Catalogue Search | MBRL
Search Results Heading
Explore the vast range of titles available.
MBRLSearchResults
-
DisciplineDiscipline
-
Is Peer ReviewedIs Peer Reviewed
-
Reading LevelReading Level
-
Content TypeContent Type
-
YearFrom:-To:
-
More FiltersMore FiltersItem TypeIs Full-Text AvailableSubjectPublisherSourceDonorLanguagePlace of PublicationContributorsLocation
Done
Filters
Reset
2,586
result(s) for
"Anxiety Philosophy."
Sort by:
ECO‐ANXIETY, TRAGEDY, AND HOPE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SPIRITUAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
2018
This article addresses the problem of “eco‐anxiety” by integrating results from numerous fields of inquiry. Although climate change may cause direct psychological and existential impacts, vast numbers of people already experience indirect impacts in the form of depression, socio‐ethical paralysis, and loss of well‐being. This is not always evident, because people have developed psychological and social defenses in response, including “socially constructed silence.” I argue that this situation causes the need to frame climate change narratives as emphasizing hope in the midst of tragedy. Framing the situation simply as a threat or a possibility does not work. Religious communities and the use of methods which include spirituality have an important role in enabling people to process their deep emotions and existential questions. I draw also from my experiences from Finland in enabling cooperation between natural scientists and theologians in order to address climate issues.
Journal Article
Anxiety : a philosophical guide
Today, anxiety is usually thought of as a pathology, the most diagnosed and medicated of all psychological disorders. But anxiety isn't always or only a medical condition. Indeed, many philosophers argue that anxiety is a normal, even essential, part of being human, and that coming to terms with this fact is potentially transformative, allowing us to live more meaningful lives by giving us a richer understanding of ourselves. In this book, Samir Chopra explores valuable insights about anxiety offered by ancient and modern philosophies - Buddhism, existentialism, psychoanalysis, and critical theory. Blending memoir and philosophy, he also tells how serious anxiety has affected his own life - and how philosophy has helped him cope with it.
45. The intervention effect of psychological care guided by Japanese wabi-sabi philosophy on anxiety symptoms of Chinese professional women
2026
Abstract
Background
Professional women in China often face multiple burdens such as work pressure, family responsibilities and social expectations, and anxiety symptoms are widespread. Although traditional psychological intervention methods have certain effects, they lack cultural adaptability and philosophical depth. The Japanese wabi-sabi philosophy emphasizes the acceptance of imperfection, impermanence and the beauty of simplicity. Its concept is in line with the traditional Chinese thought of \"conforming to nature,\" and it may provide a new approach for localized psychological care. To expand the cultural integration psychological support model, this study integrates the wabi-sabi philosophy into psychological care and explores its feasibility and effect in alleviating the anxiety of Chinese professional women.
Methods
A total of 180 professional women who met the screening criteria for anxiety symptoms in enterprises and public institutions of a certain city from June 2023 to May 2024 were selected as the research subjects and divided into the experimental group (n = 90) and the control group (n = 90) by the random number table method. The control group received regular mental health education, including a monthly stress management lecture and the distribution of self-help emotion regulation materials. The experimental group participated in a psychological nursing course guided by the philosophy of wabi-sabi on the basis of conventional education. The Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7) and the Self-Rating Anxiety Scale (SAS) were used for assessment before the intervention, 5 weeks after the intervention, and 10 weeks after the intervention respectively. And collect the participants' feedback on the course and their subjective experience reports.
Results
At baseline, there was no significant difference in GAD-7 and SAS scores between the two groups (p>.05). After 10 weeks of intervention, the GAD-7 score of the experimental group decreased to (6.4 ± 3.2) points, and the SAS score decreased to (45.8 ± 7.1) points. The score of GAD-7 in the control group was (9.8 ± 3.9) points, and the score of SAS was (52.4 ± 8.3) points. The decrease in the scores of the two items in the experimental group was significantly greater than that in the control group (p<.01). In terms of symptom relief, the relief rate of anxiety symptoms in the experimental group was 74.4% (67/90), and that in the control group was 51.1% (46/90). The difference was statistically significant (p<.001). Qualitative feedback indicated that the participants in the experimental group showed positive improvements in aspects such as \"self-acceptance,\" \"stress cognition reconstruction,\" and \"emotional calmness.\".
