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Parliamentary obstruction, popularly known as the \"filibuster,\" has been a defining feature of the U.S. Senate throughout its history. In this book, Gregory J. Wawro and Eric Schickler explain how the Senate managed to satisfy its lawmaking role during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, when it lacked seemingly essential formal rules for governing debate. What prevented the Senate from self-destructing during this time? The authors argue that in a system where filibusters played out as wars of attrition, the threat of rule changes prevented the institution from devolving into parliamentary chaos. They show that institutional patterns of behavior induced by inherited rules did not render Senate rules immune from fundamental changes. The authors' theoretical arguments are supported through a combination of extensive quantitative and case-study analysis, which spans a broad swath of history. They consider how changes in the larger institutional and political context--such as the expansion of the country and the move to direct election of senators--led to changes in the Senate regarding debate rules. They further investigate the impact these changes had on the functioning of the Senate. The book concludes with a discussion relating battles over obstruction in the Senate's past to recent conflicts over judicial nominations.

Constituents often fail to hold their representatives accountable for federal spending decisions-even though those very choices have a pervasive influence on American life. Why does this happen? Breaking new ground in the study of representation,The Impression of Influencedemonstrates how legislators skillfully inform constituents with strategic communication and how this facilitates or undermines accountability. Using a massive collection of Congressional texts and innovative experiments and methods, the book shows how legislators create an impression of influence through credit claiming messages. Anticipating constituents' reactions, legislators claim credit for programs that elicit a positive response, making constituents believe their legislator is effectively representing their district. This spurs legislators to create and defend projects popular with their constituents. Yet legislators claim credit for much more-they announce projects long before they begin, deceptively imply they deserve credit for expenditures they had little role in securing, and boast about minuscule projects. Unfortunately, legislators get away with seeking credit broadly because constituents evaluate the actions that are reported, rather than the size of the expenditures. The Impression of Influenceraises critical questions about how citizens hold their political representatives accountable and when deception is allowable in a democracy.

The expansion of transportation security requirements in the early 21st century has increased the importance of the policymaking process that establishes, directs, and finances those measures. In the United States, transportation security policy is set by authorizing legislation (e.g., the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act) that creates or modifies programs, presidential directives to federal agencies that require planning and set forth objectives, and regulations issued primarily by the Coast Guard (for maritime security) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) (for the other modes) that specify how policies are to be implemented. Funding is provided either by fees (e.g., those collected from airline passengers) or in annual appropriations bills. Aviation security continues to receive the most policy attention and resources and the land transportation sector the least on each count. Policymaking has been impeded by a poorly established authorization process, partisan divisions that have delayed appropriations, and rulemaking that remains cumbersome.