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The behavioral agency model suggests family firms invest less in R&D than nonfamily firms to protect their socioemotional wealth. Studies support this contention but do not explain how family firms make R&D investments. We hypothesize that when performance exceeds aspirations, family firms manage socioemotional and economic objectives by making exploitative R&D investments that lead to more reliable and less risky sales levels. However, performance below aspirations leads to exploratory R&D investments that result in potentially higher but less reliable sales levels. Using a risk abatement model, our analyses of 847 firms over 10years supports our hypotheses.

Multichannel sales systems in business-to-business markets vary substantially in their designs and thereby either attenuate or aggravate agency conflicts between manufacturers and sales partners. Drawing on multiple agency theory, the authors introduce direct and indirect channel usage as focal design dimensions of multichannel sales systems and investigate each channel's performance effects using a matched manufacturer–sales partner data set. Whereas direct channel usage predominantly lowers agency conflicts in terms of information asymmetry and sales partner moral hazard, indirect channel usage amplifies moral hazard concerns. How those sales partner effects translate into manufacturer performance outcomes critically depends on governance mechanisms, confirming predictions from governance value analysis: formalization enhances performance outcomes for manufacturers in the case of indirect channel usage but diminishes performance in the case of direct channel usage. The authors observe converse effects for centralization and information exchange: centralization and information exchange enhance outcomes of direct channel usage but diminish outcomes of indirect channel usage. The focal managerial implication is that managers must align the design of their multichannel sales systems with effective governance mechanisms.

This paper contributes to multiple agency theory by examining how the compensation schemes awarded to outside directors and the CEO jointly affect firm-level risk taking. Using data of the S&P 1500 firms from 1997 to 2006, we find support for earlier arguments that providing the CEO, the outside directors, or both with stock options increases risk taking. More importantly, we find that compensating outside directors with stock options has significantly stronger effects than CEO stock options. Finally, contrary to what one would expect, we find that these effects are mutually substituting; that is, if both the outside directors and the CEO are provided with stock option compensation, outside directors' incentives weaken the effect of the CEO's incentives on firms' risk taking.

The purpose of this article is to extend agency theory (AT) by applying it to social enterprises (SEs), which exhibit a dual focus on both corporate social responsibility (CSR) and profit-driven operations. This duality, often referred to as the double-bottom-line attribute, complicates the agency relationship within SEs and has led to conceptual unclear in previous studies. This study also explains why traditional AT and reciprocal theory are not applicable to the analysis of complex agency relationships in SEs. In response, this article builds upon traditional AT to propose a developmental framework that redefines the roles of principal and agent in SE contexts. This research proposes a new theory, Sustainability Agency Theory (SAT), which aims to more clearly define the dynamic agency relationships within SEs. The article further distinguishes SAT from other AT-based extensions, such as the reciprocal theory. By offering a theoretical extension to SEs, this study contributes a novel perspective to the literature on agency relationships in hybrid organizations. Furthermore, this article expands SAT through seven distinct dimensions, laying a strong foundation for future theoretical developments related to SAT.

PurposeExport market orientation can be broadly divided into intelligence (generation and dissemination) and responsiveness activities. Although previous studies assess intelligence and responsiveness activities, little is known about what type of international channel partner acts as an enabling condition for the impact of these activities on export venture performance. This study aims to examine the extent to which the selection of international channel partners through word-of-mouth referrals versus direct contacts affects the benefits of intelligence and responsiveness activities.Design/methodology/approachData were collected from 246 exporting manufacturers in Japan. To test the hypotheses, we conducted regression analyses using a subjective performance measure at the venture level. We also performed a post hoc analysis using objective performance measure at the function level.FindingsWe find that the extent to which international channel partners are selected through word-of-mouth referrals has a moderating role in the export market-oriented activities–performance linkages. Specifically, it acts as an enabling condition for intelligence activity and a disenabling condition for responsiveness activity.Originality/valueThis study contributes to a better understanding of export market orientation by classifying it into intelligence and responsiveness activities and providing empirical evidence on their different interaction effects with partner selection. It also contributes to the elaboration of agency theory by offering insights into the fit between task characteristics and contract type. Our study is critical for business managers as it suggests guidelines for manufacturing exporters engaging in export market-oriented behaviors and export channel management.

