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To ensure that audit committees provide sufficient oversight over the auditing process and quality of financial reporting, legislators have imposed stricter requirements on the independence of audit committe members. Although many audit committees appear to be \"fully\" independent, anecdotal evidence suggests that CEOs often appoint directors from their social networks. Based on a 2004 to 2008 sample of U.S.-listed companies after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we find that these social ties have a negative effect on variables that proxy for oversight quality. In particular, we find that firms whose audit committees have \"friendship\" ties to the CEO purchase fewer audit services and engage more in earnings management. Auditors are also less likely to issue going-concern opinions or to report internal control weaknesses when friendship ties are present. On the other hand, social ties formed through \"advice networks\" do not seem to hamper the quality of audit committee oversight.

We examine whether social ties between engagement auditors and audit committee members shape audit outcomes. Although these social ties can facilitate information transfer and help auditors alleviate management pressure to waive correction of detected misstatements, close interpersonal relations can undermine auditors' monitoring of the financial reporting process. We measure social ties by alma mater connections, professor-student bonding, and employment affiliation, and audit quality by the propensity to render modified audit opinions, financial reporting irregularities, and firm valuation. Our evidence implies that social ties between engagement auditors and audit committee members impair audit quality. In additional results consistent with expectations, we generally find that this relation is concentrated where social ties are more salient, or firm governance is relatively poor and agency conflicts are more severe. Implying reciprocity stemming from social networks, we also report some suggestive evidence that audit fees are higher in the presence of social ties between an engagement auditor and the audit committee. Collectively, our analysis lends support to the narrative that the negative implications—namely, worse audit quality and higher audit fees—of these social ties may outweigh the benefits.

Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize the recent financial crisis and economic recession as an exogenous shock that allows us to shed light on the relative influence of the audit committee and the CFO on fee negotiations. During the recession, we find larger fee reductions in the presence of more powerful CFOs, and smaller fee reductions in the presence of more powerful audit committees. We also find the CFO or the audit committee primarily influences fees when their counterpart is less powerful. Our findings suggest a more complex relationship between the CFO and the audit committee than current regulations recognize and cast doubt on the ability of regulation to force one structure on the negotiation process.

This study aims to examine the impact of the characteristics of the audit committee on tax avoidance in Vietnam. The article uses data of non-financial firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh City and Ha Noi Stock Exchange over the period 2010-2019. By using the FEM and SGMM estimation for panel data, the empirical results show how the characteristics of the audit committee affect tax avoidance differently. Specifically, we find that the size of the audit committee has a positive correlation to tax avoidance, while the proportion of female members, financial and accounting experts of the audit committee can constrain tax avoidance behaviors. Our finding provides some important implications for listed firms to enhance the role of the audit committee in constraining tax avoidance behavior.

We examine three characteristics (independence, expertise, and overlapping membership) of audit committees and their impact on the financial reporting quality for Singapore-listed companies. The main finding is that financial reporting quality will be higher if audit committees have mixed expertise in accounting, finance, and/or supervisory. In addition, we do not find evidence that incremental independence of audit committees enhances financial reporting quality because audit committees already consist of a majority of independent directors. Finally, we fail to find any impact of overlapping membership on audit and remuneration committees on financial reporting quality. Overall, the results have policy implications on improving corporate governance effectiveness in terms of financial reporting quality.