Discussion
Psychological care based on wabi-sabi philosophy can effectively alleviate the anxiety symptoms of Chinese professional women and enhance their emotional regulation and psychological adaptability. This model is characterized by cultural integration and practicality, and is easy to be incorporated into daily life. It is suitable as a supplementary intervention method for promoting the mental health of professional groups. It is suggested that in future practice, adjustments be made in combination with the characteristics of local culture, and its long-term effects and applicability to different career stages can be further explored.
Journal Article
Is AI the Future of Mental Healthcare?
by
Giubilini, Alberto
,
Minerva, Francesca
in
Anxiety
,
Artificial intelligence
,
Health care expenditures
2023
Journal Article
Anxious feelings, anxious friends
2021
Although anxiety is frequently seen as a predominantly negative phenomenon, some recent researchers have argued that it plays an important positive function, serving as an alert to warn agents of possible problems or threats. I argue that not only can one’s own, first-personal anxiety perform this function; because it is possible for others—in particular, one’s friends—to feel anxious on one’s behalf, their anxious feelings can sometimes play the same role in our functioning, and make similar contributions to our well-being. I distinguish between a number of kinds of cases in which what I call proxy anxiety serves a positive function, including Anxiety Avoidance (where there is good reason for an agent to avoid becoming anxious herself, but can benefit from a friend’s anxiety on her behalf), Anxiety Omission (where an agent fails to become anxious due to a malfunctioning anxiety-generating system), long-term commitments involving dispositions to feel other-directed proxy anxiety, and cases in which proxy anxiety can help reduce or relieve excessive anxiety. A person’s friends, it is argued, are particularly well positioned to help regulate deficient and/or excessive anxieties, precisely because friends are close enough to care for and identify with the agent, but at the same time distant enough to maintain a relatively objective perspective. I conclude by examining connections between proxy anxiety and theories of well-being.
Journal Article
Understanding Generalized Anxiety: Contributions from Phenomenology and Philosophy
2022
IntroductionAnxiety is an ambiguous term, meaning an emotional state, a clinical symptom, a disorder, or a group of disorders. Anxiety is a normal feeling that arises when a person believes he is in danger from a threat or unidentified danger, ensuing with a state of alertness, arousal, and exploratory attention. Its distinction from neighbouring concepts, such as anguish, fear, worry, anxiety, panic, or uneasiness, is valuable but controversial.ObjectivesReview and synthesize various contributions from phenomenology and philosophy to the understanding of what it is like to experience generalized anxiety.MethodsSelective review of the most prominent literature regarding anxiety psychopathology, namely that of Jaspers, Heidegger, López-Ibor, Sims, Berrios, Femi Oyebode, Pio Abreu, James Aho, Picazo Zappino and Gerrit Glas.ResultsJaspers described free-float anxiety as common and painful, floating and detached, as a feeling of misunderstood genesis, imposing despite the inapparent object, driving an inescapable need to provide some content to it, but also susceptible to insight by those who experience it. It can take a vitalized or primarily psychic form. Anxiety is closely related to the limits of the human being and to (hopelessness). For Heidegger, angst is the expression of authentic existence. López-Ibor considered anxiety and anguish nuances of the same experience, in both of which there is fear of the dissolution of the unity and continuity of the self (anguish). When what exists is not a fear, but only a threat, anxiety arises.ConclusionsPhenomenologically informed psychopathology is relevant for clinicians. Complementing neurosciences, each answers questions that the other cannot.DisclosureNo significant relationships.
Journal Article
Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk
2022
In this paper, I provide an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotional response to epistemic risk: the risk of believing in error. The motivation for this account is threefold. First, it makes epistemic anxiety a species of anxiety, thus rendering psychologically respectable a notion that has heretofore been taken seriously only by epistemologists. Second, it illuminates the relationship between anxiety and risk. It is standard in psychology to conceive of anxiety as a response to risk, but psychologists – very reasonably – have little to say about risk itself, as opposed to risk judgement. In this paper, I specify what risk must be like to be the kind of thing to which anxiety can be a response. Third, my account improves on extant accounts of epistemic anxiety in the literature. It is more fleshed out than Jennifer Nagel’s (2010a), which is largely agnostic about the nature of epistemic anxiety, focusing instead on what work it does in our epistemic lives. In offering an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotion, my account explains how it is able to do the epistemological work to which Nagel puts it. My account is also more plausible than Juliette Vazard’s (2018, 2021), on which epistemic anxiety is an emotional response to potential threat to one’s practical interests. Vazard’s account cannot distinguish epistemic anxiety from anxiety in general, and also fails to capture all instances of what we want to call epistemic anxiety. My account does better on both counts.
Journal Article