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197 result(s) for "Armed Forces Operational readiness."
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On military culture : theory, practice and African armed forces
\"Military professionalism is inherently linked to military culture, which centres on the collective activities and distinctive practices of armed forces, as well as an understanding of shared goals and how they are achieved\" -- Back cover.
Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
Draws upon information derived primarily from interviews with and interrogations of senior Iraqi military and civilian officials to examine why the Iraqi resistance in March and April 2003 was so weak. It focuses on two questions: (1) Why did the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard forces do so little fighting? and (2) Why did Iraqi leaders fail to adopt certain defensive measures that would have made the Coalition's task more difficult?
Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization
India, a leading importer of advance conventional weaponry, has not planned strategically for its military needs, although the haphazard approach, due to competing elements within the military and a restraint policy in place since the Nehru era, may be the right one in seeking accommodation with others in the region.
The limits of U.S. military capability : lessons from Vietnam and Iraq
Political scientist James H. Lebovic establishes that the size, strength, flexibility, and adaptability of the U.S. military cannot ensure victory in asymmetrical conflicts. In The Limits of U.S. Military Capability, Lebovic shows how political and psychological factors trumped U.S. military superiority in Vietnam and Iraq, where inappropriate strategies, low stakes, and unrealistic goals mired the United States military in protracted, no-win conflicts. Lebovic contends that the United States is at a particular disadvantage when fighting a counterinsurgency without the full support of the host government; when leveraging various third parties (the adversary's foreign allies, societal leaders, and indigenous populations); when attempting to build coalitions and nations while involved in combat; and when sustaining government and public support at home when costs rise and benefits decline. Lebovic cautions against involving the U.S. military in operations without first considering U.S. stakes and suggests that the military take a less-is-more approach when choosing to employ force. Ambitious goals bring higher costs, unexpected results, diminished options, and a greater risk of failure. Rejecting the heavy-handed approach that is typical of most comparisons between the Vietnam and Iraq wars, The Limits of U.S. Military Capability carefully assesses evidence to develop lessons applicable to other conflicts—especially the ongoing war in Afghanistan.
The foundations of operational resilience - assessing the ability to operate in an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment : the analytical framework, lexicon, and characteristics of the Operational Resilience Analysis Model (ORAM)
\"Although much work has been done considering the issue of airbase resilience especially in the Asia-Pacific region these studies have typically focused on a single aspect of the problem (such as hardening or runway repair) but have not considered the issues in total. There is a need to view the issue more holistically, especially given the strategic implications of U.S. power projection in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments. The authors of this report developed a modeling framework and lexicon for conducting a detailed analysis of future Air Force operational resilience in an A2/AD environment; the analysis itself focused on different regions (Pacific, Southwest Asia, etc.) to bound the problem and identify a robust set of strategic assumptions and planning requirements. The study was set within the context of efforts to rebalance the joint force in the Asia-Pacific region. This report describes the Operational Resilience Analysis Model (ORAM) built for this effort, which was used to evaluate the impact of different courses of action from an operational standpoint. The authors explain the ORAM model, discuss the inputs that go into modeling Blue (friendly) and Red (enemy) capabilities, and illustrate the model using a simple notional case. They conclude with some suggestions for follow-on work to improve the functionality of ORAM and to address data uncertainties in the model\"--Publisher's website.
NATO and the Challenges of Austerity
In the coming decade, NATO faces growing fiscal austerity and declining defense budgets. This study analyzes the impact of planned defense budget cuts on the capabilities of seven European members of NATO: the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Poland. The authors assess the implications of the cuts for NATO capabilities and strategy and for U.S. policy.
Enabling the Global Response Force : access strategies for the 82nd Airborne Division
\"The Global Response Force (GRF) is built for rapid response to unforeseen or, more specifically, unplanned operations. Selected Army airborne forces provide a large portion of the GRF and are dependent on joint concepts for deployment and access. This study illustrates a method for determining the best access strategies given constraints in aircraft, intermediate staging bases, operational capabilities, and other factors. The study applies this method to each geographic combatant command and develops specific, tailored strategies for each. The access strategies are built from multiple analytic techniques: historical aircraft data and platform specifications to determine capabilities and limitations of the air fleet; several airfield databases, site reports, and expert judgments to determine probable intermediate staging base locations and their likely capabilities; multiple deployment concepts for access to minimize operational risks; and detailed geographic and operational analysis to determine global coverage and reach. In the end, we were able to deduce a preferred strategy for each of the combatant commands. Global access for the GRF is provided partially through the use of well-established staging bases but will necessarily rely on austere basing and complex deployment concepts for particular locations in multiple combatant commands. The study concludes with several recommendations to close those risks, which span the services, combatant commands, and joint staff\"--Back cover.
A Review of United States Air Force and Department of Defense Aerospace Propulsion Needs
Rocket and air-breathing propulsion systems are the foundation on which planning for future aerospace systems rests. A Review of United States Air Force and Department of Defense Aerospace Propulsion Needs assesses the existing technical base in these areas and examines the future Air Force capabilities the base will be expected to support. This report also defines gaps and recommends where future warfighter capabilities not yet fully defined could be met by current science and technology development plans.