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16,865 result(s) for "Antitrust policy"
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Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy
This paper develops a theory of the centralization of firms engaged in multimarket collusive agreements. A centralized organization (called the unitary or Uform) allows price coordination across several markets, whereas with decentralized (the multidivisional or M-form) firms the probability that the antitrust authority will find evidence of collusion on one market while investigating the other is lower. We show that the firm's choice of internal structure depends to a large extent on product substitutability and the instruments used by the antitrust authority.
View from the Shop—Antitrust and the Decline of the America’s Independent Small Business
Stacy Mitchell's “View from the Shop—Antitrust and the Decline of America's Independent Small Business” is the latest contribution in a string of recent articles and reports calling for a renewal in antitrust policy.
The Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface
There is a tension between the antitrust laws and the intellectual property (IP) laws. Both aim to promote social welfare, but their focus differs. By and large, antitrust law aims to promote competition and static welfare. In contrast, IP law permits static welfare losses in exchange for dynamic welfare gains. Thus, there is a tradeoff between static and dynamic welfare considerations. This tradeoff leads to a natural tension between IP law and antitrust policy. Implicitly, we believe that the benefits of long-term progress outweigh the short-run welfare losses that are due to the mis-allocation of resources. This can be seen in our Special Issue.
Antitrust institutions and policies in the globalising economy
\"Eleonora Poli provides a coherent and comprehensive explanation of the diffusion of liberal and neo-liberal competition policies in the USA, Europe, Japan and the BRICS from an international political economy perspective. She investigates whether, how and why these countries have progressively changed their respective interpretations of market competition in light of major economic crises or political and economic issues, giving rise to the current neo-liberal era. More specifically, she analyses whether they responded to each downturn or pressure from the international arena through the enforcement of antitrust regimes and, if so, how and why specific institutional changes were implemented. In doing so, she focuses on whether policy diffusion mechanisms favoured the adoption of similar antitrust policies. \"-- Provided by publisher.
Antitrust in Innovative Industries
We study the effects of antitrust policy in industries with continual innovation. Antitrust policies that restrict incumbent behavior toward new entrants may have conflicting effects on innovation incentives, raising the profits of new entrants, but lowering those of continuing incumbents. We show that the direction of the net effect can be determined by analyzing shifts in innovation benefit and supply, holding the innovation rate fixed. We apply this framework to analyze several specific antitrust policies. We also show that, in some cases, the tension does not arise, and policies that protect entrants necessarily raise the rate of innovation.
Multisided Platforms, Big Data, and a Little Antitrust Policy
Commentators on both the right and the left ends of the political spectrum have called for new and more forceful approaches to antitrust enforcement with respect to large multisided platforms: especially Amazon, Facebook, and Google. In part, these calls have been driven by the fact that these platforms have business models that make extensive use of data about their users. This article surveys what economics has to say about a wide range of antitrust issues—including the treatment of exclusionary conduct, merger, and privacy—that are raised by multisided platforms’ reliance on big data collected about their users.