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177 result(s) for "Antitrust law India."
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Media ownership and control
As academics, lawyers, businesses, regulators and policy-makers in India cast a glance at the international experience, this book examines the legal, economic and policy issues relating to regulation of ownership and control of media markets.
Non-linear pricing in E-commerce: an exploration
PurposeTo understand the new non-linear pricing in E-commerce. The present paper aims to put forth an idea of using tie-in agreement in the electronic commerce market in the name of trust in India. According to the Indian antitrust law, tie-in agreement is not allowed to use as compulsory in an offer to the buyer. This means that a tie-in agreement cannot be a compulsion or only an option to the buyer. This means it can be an extra option.Design/methodology/approachThe paper shows that using this logic the sellers are giving two options simultaneously to the buyer: (1) a commodity with a tie-in agreement and (2) the same commodity without a tie-in agreement. Therefore, there are two price mechanisms that are present. Now it is the decision of the buyer to choose between the two. These two price mechanisms create a new variable called trust. If the buyer selects the first option, then that buyer will not be treated as a trustworthy buyer, but in the second case, the buyer would be treated as a trustworthy or the affianced buyer. Therefore, the buyer would be leaning toward the second option. The paper proves that in the second option it would be difficult to minimize the consumer expenditure. As a result, there would be a situation of non-linear pricing in the name of trust which is hidden in the offer. The present work gives both theoretical models and empirical justifications.FindingsWe find that E-wallet is often used when a consumer orders food online but offline cash payment is preferred. Therefore, the offer does matter for the consumer. Hence, the offer can be used to make a tie-in arrangement. Therefore, even if there is a tie-in arrangement in online food servicing applications, the Competition Commission of India can restrict such practices as for illegal tying, the firm has to have the monopoly power in one market and there should be compulsory tie-arrangement in another market. But it does not mean that E-wallet tie-arrangement cannot be ignored as the monopoly power in the online food servicing market can influence the market share in the E-wallet market. Tie-in arrangement is also important, as the consumer has to spend more under cashback offer conditions which reduce the long-run gain of consumers.Originality/valueThe paper considered trust as a new element in forming non-linear pricing. This is new to this literature.
Competition Law and Competition Policy in India
Can adoption of an antitrust/competition law substitute for a formal competition policy that lays down principles for reforming other government policies that affect competition? We address this question in the context of India, which has a track record of antitrust enforcement as well as a history of extensive controls over the private sector and domination of key sectors by state owned firms. After briefly summarizing these features, we argue that several clauses of the Competition Act, 2002, allow the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to challenge public restraints on competition. We then undertake a detailed review of several cases that have addressed public restraints and that have gradually extended the jurisdiction of the Act. We also identify some areas that remain beyond its reach—government policies that violate competitive neutrality, and discretionary purchases by public buyers—and we note possible social or business justifications for such restraints. Finally, we briefly discuss conflicts between the CCI and other regulatory agencies. We suggest that these remaining challenges can be addressed without laying down a broader policy.
Sylvania’s Indian Precursor and Its Legacy
The starting point of this paper is a January 1977 judgment of the Indian Supreme Court, which applied the rule of reason to vertical restraints and anticipated many of the arguments of the Sylvania judgment. After summarizing the background of the Indian case, I set out the main points of similarity and difference between the two judgments, and finally assess the somewhat erratic influence of post-Sylvania antitrust thinking on Indian competition law and jurisprudence.
Intellectual Property, Competition Law and Economics in Asia
This book results from a conference held in Singapore in September 2009 that brought together distinguished lawyers and economists to examine the differences and similarities in the intersection between intellectual property and competition laws in Asia. The prime focus was how best to balance these laws to improve economic welfare. Countries in Asia have different levels of development and experience with intellectual property and competition laws. Japan has the longest experience and now vigorously enforces both competition and intellectual property laws. Most other countries in Asia have only recently introduced intellectual property laws (due to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement) and competition laws (sometimes due to the World Bank, International Monetary Fund or free trade agreements). It would be naïve to think that laws, even if similar on the surface, have the same goals or can be enforced similarly. Countries have differing degrees of acceptance of these laws, different economic circumstances and differing legal and political institutions. To set the scene, Judge Doug Ginsburg, Greg Sidak, David Teece and Bill Kovacic look at the intersection of intellectual property and competition laws in the United States. Next are country chapters on Asia, each jointly authored by a lawyer and an economist. The country chapters outline the institutional background to the intersection in each country, discuss the policy underpinnings (theoretically as well as describing actual policy initiatives), analyse the case law in the area, and make policy prescriptions.
