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Recently, the Somali diaspora has found itself at the centre of heightened security concerns surrounding the proliferation of international terrorist networks and their recruitment strategies. These concerns have reached new levels since the absorption of al-Shabaab into al-Qaeda in 2012. Based on a qualitative analysis of interviews with 118 members of Canada's largest Somali community, this article draws upon narrative criminology to reverse the 'why they joined' question that serves as the predicate for much recent radicalization scholarship, and instead explores, 'why they would never join'. We encounter Somali-Canadians equipping themselves with sophisticated counternarratives that vitiate the enticements of al-Shabaab. Particularly, notions of 'coolness', 'trickery' and 'religious perversion' mediate participants' perceptions of al-Shabaab and enable a self-empowering rejection of its recruitment narratives. In particular, we find resonances between the narratives of non-recruits and 'bogeyman' narratives that exist commonly in many cultures. The efficacy of these narratives for resilience is three-fold, positioning the recruiters as odious agents, recruits as weak-minded dupes and our participants as knowledgeable storytellers who can forewarn others against recruitment to al-Shabaab.

Qualitative interviews were conducted with nine members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al‐Qaeda currently incarcerated in Kuwait's Central Prison. The semistructured interviews attempted to understand psychosocial factors in Kuwait that contributed to their decision to join extremist organizations. Interviews were analyzed using Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) and the emergent themes identified the following core themes explaining their involvement: (1) religious identity development; (2) personal connections; (3) propaganda; (4) defense of Islam; and (5) social marginalization. Participants described a process whereby their religion became a central part of their personal identity. As their religious identity developed, they became involved in Islamic organizations where they met people involved with ISIS or Al‐Qaeda. These social connections exposed them to jihadi propaganda which, in addition to increased military conflict in the Middle East, crystallized their beliefs that Islam is under attack, and they were religiously obligated to defend it. The results also identified societal factors that increased the probability of engaging in terrorism including relatively low levels of education, coming from low socioeconomic groups in Kuwait, and feeling socially marginalized by broader Kuwaiti society.

Terrorism studies is fascinated with the terrorist actor. Though this may seem natural, the present article argues that a different perspective can be fruitful. From a constructivist point of view, terrorism is a social construction. The terrorist actor is a product of discourse, and hence discourse is the logical starting point for terrorism research. In particular, it is the discourse of the terrorists' adversaries that constitutes terrorist motivations, strategies, organizational structures and goals. Hence, the article suggests a shift of perspective in terrorism studies – from an actor-centred to a discourse-centred perspective. It develops a discourse approach that emphasizes the crucial role of metaphors in the making of reality. To illustrate this approach, the metaphorical construction of Al-Qaeda in the German popular press in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington (2001), Madrid (2004) and London (2005) is analysed. Terrorism was first constituted as war, but from 2004 onwards the principal metaphor shifted from war to crime, constructing Al-Qaeda as a criminal rather than a military organization. This shift has transformed Al-Qaeda from an external to an internal threat, which has entailed a shift in counter-terrorism practices from a military to a judicial response.

Yemen is the dark horse of the Middle East. Every so often it enters the headlines for one alarming reason or another-links with al-Qaeda, kidnapped Westerners, explosive population growth-then sinks into obscurity again. But, as Victoria Clark argues in this riveting book, we ignore Yemen at our peril. The poorest state in the Arab world, it is still dominated by its tribal makeup and has become a perfect breeding ground for insurgent and terrorist movements. Clark returns to the country where she was born to discover a perilously fragile state that deserves more of our understanding and attention. On a series of visits to Yemen between 2004 and 2009, she meets politicians, influential tribesmen, oil workers and jihadists as well as ordinary Yemenis. Untangling Yemen's history before examining the country's role in both al-Qaeda and the wider jihadist movement today, Clark presents a lively, clear, and up-to-date account of a little-known state whose chronic instability is increasingly engaging the general reader.

The ideologies of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are rooted in larger historical trends that have to do with the rise of Islamism in the Arab world and its authoritarian politics. This article provides the basic history and ideological composition of these two militant movements, how they differ from each other, and what accounts for their initial political success and more recent failure. It also offers policy recommendations for how to more effectively counter these groups.

This article examines whether Al Qaeda Central are still relevant or not. By investigating Al Qaeda Central's activities, which are aimed at provoking violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as its continuous plots of direct attacks against the US, this article shows that Al Qaeda's operational capability is stronger than anticipated by the US and other scholars. In addition, Al Qaeda affiliates maintain a close relationship with the group which in turn facilitates Al Qaeda Central's resiliency. Moreover, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)'s aggressive support and contribution to the Al Qaeda network indicates that Al Qaeda Central's longevity depends on its relationship with affiliates. The article concludes that under these conditions, Al Qaeda Central still has a place in global security discussions.

Al-Qaeda's attempts to attack Western countries have often been enabled through the co-optation of existing jihadist organizations and their external support networks. This article examines this phenomenon through a case study of al-Qaeda's failed attempt to co-opt elements of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) for an attack in Australia. The article first examines the emergence of JI and its Australian-based support network Mantiqi IV. It then analyzes al-Qaeda's unsuccessful attempt to utilize Mantiqi IV for an attack during the 2000 Sydney Olympics, identifying key factors that both enabled and hindered the plot.

The research for this article is based on original biographical and relational data on 1,019 foreign fighters from France, Germany, and the UK who had traveled to a conflict country due to their Jihadi convictions between the years 2000 and 2016. It investigates where and how they had radicalized. The findings suggest that foreign fighters were primarily recruited through interpersonal or religious organizational networks. Salafist mosques, radical religious associations, and more informal groups dedicated to proselytizing were particularly crucial to the radicalization process. In contrast, contexts such as the Internet or prisons were comparably less relevant to the radicalization process of foreign fighters. The important role of interpersonal and organizational ties was further evidenced by social network analysis, which found that the majority of foreign fighters were linked within a single social network prior to their mobilization. Overall, the findings document the continued relevance of religious organizations in the recruitment and mobilization of jihadi foreign fighters.

Study of ideology is one of the most important domains of consideration for a successful counter-terrorism strategy. It is necessary to know and understand the ideology of a terrorist outfit coupled with the ongoing evolution at the same, its chief ideologues and its target audiences in order to provide an alternative ideology or in other words to win the ‘hearts and the minds’ of the people. This article traces the mounting similitude in the discourse and the actions of Lashkar-e-Taiba and the ideology of Al-Qaeda. The article begins with a brief depiction of the debate on the ‘end of ideology’ before proceeding on to an examination of Al-Qaeda’s ideology. In the next section, LeT’s discourse and actions from 1990 to 2010 are scrutinised followed by an analysis that attempts to draw out parallels between the ideologies of the two terrorist organisations. In the last section, the conclusion raises several pertinent points for the consideration of counter-terrorist specialists and policy makers.

Pakistan almost uniquely is both a major victim of terrorism and a major sponsor of terrorism. It has been the scene of horrific acts of terrorist violence, including the murder of Benazir Bhutto, and it has been one of the most prolific state sponsors of terror aimed at advancing its national security interests. Over the course of the past three decades, Pakistan's army has built a complex network of relationships with numerous jihadist terror groups, including the Taliban, and with terrorists like Osama bin Laden. Fear of India is the driving force behind the army's pursuit of these relationships. For the next American president, there is no issue or country more critical to get right, which means developing a policy that will move Pakistan away from being a hothouse of terror. Engaging Kashmir should be part of that new approach.