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"Antitrust law China."
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Revisiting China's competition law and its interaction with intellectual property rights
\"Taking the dynamics of EU competition policy as a reference, the author provides a historical perspective of China's competition law, enforcement mechanisms and future challenges against the background of ongoing economic reforms and the concomitant modernisation of the judicial system. Readers are familiarised with the main principles of China's IP Guidelines. Recent judicial and administrative landmark decisions are covered as well. The author studies issues at the nexus between China's competition law and IP regime. Coherent goals of the two legal systems are achieved through seemingly opposite means: Safeguarding free competition for all market players versus granting exclusive rights to IP owners. It is a constant challenge for China's competition authorities to strike an optimal balance when applying competition law to the exercise of IP rights\"--Publisher's website.
Book
Anti-monopoly law and practice in China
The China Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), which became effective August 1, 2008, is the first comprehensive competition law enacted by China. The AML prohibits a broad array of agreements between competitors and commercial counterparties, as well as competitive conduct by single firms that may harm the competitive process. In addition, it establishes a mandatory administrative review procedure for mergers and acquisitions between companies meeting certain sales thresholds, globally or in China. Beyond these fundamental provisions, the AML prohibits certain types of administrative abuses believed to be prevalent in China and establishes a complex set of administrative agencies with broad powers to enforce the law. Anti-Monopoly Law and Practice in China is the first comprehensive treatment of the AML and the practice of antitrust law under this new system. Each chapter on the substantive provisions of the law includes practical advice on approaches to meeting the challenge of complying with the law's requirements, including analysis of likely interpretations and applications of the AML based on precedents in related economic laws and actions by other administrative agencies. Where policy choices are uncertain, the text will explore probable developments in China based on comparable applications of competition laws in other jurisdictions.
eBook
Do antitrust laws erode shareholder returns? Evidence from the Chinese market
Using data on 4784 completed mergers and acquisitions in China announced between 2002 and 2016, we find that the adoption of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law substantially reduces the shareholder returns for horizontal acquisitions. Based on our findings on reduced post-merger sales and returns, we argue that a loss of market power drives this negative relationship. We also find that the acquiring firms’ cost efficiency does not significantly change as a result of the combination, suggesting that the decline in shareholders’ wealth after horizontal mergers is not because of reduced cost efficiency. Furthermore, we conduct a series of robustness checks to examine how adopting antitrust law decreases the wealth of producing firms’ shareholders. Overall, our results indicate that the government must implement stricter guidelines for antitrust policies to protect consumer welfare.
Journal Article
Players’ strategy selection in co-governance and supervision of internet platforms’ monopolistic behaviors: A study on new media participation
Incidents of monopolies among Internet platforms have seriously endangered the development of the market economy, public interest, and social fairness, making it a highly discussed topic of broad public concern. Preventing such incidents requires not only a comprehensive supervision system by governments, but also contributions from other relevant parties. The new media environment has provided a new platform to support such joint supervision from multiple parties. As such, this study constructed an evolutionary game model involving the government, Internet platforms, new media, and the public to explore the stable equilibrium point of players’ strategy selections. The stability of the strategy combinations was tested using Lyapunov’s first stability method, and MATLAB 2021b was used to conduct simulation analysis of the impact of each decision variable on players’ strategy selection. The results showed that (1) new media participation in co-governance and public complaints/reports facilitated government supervision; (2) government’s application of co-governance and supervision and public complaints/reports promotes compliance by Internet platforms; (3) new media plays a supplementary role when government supervision is lacking; the greater the impact of new media, the greater its supervisory effect on Internet platforms; and (4) effective reduction of costs stimulates the enthusiasm of the government and new media, and increases the success of the anti-monopoly co-governance and supervision system. Measures and suggestions to improve supervision of monopolistic behaviors among Internet platforms are proposed.
Journal Article
Monopoly and Anti-Monopoly in China Today
For three decades after liberation in 1949, the Chinese economy consisted almost entirely of state monopolies. Economic reforms, starting in 1979, sought to increase the efficiency of the economy by introducing competitive practices in many sectors of the economy. But the Chinese economy has been partially administered by the state for over two millennia. As a result, both state-managed and private monopolies are still an intrinsic part of the Chinese economy today. Despite two decades of anti-monopoly reforms, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to dominate key sectors of the economy, particularly in resource extraction and financial services. The government is aware of the inefficiencies and corruption caused by monopolies, both public and private. But Chinese tradition takes a balanced view of social harms and weighs the damage caused by monopoly against the stability that SOEs have provided China in recent decades. There is less reason for China to tolerate private monopolies, but most of them have arisen in conjunction with digital technology because of its distinctive cost structure (high entry costs, low marginal costs). China has made some use of antitrust law, but most economic regulation in China is administrative. Thus the anti-monopoly activities that are used to restrain monopoly power in China are different from Western practices.