Legal Treatment of Abuse of Dominance in Indian Competition Law
Abuse of dominance investigations around the world are often form-based, primarily centred on the pre-requisite of dominance. This may lead to false positives or restrict innovation in today’s dynamic and complex markets. Accordingly, abuse of dominance enforcement requires a shift towards adopting an effects-based approach, weighing pro and anticompetitive effects and considering efficiency justifications. The European Union is increasingly moving in this direction, as is demonstrated by its case law that is analysed in this paper. The paper also explores competition law in India—traditionally a form-based jurisdiction for abuse of dominance investigations—and finds an encouraging trend towards an effects-based approach.
Convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in India
The objectives of competition policy and the application of competition law need defining and redefining along with changing structures of the economy and the maturing of the competition authority. Market structures associated with digital technology and globalization are often not in consonance with the prevalent law framed in economic analysis of traditional product markets. Antitrust interventions by the competition authorities are caught in a bind as was the case with the Competition Commission of India and the Competition Act, 2002. The emphasis on monopolistic competition, or on oligopolistic markets, as anti-competitive, which marked the earlier days of implementation of competition laws, is at variance with the prevalent monopolistic structures of platform markets or technology firms and the market for ideas. Competition authorities are grappling with identifying anti-competitive activities of these markets which tip towards monopolistic structures. In the process there has been a churning of possible diverse antitrust abuses and, as competition law grapples to incorporate these new market structures, there is another churn that is slowly emerging as a major concern — that of convergence of competition policy and public interest. This is an area in antitrust literature which is yet to receive sufficient attention. The core of antitrust intervention — that competition benefits consumers — is undisputed and perhaps axiomatic but what is not axiomatic is that monopolistic market structures can also lead to enhancing public welfare. Emergent trends towards monopolistic markets suggest a rethink of competition policy and law and their convergence for public interest. The focus of this article is on the importance of convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in new and emergent markets. It raises questions: Is there convergence or divergence between policy and law and public interest? What is public interest? Do consumers represent public interest and, if so, which set of consumers? Are innovation and technological development, which are part of public interest, also in the ambit of competition policy or are they in the realm of competition law? This is another question which has become acute in recent times. In India and the BRICS group, where usage of internet on smart phones is high, the convergence between competition policy, law and public interest suggests antitrust intervention is guided by public interest.
A Critical Analysis of Concentration and Competition in the Indian Pharmaceutical Market
It can be argued that with several players marketing a large number of brands, the pharmaceutical market in India is competitive. However, the pharmaceutical market should not be studied as a single market but, as a sum total of a large number of individual sub-markets. This paper examines the methodological issues with respect to defining the relevant market involved in studying concentration in the pharmaceutical market in India. Further, we have examined whether the Indian pharmaceutical market is competitive. Indian pharmaceutical market was studied using PharmaTrac, the sales audit data from AIOCD-AWACS, that organises formulations into 5 levels of therapeutic classification based on the EphMRA system. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) was used as the indicator of market concentration. We calculated HHI for the entire pharmaceutical market studied as a single market as well as at the five different levels of therapeutic classification. Whereas the entire pharmaceutical market taken together as a single market displayed low concentration (HHI = 226.63), it was observed that if each formulation is defined as an individual sub-market, about 69 percent of the total market in terms of market value displayed at least moderate concentration. Market should be defined taking into account the ease of substitutability. Since, patients cannot themselves substitute the formulation prescribed by the doctor with another formulation with the same indication and therapeutic effect, owing to information asymmetry, it is appropriate to study market concentration at the narrower levels of therapeutic classification.
Competition and Antitrust Enforcement Against Standard Essential Patents in India
Competition authorities and courts across the world have assessed issues at the interface between competition law and intellectual property rights. India is no longer a stranger to this debate and has witnessed the initiation of multiple proceedings involving the exercise of standard essential patents. Further, a long-pending jurisdictional conflict has now been resolved by a court decision, paving the way for the Indian competition authority and courts to concurrently examine the exercise of standard essential patents. While these developments represent a step in the evolution of antitrust jurisprudence in India, several foundational issues in relation to the competition enforcement against standard essential patents are yet to be decided.