This study examines the effect of audit committee connectedness through director networks on financial reporting quality, specifically the misstatement of annual financial statements. Using network analysis, we examine multiple dimensions of connectedness and find that after controlling for operating performance and corporate governance characteristics, firms with well-connected audit committees are less likely to misstate annual financial statements. In addition, our study demonstrates that audit committee connectedness through director networks moderates the negative effect of board interlocks to misstating firms on financial reporting quality. We conduct several tests to address identification concerns and find similar results. Our findings suggest that firms with better-connected audit committees are less likely to adopt reporting practices that reduce financial reporting quality. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the characteristics of the audit committee (AC) chair affect audit report timeliness. In particular, the direct association between AC chair accounting expertise and audit report delay, and the moderating effect of other characteristics of AC chair on this association are examined.Design/methodology/approachTo achieve the purpose of this study, the characteristics examined by this study are AC chair expertise, shareholding, tenure and multiple directorships. Furthermore, a sample of Malaysian companies during the period 2005–2011 and the fixed effects panel data method are utilized.FindingsThe results suggest that an AC chair with accounting expertise is associated with a reduction in audit delay. The reduction is more obvious when the chair holds shares in the company, but is weakened by longer tenure and multiple directorships. These results are robust after conducting several robust tests. Using mediating analysis, the authors also document that an AC chair with accounting expertise can enhance the timeliness of audit reports even when the quality of financial reporting is lower. The reported result is supported by additional analysis that finds that AC chairs with accounting expertise and AC chairs with accounting expertise and shareholding are significantly associated with shorter abnormal audit delay.Originality/valueThis study provides comprehensive analysis concerning the association between AC chair and audit report timeliness using a unique setting. It is among the limited evidence that reports the moderating effect of AC chair characteristics on the role of such chair on audit report timeliness.

Purpose This paper aims to empirically analyse specific characteristics of an audit committee that could be associated with the likelihood of corporate fraud/scandal/sanctions. Design/methodology/approach The sample includes all firms that were investigated by the Financial Reporting Council through the audit enforcement procedure from 2014 to 2019, and two matched no-scandal firms. It uses logistic binary regression analysis to examine the hypotheses. Findings Results based on the logit regression suggest that audit member tenure and audit committee meeting frequency both have positive associations to the likelihood of corporate scandal. Complementing this result, the authors find negative but insignificant relationships amongst audit committee female chair, audit committee female members percentage, audit committee qualified accountants members, audit committee attendance, number of shares held by audit committee members, audit committee remuneration, board tenure and the likelihood of corporate scandal across the sample. Research limitations/implications The results should help regulatory policymakers make decisions, which could be crucial to future corporate governance. Additionally, these results should be useful to investors who use corporate governance as criteria for investment decisions. Originality/value The authors extend, as well as contribute to the growing literature on the audit committee, and therefore, wider corporate governance literature and provide originality in that it is the first, to the knowledge, to consider two characteristics (i.e. remuneration and gender) in a UK context of corporate scandal. Also, the results imply that the structure and diversity of the audit committee affect corporate fraud/scandal/sanctions.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recommends that firms provide MD&A disclosures quantifying the earnings effect of reasonably likely changes in critical accounting estimates (quantitative CAE). This paper examines the determinants and consequences of quantitative CAE. We find that quantitative CAE are negatively associated with management's incentives to misreport (proxied by portfolio vega) and positively associated with audit committee accounting expertise and with audit offices with multiple quantitative CAE clients. These findings hold for the presence, initiation, number, and magnitude of quantitative CAE, and for both pension and non-pension quantitative CAE. We also find that incidences of AAERs, misstatements, and small positive earnings surprises decrease after initiation of quantitative CAE. Collectively, our findings provide insight into the use of quantitative disclosure to inform users about accounting estimation uncertainty in financial reports.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse the influence of audit committee characteristics and external audit quality on the performance of non-financial public limited companies listed on the National Stock Exchange 100. Design/methodology/approach One-way random effect panel data regression was applied to 74 non-financial firms in the Nifty 100 from 2014 until 2019. The overall audit committee index and external audit index were built based on the new Indian Companies Act, 2013 and on a review of the literature to capture the impact of the new Act on firm financial performance. Findings The outcome of the study revealed that there is lack of evidence to show that audit committee characteristics improve the performance of top Indian non-financial listed firms. However, external audit quality was found to have a significant positive impact on the financial performance of firms as measured by Tobin’s Q, while firm size and leverage were found to have a significant impact on the financial performance of firms as measured by return on assets and return on equity. Practical implications This paper will be greatly beneficial for financial practitioners and policymakers because it provides practical suggestions and recommendations about the types of external audit that are indispensable for the overall effectiveness and performance of firms. The study findings may also aid strategic policy formulation and execution for better corporate governance practices for the purpose of profit and wealth maximisation. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, to date, no previous research has evaluated the effects of audit committee features and external audit quality on the financial performance of firms in India after the implementation of the new Companies Act, 2013. Hence, this study fills this void in the present literature by examining the overall features of the audit committee and external audit and their impact on firm performance in the setting of India.