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Many in the United States and Israel believe that Hamas is nothing but a terrorist organization, and that its social sector serves merely to recruit new supporters for its violent agenda. Based on Sara Roy's extensive fieldwork in the Gaza Strip and West Bank during the critical period of the Oslo peace process, Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza shows how the social service activities sponsored by the Islamist group emphasized not political violence but rather community development and civic restoration.

The concept of a political opportunity structure contributes to the analysis of the behaviour of political actors and is one of the current central topics that has importance for political systems at the regional and international levels, as well as for political and social scientific research centres. This study falls within the range of studies on ideological movements and political parties, and the political variables that affect the political system and these movements which lead them to adapt their ideology, by changing their position – from one of rejection to one of acceptance – with regard to participation in parliamentary elections. To achieve their aim of getting into power, ideological movements and political parties can adapt to political changes, influence the structure of political opportunities and exploit ones available to them. This study focuses on the analysis of factors that led to the change in the position of Hamas with regard to democratic practice, from boycotting the first parliamentary elections in 1996 to actively participating in the 2006 elections. It discusses a number of factors: first, the internal organizational factors of the movement; second, the political variables in the Palestinian arena; and third, the internal factors related to the ruling party (Fatah). In light of this, the study principally aims at providing an objective view on the position of Hamas with regard to its political and democratic practice prior to its participation in the Palestinian political system and beyond, using the concept of political opportunities structure. Given that the movement was restricted by its ideology and governed by the political changes that had taken place in the Palestinian political system, it was forced to adapt to the new circumstances that followed the Oslo Treaty by changing its position from opposition and rejection to political participation.

This article paints a broad canvas of Hamas after almost four years of intifada and a relentless multipronged Israeli-U.S. assault against it. The movement's views and strategies are discussed with regard to suicide attacks, the intra-Palestinian dialogue and cease-fire negotiations, and conditions for a peace settlement. While Israel's assassination of leadership cadres has unquestionably dealt the movement a serious blow, the author argues that Hamas has nonetheless made three significant strategic gains: its \"resistance project\"--contrasting with PLO negotiations policies--has gained ground as a \"national agenda\"; Arab and Muslim support, fueled by rising outrage at U.S. and Israeli policies, has grown; and, most importantly, Palestinian support at the grass-roots level has never been greater, resulting in increased political weight even as the movement's military strength has declined. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

The US voted against two resolutions passed to the UN Security Council that condemned the continuing grave violations of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly Israel's assassination of Hamas leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin. The failure of the resolution introduced by Algeria and Libya before the UN Security Council that would have condemned Sheik Ahmed Yassin's assassination as an extrajudicial execution and further condemns all terrorist attacks against any civilians, as well as all acts of violence and destruction was due to the US' nonconcurrence to it.