Institutional investors report that they prefer to invest in firms with greater board independence despite the fact that researchers have been unable to demonstrate a link between board independence and firm performance. We investigate whether differences among institutional investors affect these preferences. We find that trading strategies have some effect but that mutual funds—facing the strongest institutional pressures—have significantly stronger preferences for firms with greater board independence than do other types of institutional investors. This suggests that institutional investor preferences for independent boards are at least partially driven by institutional pressures rather than anticipated reductions in agency costs.

The search for improved value outcomes of procurement and use of PPPs lies in citizen co-production and co-delivery of public services. Applying insight from Agency theory, this study assesses the role of citizens in traditional procurement and PPPs. Based on a review of literature, interviews and focus group discussions, the study acknowledges that while the agency theory has been adopted in guiding theory and practice of procurement and PPPs, it is inadequate in engaging citizen participation. The study reveals that the principal’s interests tend to override the interests of citizens, creating a mismatch between service delivery expectations and perceptions. The outcome of this study points to the need for a radical shift in the way in which citizens are engaged in both traditional procurement and PPP routes as service delivery models. This paper is important since it advocates for the extension of the Agency theory to Citizen Principal Agency theory that puts the citizen at the frontline of service delivery design and implementation.

Complex organisations require coherence to achieve adaptive goals through agency. This paper introduces Mindset Agency Theory (MAT), a metatheoretical framework designed for modelling and diagnosing agency within culturally diverse populations. MAT, a cybernetic multi-ontology framework, delineates five formative traits defining agency character. Its cognitive style trait (with bipolar values of Patterning–Dramatising) elucidates how agencies acquire information. Examining diverse agencies requires an appreciation of the social relationships that exist there, but MAT is currently devoid of this capability. Using the configuration approach to enable the integration of Tönnies’ social organisation theory into MAT, social relationships can be suitably explored, thus enhancing its capacity to investigate agency coherence. Tönnies’ theory of social organisation (with bipolar values of Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft) that frames inter-agent interactions is configured within MAT. This integration births a new formative trait, pairing cognitive style with social organisation, and is thus capable of indicating the likelihood of operative coherence. Configuration is applied by relating propositional attributes of a holding metatheory framework such as MAT, with an entry theory such as Tönnies’ social organisation theory as determined from the literature. The elaborated MAT serves as a diagnostic tool, linking trait instabilities with agency pathologies that deliver dysfunction. A subsequent paper will apply this framework to ASEAN, a regional intergovernmental organisation addressing cultural diversity issues. The study aims to evaluate ASEAN’s mindset and diagnose its pathologies, such as narcissism and paradoxical behaviour.

Instruments to measure self-determination have only been available in the Spanish language to date, for adolescents with intellectual disability (ID). However, given the development of a new measure of self-determination for youth with and without disabilities, the Self-Determination Inventory, there is a need to adapt and validate this tool in the Spanish language so as to provide practitioners with a psychometrically strong measure of self-determination. This study provides evidence of reliability and validity of the Spanish version of the scale, empirically tested with a sample of 620 youth with and without disabilities in Spain. Specifically, validity was evidenced through structural equation modeling approaches, confirming the instrument adequacy to measure self-determination in Spanish speaking youth. Future lines of research are suggested.

The issue of conflicting interests between company management and stakeholders arises when the management prioritizes its own compensation over the interests of other parties. This disparity in interests is commonly referred to as the agency problem. To address this problem, corporate governance has been implemented as a mechanism to mitigate its effects. Consequently, this study aims to provide empirical evidence on the role of governance in alleviating the agency problem. The agency problem is measured using discretionary accrual, and panel data regression is employed to test the research hypothesis. The study focuses on 24 food and beverage companies listed on the Indonesian stock exchange, with data collected from 2018 to 2021. The findings indicate that governance, particularly in terms of the board of commissioners, can effectively reduce agency problems. In Indonesia, the implementation of a two-tier system, which separates the supervisory and executive organs, enables proper management oversight and helps mitigate agency problems. These research findings can inform capital market regulators in enhancing existing governance regulations especially for a country that applied two-tier system.