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This paper raises a challenge for those who assume that corporate social responsibility and good corporate governance naturally go hand-in-hand. The recent spate of corporate scandals in the United States and elsewhere has dramatized, once again, the severity of the agency problems that may arise between managers and shareholders. These scandals remind us that even if we adopt an extremely narrow concept of managerial responsibility - such that we recognize no social responsibility beyond the obligation to maximize shareholder value - there may still be very serious difficulties associated with the effective institutionalization of this obligation. It also suggests that if we broaden managerial responsibility, in order to include extensive responsibilities to various other stakeholder groups, we may seriously exacerbate these agency problems, making it even more difficult to impose effective discipline upon managers. Hence, our central question: is a strong commitment to corporate social responsibility institutionally feasible? In searching for an answer, we revisit the history of public management, and in particular, the experience of social-democratic governments during the 1960s and 1970s, and their attempts to impose social responsibility upon the managers of nationalized industries. The results of this inquiry are less than encouraging for proponents of corporate social responsibility. In fact, the history of public-sector management presents a number of stark warnings, which we would do well to heed if we wish to reconcile robust social responsibility with effective corporate governance.

This paper evaluates whether the agency problem in public administration shapes Spanish municipalities' tax policy. To this aim, we have considered 2,431 Spanish municipalities for the period from 2002 to 2013. We find significant evidence of tax mimicking of neighboring municipalities, in both property tax and car tax. However, incumbents are not signaling their competence through tax competition. Rather, expenditure spillovers explain this interaction. Municipalities seek to have the same services and infrastructures as their neighbors. The fact that there is not tax benchmarking does not mean that the agency problem is not present in Spanish municipalities. The agency problem is one of the reasons corruption is so widespread among Spanish municipalities. Regarding the further policy implications of our findings, legislation should direct municipal governments' decisions towards the real needs of their constituencies.

We examine whether analyst coverage influences corporate fraud in China. The fraud triangle specifies three main factors, i.e. opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. On the one hand, analysts may reduce the fraud opportunity factor through external monitoring aimed at discouraging managerial misconduct, which can moderate agency problems. On the other hand, analysts may increase the fraud incentive factor by pressurizing managers to achieve short-term performance targets, which can exacerbate agency problem. In either case, the potential influence of analysts on the fraud rationalization factor may be more pronounced among firms that are more dependent on the capital market for corporate finance. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we show a negative association between corporate fraud propensity and analyst coverage, and that this effect is more pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises, which are more reliant on the stock market for external funding. These findings suggest that analyst coverage contributes to corporate fraud deterrence in emerging economies characterized by weak investor protection. The main policy implication is that further development of the analyst profession in emerging economies may benefit investors and strengthen business ethics.

The paper examines the impact of foreign institutional investors’ (FIIs) equity holding on the non compliance with the mandatory CSR expenditure of the Indian firms from 2016 to 2020. Using a sample of 1423 listed firms, we employ OLS and Logit regression models to establish that an increase in the FIIs reduces the extent of non compliance with mandatory CSR expenditure as well as the likelihood of such non-compliance. Findings of the study support the monitoring role of the FIIs to reduce information asymmetry and agency problem. Further, we provide the channel for the negative relation between FIIs and non-compliance as FIIs’ capability to reduce free cash flows of the firms. Given the presence of business groups in India, we conduct an additional analysis for the relation between FIIs and non-compliance with CSR regulation in business groups, and report a more pronounced negative relation in the member firms. Our study can provide insights for the policy makers as well as investors to understand the importance of FIIs in compliance with the regulation and in impacting the firms’ reputation.

Research background: The rapid development of digital economy has set off a new wave of enterprise reform. Developing the digital economy is not only an urgent requirement of the current situation, but also an important way to meet the people's better life. Purpose of the article: This paper attempts to reveal the important role of the development of digital technology on the debt financing cost of micro enterprises, and provide micro evidence for the integration of digital economy and real economy. At the same time, this paper wants to provide relevant guidance for formulating digital related policies and reducing the financing cost of the real economy. Methods: Taking China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as a sample, this paper empirically tests the impact of enterprise digital transformation on debt financing cost and its mechanism. In the robustness test, this paper uses the measures of changing independent variables and dependent variables, instrumental variable method and quantile regression method. In the mechanism test, this paper uses the intermediary effect model. In the further study, this paper uses the method of group regression. Findings & value added: The study finds that the digital transformation of enterprises significantly reduces the cost of debt financing. Mechanism tests show that the role of enterprise digital transformation in reducing debt financing costs is mainly realized by reducing information asymmetry and alleviating agency problems. Further tests show that the relationship between enterprise digital transformation and debt financing cost is affected by the degree of market competition, whether it is a high-tech enterprise and audit quality. When the degree of market competition is high, the enterprise is a high-tech one, or it is audited by the four major international accounting firms, the effect of enterprise digital transformation on the reduction of debt financing cost is more significant. The method used in this paper is also applicable to the study of other economic management problems. This paper proves a positive significance of digital transformation, which is conducive to promoting the digital transformation of enterprises. Especially for those enterprises in non-high-tech industries, they should speed up the pace. At the same time, this paper has a certain guiding role for the introduction and implementation of policies to encourage digital transformation.

