the News media coverage of the Evacuation of United States Embassy. Afghanistan Personnel from Afghanistan ; J. Bruce Amstutz comments on the deterioration of [Afghanistan-United States relations; Afghanistan-China (People's Republic) relations; Afghanistan-Pakistan relations; Afghanistan-Iran relations] during a meeting with Alexander Puzanov
Government Document
Annual Policy Assessment
in
Afghanistan-China (People's Republic) relations
,
Afghanistan-Iran relations
,
Daud Administration (23 August 1973-27 April 1978)
1976
U.S. Agency for International Development protests that reductions in [Military Assistance Program; Grants; Technical advisors; Technical training] for Afghanistan are contrary to United States interests ; [Afghanistan-Iran relations; Afghanistan-China (People's Republic) relations] are important components of a Daud Administration (23 August 1973-27 April 1978) strategy intended to limit Soviet influence ; United States policy toward Afghanistan should include cooperation with the [United Nations; Daud Administration (23 August 1973-27 April 1978)] in curbing the Narcotics trade ; United States Embassy. Afghanistan states that the U.S. should provide [Economic assistance; Technical training] to Afghanistan and should encourage U.S. Investments in the Afghan Economy ; United States Embassy. Afghanistan prepares a Program evaluation of United States policy toward Afghanistan
Government Document
1976 Policy Review
1977
United States Embassy. Afghanistan should seek to improve Afghan Public opinion toward the U.S. by increasing contacts between [Afghan citizens; United States citizens] and by providing information about U.S. Social conditions ; Soviet Union is owed three quarters of the Afghan Foreign debt and dominates exploitation of Afghan [Natural gas; Oil] ; Daud Administration (23 August 1973-27 April 1978) hesitates to cooperate with the U.S. in Narcotics interdiction activities but does support the efforts of the United Nations ; United States interests are served by encouraging Economic development in Afghanistan in order to improve the Standard of living and discourage Political unrest ; Iran seeks to improve Afghanistan-Iran relations through increased Economic assistance in order to limit Soviet influence and to prevent the Pashtunistan dispute from harming Regional security ; Mohammad Aziz Naim informs China (People's Republic) that the Coup d'Etat in Afghanistan (17 July 1973) was an expression of Afghan Nationalism in order to improve Afghanistan-China (People's Republic) relations and obtain Economic assistance ; Afghan policy toward the Pashtunistan dispute under Mohammad Daud has led to increased Soviet influence in Afghanistan ; United States interests include protecting Regional security and preserving Afghan Independence as well as encouraging improved Afghanistan-Iran relations and limiting Soviet influence in the area
Government Document
Annual Policy Assessment
1976
United States Embassy. Afghanistan states that reductions in Economic assistance for [Scholarships; Technical training; Military training] will diminish United States influence in Afghanistan ; Daud Administration (23 August 1973-27 April 1978) welcomes the increased Political power of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and seeks Development assistance from member states including [Saudi Arabia; Kuwait; Iran] ; Daud Administration (23 August 1973-27 April 1978) has improved Afghanistan-China (People's Republic) relations and seeks [Military training; Military equipment] from [Egypt; India] to counter Soviet influence ; United States objectives in Afghanistan include [Independence; Nonalignment] for Afghanistan in order to limit Soviet influence and the encouragement of closer [Afghanistan-Pakistan relations; Afghanistan-Iran relations] in order to improve Regional security ; United States Embassy. Afghanistan officials fear that conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan over Pashtunistan could lead to Political unrest or Warfare ; United States Embassy. Afghanistan annual Program evaluation for 1976 recommends that United States objectives in Afghanistan should be refined
Government Document
Afghanistan in 1977: An External Assessment
in
Afghanistan-China (People's Republic) relations
,
Afghanistan-Iran Helmand Waters Treaty of 1973
,
Afghanistan-Pakistan relations
1978
Daud Administration (23 August 1973-27 April 1978) improves Afghanistan-China (People's Republic) relations as a counterbalance to Soviet influence ; Arms shipments from the Soviet Union to Afghanistan include [SA-3 Surface-to-Air Missiles; SA-7 Surface-to-air missiles] ; Daud Administration (23 August 1973-27 April 1978) contributes to Regional security by settling the Afghanistan-Iran Helmand Waters Treaty of 1973 and improving Afghanistan-Pakistan relations
Government Document
Blinders, Blunders, and Wars
2014
The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon’s invasion of Russia to America’s invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models that were seriously at odds with objective reality. Blinders, Blunders, and Wars analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case.