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This paper puts forward an argument against realist views of grounding, which hinges on explanations based on so-called ‘real definitions’. I will provide some essential background, then phrase the argument, and show some anti-realist conclusions that can be drawn from it. Finally, I will deal with some potential objections, and I will discuss Correia’s [2017] view of real definitions, in order to show that despite appearances, the notion of grounding does not have any actual theoretical role within it.

Purpose This study aims to determine whether partial least squares path modeling (PLS) is fit for purpose for scholars holding scientific realist views. Design/methodology/approach The authors present the philosophical foundations of scientific realism and constructivism and examine the extent to which PLS aligns with them. Findings PLS does not align with scientific realism but aligns well with constructivism. Research limitations/implications Research is needed to assess PLS’s fit with instrumentalism and pragmatism. Practical implications PLS has no utility as a realist scientific tool but may be of interest to constructivists. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to assess PLS’s alignments and mismatches with constructivist and scientific realist perspectives.

This paper introduces the Special Issue of Theoria entitled “Quantum mechanics and reality”. We first comment on its origins related to the VIII International Workshop on Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information, promoted by the International Network on Foundations of Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information. We then briefly introduce each contribution individually, bringing the papers together under the Special Issue’s topic. Este artículo introduce el número especial de Theoria titulado “Mecánica cuántica y realidad”. En primer lugar, se explican sus origenes en relación con el VIII Taller Internacional sobre Mecánica Cuántica e Información Cuántica, promovido por la Red Internacional sobre los Fundamentos de la Mecánica Cuántica e Información Cuántica. A continuación, se presenta brevemente cada contribución de manera individual, agrupándolas en torno al tema del número especial.

Although number sentences are ostensibly simple, familiar, and applicable, the justification for our arithmetical beliefs has been considered mysterious by the philosophical tradition. In this paper, I argue that such a mystery is due to a preconception of two realities, one mathematical and one nonmathematical, which are alien to each other. My proposal shows that the theory of numbers as properties entails a homogeneous domain in which arithmetical and nonmathematical truth occur. As a result, the possibility of arithmetical knowledge is simply a consequence of the possibility of ordinary knowledge.

This paper develops an account of metaphysical explanation according to which metaphysical explanations are answers to what-makes-it-the-case-that questions. On this view, metaphysical explanations are not to be considered entirely objective, but are subject to epistemic constraints imposed by the context in which a relevant question is asked. The resultant account of metaphysical explanation is developed independently of any particular views about grounding. Toward the end of the paper an application of the view is proposed that takes metaphysical explanations conceived in this way to characterize reality's structure. According to this proposal, reality's structure is partly constituted by a projection of our explanatory practices onto reality.

Purpose This study aims to correct errors in, and comment on the claims made in the comment papers of Rigdon (2022) and Henseler and Schuberth (2022), and to tidy up any substantive oversights made in Cadogan and Lee (2022). Design/methodology/approach The study discusses and clarifies the gap between Rigdon’s notion of scientific realism and the metaphysical, semantic and epistemological commitments that are broadly agreed to be key principles of scientific realism. The study also examines the ontological status of the variables that Henseler and Schuberth claim are emergent using emergence logic grounded in the notion that variables are only truly emergent if they demonstrate a failure of generative atomism. Findings In scientific realism, hypothetical causal contact between the unobserved and the observed is a key foundational stance, and as such, Rigdon’s concept proxy framework (CPF) is inherently anti-realist in nature. Furthermore, Henseler and Schuberth’s suggestion that composite-creating statistical packages [such as partial least squares (PLS)] can model emergent variables should be treated with skepticism by realists. Research limitations/implications Claims made by Rigdon regarding the realism of CPF are unfounded, and claims by Henseler and Schuberth regarding the universal suitability of partial least squares (PLS) as a tool for use by researchers of all ontological stripes (see their Table 5) do not appear to be well-grounded. Practical implications Those aspiring to do science according to the precepts of scientific realism need to be careful in assessing claims in the literature. For instance, despite Rigdon’s assertion that CPF is a realist framework, we show that it is not. Consequently, some of Rigdon’s core criticisms of the common factor logic make no sense for the realist. Likewise, if the variables resulting from composite creating statistical packages (like PLS) are not really emergent (contrary to Henseler and Schuberth) and so are not real, their utility as tools for scientific realist inquiry are called into question. Originality/value This study assesses PLS using the Eleatic Principle and examines H&S’s version of emergent variables from an ontological perspective.

Issue Title: Papers from the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 2005 Meeting

This paper contributes to the debate on the question of whether a systematic connection obtains between one’s commitment to realism or antirealism and one’s attitude towards the possibility of radical theoretical novelty, namely, theory change affecting our best, most successful theories (see, e.g., Stanford in Synthese 196:3915–3932, 2019; Dellsén in Stud Hist Philos Sci 76:30–38, 2019). We argue that it is not allegiance to realism or antirealism as such that primarily dictates one’s response to the possibility of radical theoretical novelty: what matters the most is, rather, the proposed alternative’s promise to realize one’s favored cognitive aim(s). Our argument tells not only against Stanford’s account of how adherence to realism or antirealism orients how one responds to possible radical theoretical novelty, but also against what we call the “natural pairing thesis.” According to such a thesis, which has kept resurfacing in the history of the philosophy of science, one-to-one pairings obtain between realism/antirealism, on the one hand, and theoretical conservatism/openness to radical theoretical novelty, on the other hand. As our argument suggests, however, when faced with the possibility of radical theoretical novelty, realists can respond either in a conservative way or by being open to theory change, not unlike antirealists.

A debate has recently appeared regarding whether non-naturalism is better than other metaethical views at explaining moral progress. I shall take the occasion of this debate to present a novel debunking dilemma for moral non-naturalists, extending Sharon Street's Darwinian one. I will argue that moral progress indicates that our moral attitudes tend to reflect contingent sociocultural and psychological factors. For non-naturalists, there is then either a relation between these factors and the moral facts, non-naturalistically construed, or there is not. If there is no relation, the contingent factors are unlikely to lead to moral knowledge. If there is a relation, they must be likely to lead to non-naturalist-style moral knowledge, but no theoretically virtuous explanation of moral progress is likely to accommodate non-naturalist commitments. It follows that non-naturalist moral realism cannot explain our moral knowledge. I call this a contingentist challenge to non-naturalism.

This paper discusses the realism-antirealism problem in philosophy of science and the stalemate we see with respect to solving this problem. The thesis is that both realism and antirealism rest on a priori arguments, which the other part does not accept. The suggested solution is to avoid a priori arguments and focus on epistemic naturalism, which embraces theories about human cognitive evolution and relies on empirical analyses in its account of scientific knowledge.