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The essential history of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) during the Nixon Administration How did Richard Nixon, a president so determined to compete for strategic nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union, become one of the most successful arms controllers of the Cold War? Drawing on newly opened Cold War archives, John D. Maurer argues that a central purpose of arms control talks for American leaders was to channel nuclear competition toward areas of American advantage and not just international cooperation. While previous accounts of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have emphasized American cooperative motives, Maurer highlights how Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird shaped negotiations, balancing their own competitive interests with proponents of cooperation while still providing a coherent rationale to Congress. Within the arms control agreements, American leaders intended to continue deploying new weapons, and the arms control restrictions, as negotiated, allowed the United States to sustain its global power, contain communism, and ultimately prevail in the Cold War.

The Control Agendais a sweeping account of the history of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), their rise in the Nixon and Ford administrations, their downfall under President Carter, and their powerful legacies in the Reagan years and beyond. Matthew Ambrose pays close attention to the interplay of diplomacy, domestic politics, and technology, and finds that the SALT process was a key point of reference for arguments regarding all forms of Cold War decision making. Ambrose argues elite U.S. decision makers used SALT to better manage their restive domestic populations and to exert greater control over the shape, structure, and direction of their nuclear arsenals. Ambrose also asserts that prolonged engagement with arms control issues introduced dynamic effects into nuclear policy. Arms control considerations came to influence most areas of defense decision making, while the measure of stability SALT provided allowed the examination of new and potentially dangerous nuclear doctrines.The Control Agendamakes clear that verification and compliance concerns by the United States prompted continuous reassessments of Soviet capabilities and intentions; assessments that later undergirded key U.S. policy changes toward the Soviet Union. Through SALT's many twists and turns, accusations and countercharges, secret backchannels and propaganda campaigns the specter of nuclear conflict loomed large.

The failure of détente has been a popular theme among historians of American foreign policy, with opinions divided as to where the responsibility for this failure lies. A commonality among all points of view, however, is the importance of events in the third world, particularly in the \"Arc of Crisis.\" One such event—the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia—prompted Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security advisor, to comment that détente was \"buried\" in the Ogaden. His point was that Carter's new approach to the cold war was put to the test during the Ogaden War, and there the policy's untenability was proven. The policy's failure, in turn, encouraged Soviet adventurism, which further alienated the American public from Carter's attempt to fight the cold war. Carter's policy eventually led to the withdrawal of the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) Treaty and, as Brzezinski claimed, the collapse of détente. This article discusses Carter's foreign policy toward the Ogaden War, considers the accuracy of Brzezinski's claim, and reaches conclusions regarding the role of the Carter administration in the demise of détente.

While sites associated with the cultural heritage of armed conflict are self-evident in the landscape, sites associated with arms limitation treaties are usually conspicuously absent. The Washington Arms Limitation Treaty 1922 was arguably one the most significant treaties of the first half of the twentieth century. It can be shown that some heritage items associated with this treaty are still extant. Just as the Treaty required multinational goodwill and cooperation, the preservation of some of that heritage will also require multinational collaboration.

This book assesses how progress in disarmament diplomacy in the last decade has improved human security. In doing so, the book looks at three cases of the development of international norms in this arena. First, it traces how new international normative understandings have shaped the evolution of and support for an Arms Trade Treaty (the supply side of the arms trade); and, second, it examines the small arms international regime and examines a multilateral initiative that aims to address the demand side (by the Geneva Declaration); and, third, it examines the evolution of two processes to ban and regulate cluster munitions. The formation of international norms in these areas is a remarkable development, as it means that a domain that was previously thought to be the exclusive purview of states, i.e. how they procure and manage arms, has been penetrated by multiple influences from worldwide civil society. As a result, norms and treaties are being established to address the domain of arms, and states will have more multilateral restriction over their arms and less sovereignty in this domain. This book will be of much interest to students of the arms trade, international security, international law, human security and IR in general. Denise Garcia is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Northeastern University, Boston. She is author of Small Arms and Security (Routledge 2006). Denise Garcia is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Northeastern University, Boston. She is author of Small Arms and Security (Routledge 2006). Introduction 1. Norms: Progress and Evolution in the Conduct of International Affairs 2. The Arms Trade Treaty 3. Small Arms and Light Weapons Regimes and the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence 4. Banning Cluster Munitions. Conclusion

Despite the effort that went into strategizing and negotiating arms control during the Cold War, U.S. leaders remained divided over arms control’s intent and fundamental purpose. While there was general agreement that arms control should aim to avoid war, limit destructiveness, and decrease the costs of armaments, significant differences existed on the best specific policies to achieve these objectives. In approaching arms control negotiations, two schools of thought emerged by the late 1960s, when the Nixon administration came into office and began formulating its policies to guide the upcoming Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). One school that can be labeled...

In the aftermath of the ruptures caused by the Iraq crisis, European states agreed in December 2003 on both a European Security Strategy and an EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Ten years have passed since this attempt to kick-start common European policies on WMD proliferation. How well have EU policies performed in this area? Has a specifically European way of dealing with proliferation challenges emerged? This article traces the development of EU policies on WMD proliferation since 2003 by examining, in particular, European reactions to the nuclear crisis in Iran, as well as European interactions with the international non-proliferation regime and the cooperation with partner countries. The article concludes that the EU has performed much better than might have been expected in an area that has traditionally been one of the fiercely guarded prerogatives of national security policies. The EU's good performance is very much related to institutional flexibility, as exemplified by the EU/E3 approach to Iran; and, to a high degree of political pragmatism. However, important shortcomings remain, most notably the lack of coordination between national and European non-proliferation efforts. In other words, the EU has not in the last ten years turned into a fully fledged non-proliferation actor that can deliver tangible results in any area of proliferation concern.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987, obligates the parties “not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.” In 2014, the State Department reported that Russia was in violation of its obligation not to possess intermediate- or short-range missiles. Russia denied the violation and expressed its own doubts about the United States' compliance with the INF Treaty; the meetings and discussions that followed did not resolve either state's concerns. Subsequent State Department reports in 2015 and 2016 continued to express concern about Russia's violation.

Two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game. Each player's type determines his propensity to arm. Types are private information, and are independently drawn from a continuous distribution. With probability close to one, the best outcome for each player is for neither to acquire new weapons (although each prefers to acquire new weapons if he thinks the opponent will). There is a small probability that a player is a dominant strategy type who always prefers to acquire new weapons. We find conditions under which the unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium involves an arms race with probability one. However, if the probability that a player is a dominant strategy type is sufficiently small, then there is an equilibrium of the cheap-talk extension of the game where the probability of an arms race is close to zero.

Does the extent or lack of progress toward nuclear disarmament affect the health of the nuclear nonproliferation regime? Commentators have long asserted both positive and negative responses to this question as if the answer were self-evident. Given that opposite positions have been advanced with equal conviction, a more systematic analysis is required. This analysis begins by attempting to identify all of the potential arguments that can be made both for and against the hypothesis of a disarmament-nonproliferation linkage. The arguments are grouped in terms of five broader sets of explanatory factors: security, institutions, norms, domestic politics, and psychology. This approach clarifies the various causal microfoundations that could underpin different arguments in the debate as well as the types of empirical tests that would be most relevant for evaluating the \"linkage hypothesis.\" Comparative assessment of the arguments on both sides suggests that signs of commitment to nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states will tend to enhance support for nonproliferation. Because of the multitude of other factors that affect state decisionmaking, however, progress on disarmament will not by itself address all of the challenges to making the nonproliferation regime effective.