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This edited volume provides a critical overview of the new stabilization agenda in international relations. The primary focus of so-called stability operations since 9/11 has been Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. Covering the wider picture, this volume provides a comprehensive assessment of the new agenda, including the expansion of efforts in Latin America, the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia. By harnessing the findings of studies undertaken in Brazil, Colombia, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan and Sri Lanka, the volume demonstrates the impacts - intended and otherwise - of stabilization in practice. The book clarifies the debate on stabilization, focusing primarily on the policy, practice and outcomes of such operations. Rather than relying exclusively on existing military doctrine or academic writings, the volume focuses on stabilization as it is actually occurring. Drawing on the reflections of scholars and practitioners, the volume identifies the origins and historical antecedents of contemporary operations, and also examines how the practice is linked to other policy spheres - ranging from peacebuilding to statebuilding. Finally, the volume reviews eight practical cases of stabilization in disparate regions around the globe. This book will be of much interest to students of war and conflict studies, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, statebuilding, development studies and international relations in general.

As the U.S. experience in Iraq following the 2003 invasion made abundantly clear, failure to properly plan for risks associated with postconflict stabilization and reconstruction can have a devastating impact on the overall success of a military mission. In Waging War, Planning Peace , Aaron Rapport investigates how U.S. presidents and their senior advisers have managed vital noncombat activities while the nation is in the midst of fighting or preparing to fight major wars. He argues that research from psychology-specifically, construal level theory-can help explain how individuals reason about the costs of postconflict noncombat operations that they perceive as lying in the distant future. In addition to preparations for \"Phase IV\" in the lead-up to the Iraq War, Rapport looks at the occupation of Germany after World War II, the planned occupation of North Korea in 1950, and noncombat operations in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. Applying his insights to these cases, he finds that civilian and military planners tend to think about near-term tasks in concrete terms, seriously assessing the feasibility of the means they plan to employ to secure valued ends. For tasks they perceive as further removed in time, they tend to focus more on the desirability of the overarching goals they are pursuing rather than the potential costs, risks, and challenges associated with the means necessary to achieve these goals. Construal level theory, Rapport contends, provides a coherent explanation of how a strategic disconnect can occur. It can also show postwar planners how to avoid such perilous missteps. As the U.S. experience in Iraq following the 2003 invasion made abundantly clear, failure to properly plan for risks associated with postconflict stabilization and reconstruction can have a devastating impact on the overall success of a military mission. In Waging War, Planning Peace , Aaron Rapport investigates how U.S. presidents and their senior advisers have managed vital noncombat activities while the nation is in the midst of fighting or preparing to fight major wars. He argues that research from psychology-specifically, construal level theory-can help explain how individuals reason about the costs of postconflict noncombat operations that they perceive as lying in the distant future.In addition to preparations for \"Phase IV\" in the lead-up to the Iraq War, Rapport looks at the occupation of Germany after World War II, the planned occupation of North Korea in 1950, and noncombat operations in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. Applying his insights to these cases, he finds that civilian and military planners tend to think about near-term tasks in concrete terms, seriously assessing the feasibility of the means they plan to employ to secure valued ends. For tasks they perceive as further removed in time, they tend to focus more on the desirability of the overarching goals they are pursuing rather than the potential costs, risks, and challenges associated with the means necessary to achieve these goals. Construal level theory, Rapport contends, provides a coherent explanation of how a strategic disconnect can occur. It can also show postwar planners how to avoid such perilous missteps.

Political scientist James H. Lebovic establishes that the size, strength, flexibility, and adaptability of the U.S. military cannot ensure victory in asymmetrical conflicts. In The Limits of U.S. Military Capability, Lebovic shows how political and psychological factors trumped U.S. military superiority in Vietnam and Iraq, where inappropriate strategies, low stakes, and unrealistic goals mired the United States military in protracted, no-win conflicts. Lebovic contends that the United States is at a particular disadvantage when fighting a counterinsurgency without the full support of the host government; when leveraging various third parties (the adversary's foreign allies, societal leaders, and indigenous populations); when attempting to build coalitions and nations while involved in combat; and when sustaining government and public support at home when costs rise and benefits decline. Lebovic cautions against involving the U.S. military in operations without first considering U.S. stakes and suggests that the military take a less-is-more approach when choosing to employ force. Ambitious goals bring higher costs, unexpected results, diminished options, and a greater risk of failure. Rejecting the heavy-handed approach that is typical of most comparisons between the Vietnam and Iraq wars, The Limits of U.S. Military Capability carefully assesses evidence to develop lessons applicable to other conflicts—especially the ongoing war in Afghanistan.