We examine whether family firms invest more in employee relations than nonfamily firms. Using the variation in state-level changes in inheritance, gift, and estate taxes as an exogenous shock to family control, we find that family firms, particularly those in which a founder serves as chief executive officer or those in which a family member serves as a director on the board, treat their employees better than nonfamily firms. More importantly, family firms focus on investing in employee relations that help alleviate labor-related conflicts and controversies, possibly to avoid a negative family reputation among stakeholders. Family firms’ better treatment of their employees is also evident when we use a difference-in-difference test to exploit changes in family firm status due to (sudden) deaths of family members and firms’ inclusion in Fortune ’s “100 Best Companies to Work For” list to identify employee-friendly treatment. We further find that family firms in the early stage of their life cycle invest more in employee relations when they operate in labor-intensive industries in which the benefits from family owners’ monitoring of employees are expected to be large. Moreover, we find that although nonfamily firms’ investment in employee relations is impeded by several constraints, such as short-term investor pressure, managerial myopia, and managerial agency problems, family firms do not suffer from such constraints. These findings help explain why underinvestment in employee relations is prevalent in public firms despite potential long-term benefits from such intangible investment. This paper was accepted by Neng Wang, finance.

The aim of this study is to revisit the concept of the separation between ownership and control through reviewing studies on agency theory, governance, and corruption. This study applies integrative literature review as research method where the arguments and counterarguments are derived from existing studies. Relevant literature is identified and read in detail using the selected review strategy. The principal goal of the study is to develop an inventory surrounding the key themes of governance, corruption, and agency theory. None of the existing studies addresses the interrelationships between agency theory, corruption, and corporate governance. This study, thus, fills the gap exploring the theoretical and empirical evidence studying the bibliometric sources. The study finds evidence in support of changing ownership pattern from diffuse to concentrated and argues that the change has caused corruption due to deepening agency crisis. The study also finds that the extant literature focuses on applied areas which calls for further studies on core areas. Incorporating the concept espoused by Berle and Means, this study brings practical implication of agency theory in real life and extends the applicability of the concept.

This article documents that blockholders with both ownership and management control in family firms have different goals compared to blockholders with only ownership (but no management) control. We theorize and find evidence that family controlled and family managed (FCFM) firms negatively moderate the relationships between internationalization and governance mechanisms, while family controlled and nonfamily managed (FCNFM) firms do not. The findings indicate that family owners in FCFM firms have greater opportunities to reap private benefits of control indicating the presence of secondary (principal-principal) agency problems, while these problems are mitigated in FCNFM firms. In emerging economies like India where family firms are ubiquitous, they highlight the need to recognize differing blockholder influences on internationalization-governance relationships and to develop more nuanced theorizing for understanding them.

Purpose This study aims to investigate the impact of board independence on the cash dividend payments of family firms listed on the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) in balancing controlling families’ power to mitigate agency problems between family and minority shareholders in the post-2012 period. The authors focus on this period because Turkish authorities implemented mandatory regulations on the employment of independent directors on boards from fiscal year 2012. Design/methodology/approach The research model uses a panel dataset of 153 BIST-listed family firms over the period 2012–2017, employs alternative dependent variables and regression techniques and is applied to various sub-groups to improve robustness. Findings The empirical results show a strong positive effect of board independence on dividend decisions. The authors further detect that family directorship exhibits a negative effect, whereas both board size and audit committees have positive influences but chief executive officer (CEO)/duality has had no significant impact on the dividend policies of Turkish family firms since the new compulsory legal requirements in the Turkish market. Research limitations/implications The findings suggest that independent directorship and dividend policy are complementary governance mechanisms to reduce agency conflicts between families and minority shareholders in Turkey, which is a civil law-based emerging country characterized by high family ownership concentration. Practical implications The authors present evidence that Turkish family firms’ corporate boards have evolved, to some extent, from being managerial rubber stamps to more independent boards that raise opposing voices in family decision-making. However, independent directors’ preference for dividend-induced capital market monitoring implies that their direct monitoring is less effective than it is supposed to be. This suggests a need to revise the Turkish Corporate Governance Principles to enhance independent directors’ monitoring and supervisory power. Originality/value This is thought to be the first study to provide insights on how board independence influences dividend policy in controlling agency problems in Turkish family firms since Turkish authorities introduced compulsory rules on the employment of independent directors on boards.