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Behavioural economics : a very short introduction
Traditionally economists have based their economic predictions on the assumption that humans are super-rational creatures, using the information we are given efficiently and generally making selfish decisions that work well for us as individuals. Economists also assume that we're doing the very best we can possibly do - not only for today, but over our whole lifetimes too. But increasingly the study of behavioural economics is revealing that our lives are not that simple. Instead, our decisions are complicated by our own psychology. Each of us makes mistakes every day. We don't always know what's best for us and, even if we do, we might not have the self-control to deliver on our best intentions. We struggle to stay on diets, to get enough exercise and to manage our money. We misjudge risky situations. We are prone to herding: sometimes peer pressure leads us blindly to copy others around us; other times copying others helps us to learn quickly about new, unfamiliar situations. 00This Very Short Introduction explores the reasons why we make irrational decisions; how we decide quickly; why we make mistakes in risky situations; our tendency to procrastination; and how we are affected by social influences, personality, mood and emotions.
Book
Incentives in Experiments
Experimental economists currently lack a convention for how to pay subjects in experiments with multiple tasks. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this question. Assuming statewise monotonicity and nothing else, we prove that paying for one randomly chosen problem—the random problem selection mechanism—is essentially the only incentive compatible mechanism. Paying for every period is similarly justified when we assume only a “no complementarities at the top” condition. To help experimenters decide which is appropriate for their particular experiment, we discuss empirical tests of these two assumptions.
Journal Article
RCTS TO SCALE
Nudge interventions have quickly expanded from academic studies to larger implementation in so-called Nudge Units in governments. This provides an opportunity to compare interventions in research studies, versus at scale. We assemble a unique data set of 126 RCTs covering 23 million individuals, including all trials run by two of the largest Nudge Units in the United States. We compare these trials to a sample of nudge trials in academic journals from two recent meta-analyses. In the Academic Journals papers, the average impact of a nudge is very large—an 8.7 percentage point take-up effect, which is a 33.4% increase over the average control. In the Nudge Units sample, the average impact is still sizable and highly statistically significant, but smaller at 1.4 percentage points, an 8.0% increase. We document three dimensions which can account for the difference between these two estimates: (i) statistical power of the trials; (ii) characteristics of the interventions, such as topic area and behavioral channel; and (iii) selective publication. A meta-analysis model incorporating these dimensions indicates that selective publication in the Academic Journals sample, exacerbated by low statistical power, explains about 70 percent of the difference in effect sizes between the two samples. Different nudge characteristics account for most of the residual difference.
Journal Article
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: The Incentive to Be Engaged
This paper studies institutional investors' incentives to be engaged shareholders. In 2017, the average institution gains an extra $129,000 in annual management fees if a stockholding increases 1% in value, considering both the direct effect on assets under management and the indirect effect on subsequent fund flows. The estimates range from $19,600 for investments in small firms to $307,600 for investments in large firms. Institutional shareholders in one firm often gain when the firm's competitors do well, by virtue of institutions' holdings in those firms, but the impact of common ownership is modest in the most concentrated industries.
Journal Article
Subsidies and Time Discounting in New Technology Adoption
We study a generous program to promote the adoption of solar photovoltaic (PV ) systems through subsidies on future electricity production, rather than through upfront investment subsidies. We develop a tractable dynamic model of new technology adoption, also accounting for local market heterogeneity. We identify the discount factor from demand responses to variation that shifts expected future but not current utilities. Despite the massive adoption, we find that households significantly discounted the future benefits from the new technology. This implies that an upfront investment subsidy program would have promoted the technology at a much lower budgetary cost.
Journal Article
Belief Elicitation and Behavioral Incentive Compatibility
Subjective beliefs are crucial for economic inference, yet behavior can challenge the elicitation. We propose that belief elicitation should be incentive compatible not only theoretically but also in a de facto behavioral sense. To demonstrate, we show that the binarized scoring rule, a state-of-the-art elicitation, violates two weak conditions for behavioral incentive compatibility: (i) within the elicitation, information on the incentives increases deviations from truthful reporting; and (ii) in a pure choice over the set of incentives, most deviate from the theorized maximizer. Moreover, we document that deviations are systematic and center-biased, and that the elicited beliefs substantially distort inference.
Journal Article
Reference Points for Retirement Behavior
This paper studies the large concentration of retirement behavior around statutory retirement ages, a puzzling stylized fact. To investigate this fact, I estimate bunching responses to 644 pension benefit discontinuities, using administrative data on the universe of German retirees. Financial incentives alone cannot explain retirement patterns, but there is a large direct effect of statutory retirement ages. I argue that the framing of statutory ages as reference points for retirement provides a plausible explanation. Simulations based on a model with reference dependence highlight that shifting statutory ages via pension reforms is an effective policy to influence retirement behavior.
Journal Article
Variable Compensation and Salesperson Health
Positive effects of incentives on salespeople's motivation, effort, and performance are well-established in literature. This article takes a novel look at their influence on salespeople's health. The results of four empirical studies, including more than 1,400 salespeople, suggest that an increasing variable compensation share (i.e., greater pay-for-performance component in salespeople's compensation plans) increases salespeople's stress, resulting in emotional exhaustion and more sick days. These outcomes are more likely for salespeople with lower personal ability and fewer social resources. The harmful effects of the variable compensation share on salespeople's health reduce the positive effects of this incentive on sales performance. To practice better marketing for a better world, if variable compensation is used, the authors recommend that managers screen new hires for job-related resources and help their existing staff build such resources. In addition, companies may personalize incentive schemes and sensitize managers to the stress-inducing effects of variable compensation shares.
Journal Article