Journal Article
Abuse of Market Dominance Under China’s Anti‑Monopoly Law
In this paper, we analyze a recent antitrust case of abuse of dominance that was decided by a Chinese administrative enforcement agency under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”). A key issue in this case involved the impact of loyalty rebate programs used by a dominant firm. We provide an overview of the case, highlight the main points of the decision, and focus on the assessment of loyalty rebates. As the first antitrust ruling in China involving loyalty discounts, we expect that the decision will serve as an important reference in antitrust enforcement in China.
Journal Article
Economic Analysis Methodologies Applied in Merger Investigations in the EU and China: Comparative Case Studies
Understanding the application of economic analysis methods in merger reviews across various jurisdictions can benefit antitrust authorities when reviewing cases and aid the legal and economic teams that work with merging parties in better anticipating concerns and outcomes. The comparative studies on economic analysis methods applied in merger cases have mainly been focused on China/the US and the EU/US. The objective of this study is to explore how the EU and China apply economic analysis methods to merger control enforcement for the same concentrations, by means of a comparative case study. Two research questions are addressed: (i) What are the economic analysis methods employed by Chinese antitrust authorities when investigating merger cases and how are they used? (ii) What similarities and differences exist between the antitrust authorities in the EU and China in applying economic analysis methods during merger case reviews?
Journal Article
Buyer cartels and private enforcement of antitrust policy
Collusion among buyers leads to social welfare losses, which provide the economic rationale for public enforcement of the antitrust law. This conduct also imposes losses on the victimized sellers, which provide the foundation for private enforcement through private damage actions. In this paper, we present a rigorous economic analysis of buyer cartels. This effort includes both full participation and partial conspiracies. We review the antitrust treatment of collusive monopsony in the United States, the European Union, and Asia, offer a measure of antitrust damages, and examine the necessary precision of the damage estimate. We also suggest that the proper use of modern econometrics should allay judicial concerns with speculation.
Journal Article
The impact of consumer preferences on the evolution of competition in China’s automobile market under the Dual Credit Policy—A density game based perspective
The evolution of the automobile market is a macro-expression of the behavior of automakers’ production decisions. This study examines the competitive environment between new energy vehicles (NEVs) and conventional fuel vehicles (CFVs) and develops a game-theoretical model incorporating consumer utility, automaker profit, and the competitive density of NEVs and CFVs. It aims to assess how consumers’ preferences for vehicle range and smart features influence automakers’ strategic decisions and the broader market evolution under the Dual Credit Policy. The findings indicate: (1) A low NEV credit price facilitates NEV market size growth, but this growth rate diminishes beyond a certain price threshold; (2) The lower the consumer’s range preference, the higher NEV credit price can accelerate the development of new energy vehicles to their saturation value. However, when consumers in the market prioritize smart features, increasing the NEV credit price does not significantly influence the growth of NEV market size. (3) Higher consumer preferences for both range and smart features, combined with increased NEV credit prices, can synergistically accelerate the speed of the NEV market to reach the saturation value and also raise the saturation value of the scale of NEVs. And higher consumer range preference combined with increased NEV credit prices has a more significant effect on the promotion of NEV market size than the combined effect of higher consumer smart preference and increased NEV credit prices. The actual data of China’s automobile market is used in the simulation of this model. The model and its simulation results effectively explain and reveal the evolutionary impacts of consumers’ range and smart feature preference on the promotion of China’s NEVs under the Dual Credit Policy to provide effective technological and theoretical support for the promotion of the sustainable development of China’s NEV industry.
Journal Article
Understanding merger control remedies in China
We identified 8 merger cases with remedies in China for a period from the time when the Anti-monopoly Law was enacted in 2008–2018, and about 150 other merger cases corresponding to these 8 cases in their respective industries but approved without remedies. We then use the latter data to construct a counterfactual for the former to compare the factually observed level of competition after the merger decision with that derived from the counterfactual, based on a method called the synthetic control method (SCM). The exercise allows us to assess the remedies’ effectiveness. We find that overall the remedies are effective, but the structural remedies’ effect tends to be more abrupt and pronounced than behavioral remedies.
Journal Article