In Humanitarian Hypocrisy , Andrea L. Everett maps the often glaring differences between declared ambitions to protect civilians in conflict zones and the resources committed for doing so. Examining how powerful governments contribute to peace operations and determine how they are designed, Everett argues that ambitions-resources gaps are a form of organized hypocrisy. Her book shows how political compromises lead to disparities between the humanitarian principles leaders proclaim and what their policies are designed to accomplish. When those in power face strong pressure to protect civilians but are worried about the high costs and dangers of intervention, Everett asserts, they allocate insufficient resources or impose excessive operational constraints. The ways in which this can play out are illustrated by Everett's use of original data and in-depth case studies of France in Rwanda, the United States in Darfur, and Australia in East Timor and Aceh. Humanitarian Hypocrisy has a sad lesson: missions that gesture toward the protection of civilians but overlook the most pressing security needs of affected populations can worsen suffering even while the entities who doom those missions to failure assume the moral high ground. This is a must-read book for activists, NGO officials, and policymakers alike.

The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which began on July 24, 2003, has been a remarkable success, in part because of the consistency of its message, the strength of its leadership, and its uncommon support for, rather than overt control of, the Solomon Islands government and policing capability. This study reviews RAMSI operations through the lens of a broader application to current and future counterinsurgency efforts.

America's debate over whether and how to invade Iraq clustered into civilian versus military camps. Top military officials appeared reluctant to use force, the most hawkish voices in government were civilians who had not served in uniform, and everyone was worried that the American public would not tolerate casualties in war. This book shows that this civilian-military argument--which has characterized earlier debates over Bosnia, Somalia, and Kosovo--is typical, not exceptional. Indeed, the underlying pattern has shaped U.S. foreign policy at least since 1816. The new afterword by Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi traces these themes through the first two years of the current Iraq war, showing how civil-military debates and concerns about sensitivity to casualties continue to shape American foreign policy in profound ways.

What distinguishes a peace enforcement operation from an invasion? This question has been asked with particular vehemence since the US intervention in Iraq, but it faces all military operations seeking to impose peace in countries torn by civil war. This book highlights the critical role of international organisations (IOs) as gatekeepers to international legitimacy for modern peace enforcement operations. The author analyses five operations launched through four IOs: the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, the SADC operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Lesotho, the NATO Kosovo campaign and the UN intervention in East Timor. In all these campaigns, lead states sought IO mandates primarily to establish the international legitimacy of their interventions. The evidence suggests that international relations are structured by commonly accepted rules, that both democratic and authoritarian states care about the international legitimacy of their actions, and that IOs have a key function in world politics.

Eventually every conqueror, every imperial power, every occupying army gets out. Why do they decide to leave? And how do political and military leaders manage withdrawal? Do they take with them those who might be at risk if left behind? What are the immediate consequences of departure? For Michael Walzer and Nicolaus Mills, now is the time to ask those questions about exiting-and to worry specifically about the difficulties certain to arise as we leave-Iraq.Getting Outapproaches these issues in two sections. The first, entitled \"Lessons Learned,\" examines seven historical cases of how and how not to withdraw: Britain's departure from the American colonies and from India, the French withdrawal from Algeria, Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, and the U.S. decision to leave (or not leave) the Philippines, Korea, and Vietnam. These cases offer a comparative perspective and an opportunity to learn from the history of political and military retreats. The second section, \"Exiting Iraq,\" begins with an introduction to just how the United States got into Iraq and continues with an examination of how the U.S. might leave from a diversity of voices, ranging from those who believe that the Iraq war has produced no real good to those who hope for a decent ending. In addition to essays by volume editors Walzer and Mills,Getting Outfeatures contributions by Shlomo Avineri, Rajeev Bhargava, David Bromwich, Frances FitzGerald, Stanley Karnow, Brendan O'Leary, George Packer, Todd Shepard, Fred Smoler, and Stanley Weintraub.

The United States (US) involvement in covert action abroad has received significant scholarly attention, including the outsourcing of force to third parties, such as foreign death squads, private paramilitaries, and more recently private military and security companies. However, less attention has been paid to the routine and everyday mechanisms the US state uses to administer outsourced force, and the impacts this has both on the combatants and civilians. Through a historical examination of the covert conflict in Laos from 1962–1975, this article documents the routine administrative mechanisms the US state employed to prosecute an illegal war. This article’s principal contribution to the state crime literature is the documentation of the hidden harms this generated both for the combatants used and the civilians affected by the violence. This contribution is grounded in interviews conducted with ex-service people from the conflict period and archival research, including recently declassified materials.